Freedom in the World 2018
Democracy in Crisis
The Economist
After decades of triumph, democracy is losing ground
What is behind the reversal?
Jun 14th 2018 | BUDAPEST, DIYARBAKIR, KUALA LUMPUR, LUSAKA AND MANAGUA
これは面白い記事だね。
This distinction is important. In “The People v Democracy”, Yascha Mounk of Harvard University stresses that liberalism and democracy are separable. Voters often want things that are democratic but not liberal, in the most basic sense, which has nothing to do with left- or right-wing policies. For example, they may elect a government that promises to censor speech they dislike, or back a referendum that would curtail the rights of an unpopular minority.
At the same time, plenty of liberal institutions are undemocratic. Unelected judges can often overrule elected politicians, for example. Liberals see this as an essential constraint on the government’s power. Even the people’s chosen representatives must be subject to the law. In a liberal democracy, power is dispersed. Politicians are not only accountable to voters but also kept in line by feisty courts, journalists and pressure groups. A loyal opposition recognises the government as legitimate, but decries many of its actions and seeks to replace it at the next election. A clear boundary exists between the ruling party and the state.
This system is now under siege. In many countries, voters are picking leaders who do not respect it, and gradually undermine it, creating what Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister, proudly calls “illiberal democracy”.
Eventually, when enough checks and balances have been removed, a would-be autocrat finds it easier to neuter democracy itself, by shutting down the opposition (as in Turkey) or neutering the legislature (as in Venezuela, where the government staged a sham election on May 20th).
The mature democracies of the West are not yet in serious danger. Donald Trump may scorn liberal norms, but America’s checks and balances are strong, and will outlast him. The real threat is to less mature democracies, where institutions are weaker and democratic habits less ingrained.
Meanwhile, China supplies an alternative model. Having grown much less dictatorial after the death of Mao Zedong, it is reconcentrating power in one man, Xi Jinping, whose term limits as president have just been removed. Some would-be autocrats cite China as evidence that authoritarianism promotes economic growth
To oversimplify, a democracy typically declines like this. First, a crisis occurs and voters back a charismatic leader who promises to save them. Second, this leader finds enemies. His aim, in the words of H.L. Mencken, a 20th-century American wit, “is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary.” Third, he nobbles independent institutions that might get in his way. Finally, he changes the rules to make it harder for voters to dislodge him. During the first three stages, his country is still a democracy. At some point in the final stage, it ceases to be one. All four stages are worth examining.
Would-be autocrats need a positive agenda, too. Often they pose as defenders of an identity that voters hold dear, such as their nationality, culture or religion. Poland’s ruling party, for example, waxes lyrical about the country’s Catholic way of life, and lavishes subsidies on big families, who are likely to be rural and religious.
Parties of the nationalist right have learned from the left how to exploit identity politics. Both sides tend to favour “group rights” over those of individuals. The “Hungarian nation is not a simple sum of individuals,” Mr Orban said in 2014, “but a community that needs to be organised, strengthened and developed.” Steve Bannon, Donald Trump’s nationalist guru, calls him “a hero”.
Autocrats who plan to stay in power for ever need to indoctrinate children. “Most countries don’t have events from two years ago in their school history books. We do,” says a Turkish liberal, aghast that Turks as young as four are taught that their president saved the nation from the Gulenists. Venezuela’s Bolivarian University offers free tuition to students who submit to lectures blaming America for food shortages
And in the long run, it seems to deliver better material results. A study by Daron Acemoglu of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology found that switching from autocracy to democracy adds 20% to income per head over 30 years, though some economists dispute these findings. Guillermo Vuletin of the World Bank argues that autocrats fall when economies slump, and the democrats who succeed them take credit for the inevitable recovery.
What is certain, however, is that freely elected governments bound by the rule of law have less power to abuse citizens.
まず、自由主義と民主主義は別物なんだ、と。
選挙民は、民主的であってほしいけど、自由は欲しない、という場合もある、と。例えば、自分たちが欲しない言論について、その自由を政府に検閲してもらいたがったり、少数者の権利・自由を制限する国民投票を支持することはある。
自由主義社会における機関には民主的でないものもある。例えば、裁判官は民主的に選ばれるわけではないが、民主的選ばれた政治家の決めたことを覆すこともある。自由民主主義社会において、権力は分散される。政治家は、選挙民だけでなく、裁判所や、メディア、圧力団体に対しても説明責任を負う。野党も政権は正当だとは認めるものの、政権を批判し、次期選挙では政権交代をしようとしている。支配的与党と国家の間には明確な区別があるんだ、と。
ところが、こうしたシステムが弱体化している。多くに国では、選挙民は自由民主主義を尊重しない指導者を選び、非自由主義的民主主義国家ができている、と。
アメリカのような成熟した民主主義国家の場合、権力の集中・専制を防ぐ、抑制と均衡が効いているから大丈夫だが、民主主義が成熟していない国が独裁者にやられる危険がある。
その段階として、
１）危機が発生し、選挙民は、危機を回収すると約束する政治家を支持
例えば、金融危機や大量の難民の流入
２）敵を設定、また、耳に心地良い政策を掲げる
例えば、選挙権をもたない移民や、麻薬密売人、貪欲な資本家
例えば、国、伝統を、宗教を守るなど
３）邪魔になる独立機関を味方に引きずりこむ、あるいは、引きずり落とす
例えば、警察、軍隊は味方につけ、自分に反対する裁判官、ジャーナリストたちは引きずり落とす。
若い衆の自分の都合のいいように教育する
４）選挙民が自分を追い出せないような制度に改変する
中国のように独裁政権でも、経済成長していければそれでいいじゃないか、とも思えるが、しかし、独裁から民主政に代わると、一人あたりの収入が２０％増える、という研究もあるし、なによりも、法の支配を採用する民主国家は、住民をひどくあつかう権力が制限されている分安心できるのである、と。
