Enemy tanks were the primary target. Iraqi armor had literally nowhere to hide in the open desert; their steel hulls were painfully clear from the skies and defenseless to air attacks.
Yet as we discovered when we closed with the enemy, more than 80 percent of the enemy’s tanks and other armored vehicles had survived the air attacks. An enemy that can’t hide or defend itself can still survive sustained bombardment under near-perfect attack conditions, even in open desert.
The implications are clear: if missiles and unimpeded air power are insufficient to destroy enemy armor out in the open after forty-two days, and if men clothed in mere robes can survive on the surface of a mountain against heavy weapons, then the tens of thousands of North Korean artillery pieces, their mobile missile launchers, and hidden nuclear-missile silos would be able to withstand even the most withering and sustained attack.
Kim will most likely launch a massive artillery strike of limited duration on the South Korean capital of Seoul, causing enormous damage and killing tens of thousands of South Korean citizens—and then stop his attack and warn that if the United States doesn’t cease its attack, then North Korea will obliterate the rest of Seoul, inflicting casualties in the hundreds of thousands. The most dangerous course of action for Kim would be to detonate a nuclear bomb on Seoul or launch a nuclear missile against Japan, killing millions—and then threatening to fire more if the U.S. does not cease-fire.
The Trump administration can and should, however, communicate an unambiguous and certain promise that if North Korea were to attack any U.S. personnel, citizens, or allied nations—or if the administration discovers that North Korea was about to launch such an attack—then Kim’s forces will be met with a powerful and punitive strike out of all proportion to the attack. That is a credible and justifiable use of U.S. military power.
The objective must be to prevent war, secure the lives of American and allied citizens, and to keep sustained economic and diplomatic pressure on North Korea to eventually give up its nuclear weapons. Diplomatic engagement combined with a credible military deterrent has a reasonable chance of accomplishing that outcome. Launching a misnamed “preventive” strike will fail catastrophically.
マクマスター氏は軍事的選択肢はあるというが、しかし、イラクやアフガンの経験からして、先制攻撃は無謀だ、と。
砂漠の戦車や装甲車を爆撃しても、８０％以上はほぼ無傷だったし、山間部からの攻撃に反撃しても攻撃部隊を黙らせることはできなかったし、山間部敵陣を空爆したが、地形のおかげで爆撃に耐え、爆撃機が現場に直行し、攻撃してはじめて敵陣を破壊できた。つまり、北朝鮮でも、大砲、可動式ミサイル発射装置、核爆弾倉庫は、米軍の攻撃に耐えうるだろう、ということだ。
フセインは、米軍の攻撃に対してたいした反撃はしなかったが、北朝鮮はそんな過ちを犯すまい。ソウルに砲弾をボコボコ打ち込んだり、最悪、ソウルや日本に核爆弾を打ち込むかもしれない、と。
こうした危険に鑑みれば、先制攻撃はやめたほうがいい。北朝鮮がしかけきたら、その攻撃を、数倍にしてお返ししてやる、と脅して、抑止政策を取りながら、外交的、経済的圧力をかけて、核兵器を放棄させるようにしむけるべきだ、と。
ーーマチス氏やトランプ氏の発言をみると、政権も先制攻撃は考えてないでしょ、たぶん。
