1995年の記事なんですね。
Those who say it was necessary argue that a conventional invasion of Japan, scheduled to begin on the southernmost island of Kyushu on November 1, 1945, would have cost the lives of large numbers of Americans and Japanese alike. Much ink has been spilled over just how large these numbers would have been. Truman in later life sometimes said that he had used the atomic bomb to save the lives of half a million or even a million American boys who might have died in an island-by-island battle to the bitter end for the conquest of Japan.
Where Truman got those numbers is hard to say. In the spring of 1945, when it was clear that the final stage of the war was at hand, Truman received a letter from former President Herbert Hoover urging him to negotiate an end to the war in order to save the "500,000 to 1 million American lives" that might be lost in an invasion. But the commander of the invasion force, General Douglas MacArthur, predicted nothing on that scale. In a paper prepared for a White House strategy meeting held on June 18, a month before the first atomic bomb was tested, MacArthur estimated that he would suffer about 95,000 casualties in the first ninety days—a third of them deaths. The conflict of estimates is best explained by the fact that they were being used at the time as weapons in a larger argument. Admirals William Leahy and Ernest J. King thought that Japan could be forced to surrender by a combination of bombing and naval blockade. Naturally they inflated the number of casualties that their strategy would avoid. MacArthur and other generals, convinced that the war would have to be won on the ground, may have deliberately guessed low to avoid frightening the President.
The real question is not whether an invasion would have been a ghastly human tragedy, to which the answer is surely yes, but whether Hoover, Leahy, King, and others were right when they said that bombing and blockade would end the war.
Here the historians are on firm ground. American cryptanalysts had been reading high-level Japanese diplomatic ciphers and knew that the government in Tokyo was eagerly pressing the Russians for help in obtaining a negotiated peace. The sticking point was narrow: the Allies insisted on unconditional surrender; the Japanese peace faction wanted assurances that the imperial dynasty would remain. Truman knew this at the time.
What Truman did not know, but what has been well established by historians since, is that the peace faction in the Japanese cabinet feared the utter physical destruction of the Japanese homeland, the forced removal of the imperial dynasty, and an end to the Japanese state. After the war it was also learned that Emperor Hirohito, a shy and unprepossessing man of forty-four whose first love was marine biology, felt pressed to intervene by his horror at the bombing of Japanese cities. The devastation of Tokyo left by a single night of firebomb raids on March 9–10, 1945, in which 100,000 civilians died, had been clearly visible from the palace grounds for months thereafter. It is further known that the intervention of the Emperor at a special meeting, or gozen kaigin, on the night of August 9–10 made it possible for the government to surrender.
Questions employing the word "if" lack rigor, but it is very probable that the use of the atomic bomb only confirmed the Emperor in a decision he had already reached. What distressed him was the destruction of Japanese cities, and every night of good bombing weather brought the obliteration by fire of another city. Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and several other cities had been spared from B-29 raids and therefore offered good atomic-bomb targets. But Truman had no need to use the atomic bomb, and he did not have to invade. General Curtis LeMay had a firm timetable in mind for the 21st Bomber Command; he had told General H. H. ("Hap") Arnold, the commander in chief of the Army Air Corps, that he expected to destroy all Japanese cities before the end of the fall. Truman need only wait. Steady bombing, the disappearance of one city after another in fire storms, the death of another 100,000 Japanese civilians every week or ten days, would sooner or later have forced the cabinet, the army, and the Emperor to bear the unbearable.
While the British Bomber Command methodically burned Germany under the command of Sir Arthur Harris (called Bomber Harris in the press but Butch—short for "Butcher"—by his own men), the Americans quietly insisted that they would have no part of this slaughter but would instead attack "precision" targets with "pinpoint" bombing. But American confidence was soon eroded by daylight disasters, including the mid-1943 raid on ball-bearing factories in Schweinfurt, in which sixty-three of 230 B-17s were destroyed for only paltry results on the ground. Some Americans continued to criticize British plans for colossal city-busting raids as "baby-killing schemes," but by the end of 1943, discouraged by runs of bad weather and anxious to keep planes in the air, the commander of the American Air Corps authorized bombing "by radar"—that is, attacks on cities, which radar could find through cloud cover.
