NYT
The Opinion Pages | OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
Don't Arm Ukraine
By JOHN J. MEARSHEIMERFEB. 8, 2015
Going down that road would be a huge mistake for the United States, NATO and Ukraine itself. Sending weapons to Ukraine will not rescue its army and will instead lead to an escalation in the fighting. Such a step is especially dangerous because Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons and is seeking to defend a vital strategic interest.
To save Ukraine and eventually restore a working relationship with Moscow, the West should seek to make Ukraine a neutral buffer state between Russia and NATO. It should look like Austria during the Cold War. Toward that end, the West should explicitly take European Union and NATO expansion off the table, and emphasize that its goal is a nonaligned Ukraine that does not threaten Russia. The United States and its allies should also work with Mr. Putin to rescue Ukraine’s economy, a goal that is clearly in everyone’s interest.
It is essential that Russia help end the fighting in eastern Ukraine and that Kiev regain control over that region. Still, the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk should be given substantial autonomy, and protection for Russian language rights should be a top priority.
Crimea, a casualty of the West’s attempt to march NATO and the European Union up to Russia’s doorstep, is surely lost for good. It is time to end that imprudent policy before more damage is done — to Ukraine and to relations between Russia and the West.
ミアシャイマー
ウクライナはロシアにとって必須の国益であるから、武器供与してもエスカレートするだけ。武器供与するな。ウクライナはどことも同盟を組まない緩衝地域にして、アメリカ、ロシアが協力して、ウクライナの経済を持ち直せ。クリミアは諦めろ。ドネスク、ルハンスクには、実質的な自治権とロシア語を使う権利を与えろ。
WAPO
Why Ukraine cannot be a buffer state
Arming Ukraine might not be a good idea, but making Ukraine a buffer state between Russia and the West is an impossible idea.
via mozu
The Ukrainians will not accept anything that looks like “economic neutrality,” and the Russians will not accept a Ukraine with closer economic ties to Europe.Other than that, Mearsheimer’s proposed compromise looks peachy.
The point of the war is not to achieve a victory. The point is to prevent the emergence of anything resembling a prosperous, European Ukraine, because such a state would pose an ideological threat to Putinism. Following this logic, even a German-brokered cease-fire will not bring “peace,” but rather a so-called frozen conflict.
ミアシャイマーの案をウクライナもロシアも受けいれんだろう。ロシアを甘くみている。ロシアは経済的な中立なウクライナなど望んでいない。西欧流の繁栄したウクライナをプーチンは認めず、停戦しても、凍りついた紛争が残るだけ。
National Interest
Here's Why Arming Ukraine Would Be a Disaster
Arming a foreign military with weapons it doesn't know how to use is the stuff quagmires are made of...
James Carden
February 10, 2015
The argument goes something like this: every time Kiev’s forces have been on the verge of victory over the separatist forces, Russia has stepped in, escalated and turned the tide in favor of the rebels. We see this happening right now in the battle taking place in and around the Debaltseve junction in eastern Ukraine. We may well see something similar occur in and around Mariupol. If the West, so the argument goes, would just provide Kiev with the armaments it needs, then Kiev would have a better chance at securing a victory over the rebels. After all, if the Russians can supply their clients, why can’t we supply ours?
Besides the fact that such a program of proxy-supply rarely works, and when it has, has usually come back to haunt us (see under: bin Laden, Osama), the idea that Kiev would emerge victorious if only we act as its principal arms supplier is fallacious simply because there is nothing that we could provide them with that Russia, in turn, couldn't and more to the point, wouldn’t, supply the rebels. It would simply mean a net increase in armaments on both sides, which would almost certainly result in more and more civilian deaths. The simple fact of the matter is that Russia is so situated geographically that it has an overwhelming advantage over NATO in the region.
Further, even if the president went along with the McCain plan, and the United States did supply military aid to Kiev, are we so sure that their troops are equipped with the proper training to use these weapons? Doubtful. And if the United States then has to send in military advisers to train the Ukrainian troops, what happens if one of them gets killed by Russian forces? Is McCain willing to risk a shooting war—or possibly a nuclear war—with Russia over the fate of the Donbas? It would seem so.
Another objection to arming Kiev is the nature of the regime to which we are propping up. The government in Ukraine is still wondrously corrupt.
