『直ちに影響が無い』との言葉を発し続けた、『エダノ官房長』の言葉通り、其の放射能被害はジワリジワリと広がりを見せている。 弁護士的な言葉遣いとしての責任は問れ無いのか知らないが、５年経っても其の言葉を発し続ける事が出来るかどうか・・、今のうちから首を洗っていたほうが良いとも思うのだが・・・。
少なくても、福島県内に於ける放射線被曝の実際を『風評被害』 と言い続ける事は、早々に改めた方が良いと思う・・・。
未だ持って、ＳＰＥＥＤＩの情報を握りつぶし国民を被曝に導いた、責任を謝罪する事も無く、其の原発の事故処理も正常に（確たる証拠も無く）進んでいるように国民に説明を続ける政府と東電首脳。 例え、謝ったとしても、いや死を持って其の罪を贖ったとしても、とうてい許される事ではないと個人的には思うのだが・・ 。
民主党首脳の福一原発爆発事象に対する処置が、いかに無責任な事であったのか、徐々に明らかにされようとしている、 と同時にオソマツさも暴かれ始めている。
今日は、英語の勉強のつもりで The Economist から引用します。
＊＊＊ 以下引用 Ｔｈｅ Ｅｃｏｎｏｍｉｓｔ １／７付 ＊＊＊
http://www.economist.com/node/21542437
―The Fukushima black box―
THERE is a breathtaking serenity to the valley that winds from the town of Namie, on the coast of Fukushima prefecture, into the hills above. A narrow road runs by a river that passes through steep ravines, studded with maples. Lovely it may be, but it is the last place where you would want to see an exodus of 8,000 people fleeing meltdowns at a nearby nuclear-power plant.
Along that switchback road the day after the earthquake and tsunami on March 11th 2011, it took Namie’s residents more than three hours to drive 30km (19 miles) to what they thought was the relative safety of Tsushima, a secluded hamlet. What they did not know was that they were heading into an invisible fog of radioactive matter that has made this one of the worst radiation hotspots in Japan—far worse than the town they abandoned, just ten minutes’ drive from the gates of the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant. It was not until a New York Times report in August that many of the evacuees realised they had been exposed to such a danger, thanks to government neglect.
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Since the Three Mile Island disaster in 1979, it has become axiomatic to assume that complex systems fail in complex ways. That was broadly true of Fukushima, though often the failures appear absurdly elementary. In the most quake-prone archipelago on earth, TEPCO and its regulators had no accident-management plan in the event of earthquakes and tsunamis—assuming, apparently, that the plant was proofed against them and that any hypothetical accidents would be generated only from within.
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Crucial data estimating the dispersion of radioactive matter were not given to the prime minister’s office, so that evacuees like those from Namie were not given any advice on where to go. That is why they drove straight into the radioactive cloud.
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A privately funded foundation, headed by Yoichi Funabashi, a former editor of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper, is doing a separate investigation, based partly on the testimony of TEPCO whistle-blowers. (One, according to Mr Funabashi, says the earthquake damaged the reactors before the tsunami, a claim that officials have always rejected.) It at least promises to have literary merit. Mr Funabashi, a prominent author, draws parallels between the roots of the disaster and Japan’s failures in the second world war. They include the use of heroic front-line troops with out-of-touch superiors; rotating decision-makers too often; narrow “stovepipe” thinking; and the failure to imagine that everything could go wrong at once.
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Such reports are, after all, confidence-building exercises. They are meant to reassure the public that, by exposing failures, they will help to prevent them from being repeated. In the case of Fukushima Dai-ichi there is still plenty to be nervous about. Although the government declared on December 16th that the plant had reached a state of “cold shutdown”, much of the cooling system is jerry-rigged and probably still not earthquake-proof. On January 1st a quake temporarily caused water levels to plunge in a pool containing highly radioactive spent-fuel rods.
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＊＊＊ 以上 引用 終 ＊＊＊
注：意訳は全文下記ＵＲＬをご参照ください。
http://jbpress.ismedia.jp/articles/-/34278