Was it right? There is an awkward, evasive cast to the internal official documents of the British and American air war of 1939–1945 that record the shift in targets from factories and power plants and the like toward people in cities. Nowhere was the belief ever baldly confessed that if we killed enough people, they would give up; but that is what was meant by the phrase "morale bombing," and in the case of Japan it worked. The mayor of Nagasaki recently compared the crime of the destruction of his city to the genocide of the Holocaust, but whereas comparisons—and especially this one—are invidious, how could the killing of 100,000 civilians in a day for a political purpose ever be considered anything but a crime?
Several things explain this. One of them is my inability to see any significant distinction between the destruction of Tokyo and the destruction of Hiroshima. If either is a crime, then surely both are.
アメリカ人識者の多くは、戦闘員と一般市民の犠牲をごったにしている。
さらに、この当時、あるいは、いまでも、南京虐殺は必要だったか、正当化できるか、などと思い悩んでいるわけです。
アメリカは戦争の反省がなく、いまだに、戦争万歳なんですから、アメリカの戦争に巻き込まれたくない、という恐怖は正当なわけです。
（歴史問題、原爆）
戦後70年で核兵器はここまで威力を増している（インフォグラフィック）
The Huffington Post UK | 執筆者： George Bowden
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投稿日: 2015年08月07日 15時24分 JS
米中が他国に原爆をもたせない理由ってのは、自分たちおはらい箱になってしまうなんだろうかね。
The Huffington Post UK | 執筆者： George Bowden
メール
投稿日: 2015年08月07日 15時24分 JS
米中が他国に原爆をもたせない理由ってのは、自分たちおはらい箱になってしまうなんだろうかね。
中曽根元首相、終戦７０年寄稿の詳報
対欧米については、帝国主義国家同士の戦争、対アジアについては、侵略戦争、というのは、その通りだろうね。
アメリカの主流のリベラルは、たぶんここまで認められる人は少ない。
日本の右翼は、軍事や歴史に関しては、アメリカのリベラルの左隣くらいに位置する。
第２次世界大戦は、帝国主義的な資源や国家、民族の在り方をめぐる戦いであり、欧米諸国との間の戦争もそのような性格を持ったものであった。
他方、アジア諸国に対しては侵略戦争でもあった。特に中国に対しては、１９１５年の「対華２１か条要求」以降、侵略性が非常に強くなった。軍部による中国国内への事変の拡大は、中国民族の感情を著しく傷つけたと言わざるを得ない。資源獲得のための東南アジア諸国への進出も、現地の人からすれば日本軍が土足で入り込んできたわけで、まぎれもない侵略行為だった。
対欧米については、帝国主義国家同士の戦争、対アジアについては、侵略戦争、というのは、その通りだろうね。
アメリカの主流のリベラルは、たぶんここまで認められる人は少ない。
日本の右翼は、軍事や歴史に関しては、アメリカのリベラルの左隣くらいに位置する。
国会で「女性、扱いにくい」発言 次世代の党議員
女性活躍推進法案を審議するために開かれた６日の参院内閣委員会で、次世代の党の江口克彦参院議員（比例）が参考人への質問の際に「女性は相手によってセクハラだとか、セクハラじゃないとか言ってくる」「女性社員は管理職になっても扱いにくいところがあると思う」などと述べた。女性への配慮を欠いた発言で、今後批判を浴びそうだ。
江口氏は終了後の取材に「自分の会社経営者としての経験を基に、男女差別やセクハラはいけないと言いたかったが、誤解される表現があったならば不徳の致すところだ」と釈明した。
あったならば、ではなく、不適切な発言をした、あるいは、少なくとも、不適切と誤解される発言があった、とはっきり認めるべき
NYTのクリストフ 過去の自分の記事らしいが、日本への原爆投下で多くの命が救われた、と。
米軍慰安婦問題は無視、一般市民を標的にした大量虐殺は正当化、それでいて、シリアへは軍事介入しろと太鼓を叩くーーーこれがアメリカの主流リベラルの立場です。
河野談話、村山談話を認める安倍ちゃんなんて、同じ基準を適用したら、良心的で、リベラル左翼にしかみえない。
Gay Rights May Come at the Cost of Religious Freedom
Anti-discrimination statutes are coming into conflict with laws designed to preserve freedom of conscience, especially in the private sector.