キエフが勝ちそうになるとロシアが加担して反転攻勢されてしまうのだから、アメリカが加担してやればえやないか、というが、武器供与してビンラディンのような怪物を生んだのも記憶に新しいし、アメリカが供与できるものは、ロシアも供与できるから、紛争がエスカレートして市民の犠牲者が増えるだけ、また、ロシアは地理的に有利だし、キエフの兵隊は武器の使い方を知らないから、アメリカの教習が必要で、仮にアメリカ人参与がウクライナで戦闘で犠牲になったら、米ロ戦争になるかもしれんし、そもそも、キエフ軍の兵隊のなり手が圧倒的に少ないんよ、さらに、キエフ政府は、腐敗している。ロシアにとって重要だから必死。こんな状態で武器提供したら惨憺たるものになるでええ。
National Interest
The Real Solution to the Ukraine Crisis (And It Doesn't Involve Arms)
Raymond Smith
February 11, 2015
アメリカの国益にならんから、武器提供すな、というのだが、議論の過程が、理論的、演繹的で興味深い。
核心的な国益の定義から入るんですね。
Vital national interests are usually defined as those you are prepared to go to war to defend. In democratic societies, partisan politics ought to be about defining means and objectives within a framework of common understanding about American vital interests, but in contemporary U.S. politics, that is not necessarily the case. For a couple of centuries, Britain had a powerful, clear-eyed, fundamentally simple definition of its vital national interests that transcended party interests: 1) prevent the emergence of any dominant land power on the European continent; 2) obtain and maintain British naval dominance. I suggest that America’s vital national interests can also be succinctly defined: 1) prevent an attack on the homeland; 2) enhance the stability of the international system; 3) fulfill our security-alliance commitments. The first of these is presumably clear enough in principle; the second and third perhaps less so. We want to maintain the stability of the international system, because we are the most powerful state in it and its structure is advantageous to us. If we are perceived as unwilling or unable to maintain our security-alliance commitments, that will have a profoundly destabilizing effect on the international system.
There are some high-level objectives that flow from this definition of our national interests. One of the most significant is to encourage the spread of our political and social values, since an international system whose participants generally accept those values is not one likely to threaten our vital interests. The reality of the world today, however, is that an injudicious pursuit of that objective can produce conditions that threaten, rather than advance, our fundamental interests. So we deal with, rather than oppose, authoritarian regimes of varying kinds in all parts of the world. In some cases, we do it because we believe that to do otherwise would increase the instability of the system. In other cases, we do it because we are not prepared to employ the resources (means) necessary to effect fundamental change. We deal with the Saudi monarchy and the Egyptian military because our security interests trump our human-rights objectives, and because we are not prepared either to employ the means or incur the risks necessary to replace them.
We need to step back from this. There is a better way. Ukraine could be a bridge between the West and Russia, rather than a prize to be fought over. Ukraine must negotiate a relationship with Russia that both countries can live with. There is no reason that cannot include an economic relationship with the European Union that encourages desperately needed reform within Ukraine, while at the same time promoting trilateral economic ties beneficial to all three parties. The EU leadership can help with this. If we have no vital interests in Ukraine, European countries do have vital interests in not seeing a large-scale ground war break out on their continent.
イギリスにとっての核心的国益とは、
1)大陸に巨大な
支配勢力を形成させないこと。
2)イギリスの海洋における優位を維持すること
アメリカにとっては、
1)母国へ攻撃を許さないこと
2)アメリカに有利にできている現状の国際システムの安定を維持・促進すること
3)同盟国との安全保障の責任を果たすことーーーそうしないと2)の国際システムが不安定になる
民主主義や人権保護を推進すれば、このアメリカ流の国際システムを危険におとしていれることになるので、民主主義や人権を世界に広めるにこしたことはないが、無理をすると、アメリカの根底的国益をそこねる場合がある。例えば、サウジアラビアなど、民主主義の観点からも人権の観点からも問題があるが、しかし、安全保障上のアメリカの利益のほうが優先するので、放置しているわけですね。
ここらへん、正直ですね。
で、結局、ウクライナはアメリカにとって核心的利益ではなく、ロシアにとっては核心的利益。だから、武器供与するな、と。
そこで、ウクライナは、ロシアと交渉して、経済的にはEUと協力できる仕組みを構築することもできるはずだ、と。大陸で、ドンパチやられては困るだろうから、欧州も協力するだろう、と。