Andy Clark / Reuters
3.8k 900
EMMA GREEN JUL 27, 2015
同性婚が合法になっても、同性愛者の権利と、同性愛に反対する宗教の信者の宗教の自由は衝突するだろう、と。
同性婚を認めるのは、国家なり、州だが、同性愛に反対しているのは民間人だからである、と。
例えば、ユダヤ教の教会が、同性婚を挙式を行わない自由はあるだろうし、民間企業で、雇用主が、信仰上の問題で、従業員に補助金などを供与しないことはありえる、と。
従って、同性婚が合法化されても、信仰の自由と性的嗜好性の自由が衝突する場合、民間レベルで、裁判所がどのような裁定を下すかは未定である、と。
Anti-discrimination statutes are coming into conflict with laws designed to preserve freedom of conscience, especially in the private sector.
Andy Clark / Reuters
3.8k 900
EMMA GREEN JUL 27, 2015
The Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of same-sex marriage at the end of June has set the country up for two new waves of discrimination claims: those made by same-sex couples and LGBT workers, and those made by religious Americans who oppose same-sex marriage. The two may seem distinct or even opposed, but they’re actually intertwined: In certain cases, extending new rights to LBGT workers will necessarily lead to religious-freedom objections, and vice versa.
Many Americans may assume the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell will have a direct bearing on cases of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. That’s not quite right, said Andrew Koppelman, a law professor at Northwestern University. “The question of how you treat discrimination against gay people is just a different question [than] whether you allow them to marry,” he said. “Allowing them to marry is a question of what the state does. The other question is a question of how you regulate private actors and for what reason.”
A 2014 survey found that roughly 75 percent of Americans believed that federal law prohibits firing or refusing to hire someone on the basis of sexual orientation. Roughly 75 percent of Americans were wrong. Despite repeated attempts to pass the Employment Non-Discrimination Act and similar pieces of legislation in Congress, no federal protection has ever been put in place.
Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have laws covering sexual-orientation discrimination in areas like housing and employment, which means 28 states don’t have them. Last March, Utah passed a law prohibiting sexual-orientation-based discrimination, but with an important caveat: All religious organizations, including colleges, charities, and some miscellaneous organizations like the Boy Scouts are exempt.
Which leaves an open question: What about private employers who claim to have a religious objection to having gay employees? Douglas Laycock, a law professor at the University of Virginia, was skeptical that these kinds of claims could make it very far in court—or that they’d even come up that often. “When you say, I can’t have any gay person working in my [business], and it’s against my religion, judges are going to be skeptical that that’s a religious belief,” he said. “Non-discrimination laws serve a compelling interest.”
“I do anticipate the kinds of claims,” said Douglas NeJaime, a law professor at UCLA. “The kind of claim that you saw in Hobby Lobby—you could see similar kinds of claims in the same-sex marriage context: The employer objects to providing benefits to the same-sex spouse, claiming that it makes the employer complicit in the sinful conduct it objects to.”
Photographers, florists, and bakers all have two things in common: They all get mad business from weddings, and they all have colleagues who have refused to provide services at a same-sex marriage ceremony because of religious objections. A number of cases over the past several years have asked whether these private business owners should be required by law to serve at these weddings, and some courts have definitively answered: Yes. The husband-and-wife duo who owned Sweet Cakes bakery in Oregon was fined $135,000 this summer for turning away a lesbian couple.
“The pastor protection acts are purely symbolic politics for the following reason: The government cannot discriminate ... when recognizing marriage, but certainly my rabbi can,” said Mark Graber, a law professor at the University of Maryland. “My rabbi had that right before Obergefell, and my rabbi has that right afterwards. My rabbi, by the First Amendment, only has to perform religious marriages that my rabbi believes are sanctified by Jewish law.”
同性婚が合法になっても、同性愛者の権利と、同性愛に反対する宗教の信者の宗教の自由は衝突するだろう、と。
同性婚を認めるのは、国家なり、州だが、同性愛に反対しているのは民間人だからである、と。
例えば、ユダヤ教の教会が、同性婚を挙式を行わない自由はあるだろうし、民間企業で、雇用主が、信仰上の問題で、従業員に補助金などを供与しないことはありえる、と。
従って、同性婚が合法化されても、信仰の自由と性的嗜好性の自由が衝突する場合、民間レベルで、裁判所がどのような裁定を下すかは未定である、と。
ドイツ陥落のさいのソ連軍による大量強姦について告発した本がロシアの検閲にひっかかって、発禁本になった、と。
欧州における米軍のレイプ、また、アジアでの米軍のための性奴隷制度についてもぼちぼち光をあてるべきだ。
Denying historical facts is wrong, whether they concern the Holocaust or Red Army atrocities
歴史的事実を否定するのは、それがホロコーストだろうが赤軍だろうが、間違っている、と。
同じように、
Pretend that historical facts did not happen is wrong, whether they concern Sex Slavery for Japanese military or Sex Slavery for the U.S. military.
日本軍のための性奴隷だろうが、米軍のための性奴隷が、それが、なかったのようにふるまうのは間違っている。
ファクラー記者や、その米人ブロガーたちは、私のブログの影響が少ないと思って、米軍の罪については押し黙っているが、歴史が彼らに微笑むかどうか？
（sex slaves)
だって、そもそも、NYTなどが事実を伝えないから、アメリカ人の多くは、神についても、歴史についても、事実ではなく、MYTHを信じているのであるから、神話に基づいた回答がくるだけだろう。
これでは、歴史ついて反省はできまいーーー茶番である。
過半数のアメリカ人は広島は正当化できる、と。
ナショナリスト記者ファクラーやその協力をしている米メディアの日本人記者たちのおかげで、米国は、いまだに、歴史に直面していない。
安倍が日本の過去の罪についてあいまいにしたところどころの比ではないのである。
彼らは、洗浄されたアメリカしか、国民に伝えていないのである。
記事
マガジン92015年08月05日 12:09一水会「脱右翼宣言」と、これからのこと-鈴木邦男
へええ、ガード下かなにかの壁のビラ、そして、選挙のときの政権放送でおなじみのあの人がねえ。
マガジン92015年08月05日 12:09一水会「脱右翼宣言」と、これからのこと-鈴木邦男
このかなり前だが、愛国党の赤尾敏さんは、「日の丸、君が代は大人が大事にして見せたら、子どもはそれを見て、ならう」と言っていた。
へええ、ガード下かなにかの壁のビラ、そして、選挙のときの政権放送でおなじみのあの人がねえ。
The Bomb Didn’t Beat Japan… Stalin Did
Have 70 years of nuclear policy been based on a lie?
BY WARD WILSONMAY 30, 2013
Have 70 years of nuclear policy been based on a lie?
BY WARD WILSONMAY 30, 2013
Based on timing alone, Nagasaki can’t have been what motivated them.
Hiroshima isn’t a very good candidate either. It came 74 hours — more than three days — earlier.
Scale
Historically, the use of the Bomb may seem like the most important discrete event of the war. From the contemporary Japanese perspective, however, it might not have been so easy to distinguish the Bomb from other events. It is, after all, difficult to distinguish a single drop of rain in the midst of a hurricane.
In the summer of 1945, the U.S. Army Air Force carried out one of the most intense campaigns of city destruction in the history of the world. Sixty-eight cities in Japan were attacked and all of them were either partially or completely destroyed. An estimated 1.7 million people were made homeless, 300,000 were killed, and 750,000 were wounded. Sixty-six of these raids were carried out with conventional bombs, two with atomic bombs. The destruction caused by conventional attacks was huge. Night after night, all summer long, cities would go up in smoke. In the midst of this cascade of destruction, it would not be surprising if this or that individual attack failed to make much of an impression — even if it was carried out with a remarkable new type of weapon.
We often imagine, because of the way the story is told, that the bombing of Hiroshima was far worse. We imagine that the number of people killed was off the charts. But if you graph the number of people killed in all 68 cities bombed in the summer of 1945, you find that Hiroshima was second in terms of civilian deaths. If you chart the number of square miles destroyed, you find that Hiroshima was fourth. If you chart the percentage of the city destroyed, Hiroshima was 17th. Hiroshima was clearly within the parameters of the conventional attacks carried out that summer.
If the Japanese were not concerned with city bombing in general or the atomic bombing of Hiroshima in particular, what were they concerned with? The answer
is simple: the Soviet Union.
これが2013年の記事である。
日本を打ち負かしたのは、原爆ではなくスターリンである、という説得的な議論である。
仮に議論に賛成しなくても、議論の存在に言及できない記者たちは無知としかいいようがない。
（歴史問題）
