韓国とアメリカが｢衝突｣する日が迫っている
トランプ大統領の突飛な行動がリスク要因に
This means that the U.S. decision-makers, increasingly disappointed by Pyongyang’s unwillingness to deliver (and unwilling to make concessions themselves), are likely to eventually switch to the ‘fire and fury’ mood, resuming the maximum pressure policy. This is a frightening perspective for Seoul: the second edition of ‘maximum pressure’ will hardly deliver progress on the denuclearization front, but it will surely increase the likelihood of military confrontation, with South Korea positioned to suffer the most damage.
Indeed, from Seoul’s point of view, the immediate – and significant – threat to the ROK’s security comes nowadays not from North Korea, but from the United States. North Koreans might invade eventually, but this is not going to happen any time soon, while a U.S.-initiated military operation could result in the annihilation of Seoul’s downtown virtually next year. This new security threat determines the Moon administration’s behavior.
It is true that President Moon does not want a crisis in his country’s relations with the U.S., and is willing to make significant concessions just to eliminate all possible sources of petty tensions. However, objectively speaking, North Korean and the United States might be on a collision course right now. This reflects the objective gap between the national interests of two allied countries when it comes to dealing with North Korea.
For the U.S. top leaders, North Korea’s nuclear and missile program is, essentially, the only major reason why they should pay much attention to North Korea – otherwise a small and insignificant country far away. North Korea is about to become the third country in the world capable of obliterating any American downtown (after Russia and China), and there is little wonder that the U.S. leaders and public are not happy about it. Therefore, U.S. policy towards North Korea is almost completely centered on the nuclear issue.
For South Korea, the nukes are merely one of many problems created by the existence of ‘another Korea’ nearby – and not necessarily the most burning one. While in the long run, the North Korean nuclear and missile systems can be used to subdue or even conquer the South, the probability of this scenario is relatively small and it is clearly not something which is likely to happen in the near future.
Therefore, South Korea feels much less threatened by the North Korean nuclear program than one would expect. For South Korea, the major goal is to handle the North, to maintain peace, stability, and the status quo – while also paying lip service to the peaceful unification, denuclearization, and other wonderful (but hardly possible) things. If one has to overlook the North Korean nuclear program in order to maintain the status quo, then this is seen in Seoul as an acceptable price to pay.
Such a gap in perceptions and interests has existed since long ago, but under the stewardship of Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in, the old contradictions became more pronounced.
Donald Trump has made North Korea one of his major foreign policy agenda issues. Last year, at the heyday of the ‘maximum pressure policy,’ he frequently hinted at his willingness to use military force if North Korea would not accept his demand for denuclearization.
Given Donald Trump’s reputation, he was widely seen as a person who really could make good on these threats, ignoring the fact that any military strike against North Korea would likely provoke a counter-strike against greater Seoul.
This means that the U.S. decision-makers, increasingly disappointed by Pyongyang’s unwillingness to deliver (and unwilling to make concessions themselves),are likely to eventually switch to the ‘fire and fury’ mood, resuming the maximum pressure policy. This is a frightening perspective for Seoul: the second edition of ‘maximum pressure’ will hardly deliver progress on the denuclearization front, but it will surely increase the likelihood of military confrontation, with South Korea positioned to suffer the most damage.
Indeed, from Seoul’s point of view, the immediate – and significant – threat to the ROK’s security comes nowadays not from North Korea, but from the United States. North Koreans might invade eventually, but this is not going to happen any time soon, while a U.S.-initiated military operation could result in the annihilation of Seoul’s downtown virtually next year. This new security threat determines the Moon administration’s behavior.
However, the UN-approved sanctions regime makes nearly all economic interaction with North Korea impossible. Therefore, in order to realize the ambitious plans of Moon Jae-in and his people, the existing sanctions should be softened – ideally, rolled back to the level of 2016, before the introduction of sectoral sanctions.
This policy change, however, is actively opposed by the U.S., and this is vital, since the U.S. representatives can veto any change in the UN-endorsed sanctions regime. The U.S.’s unwillingness to open way to this much-coveted economic cooperation creates another potential source of unease in Seoul.
The background of President Moon and his advisors also influences their attitude towards U.S. and North Korea. These people are members of the ‘386 generation,’ the former student activists from the late 1980s, from the days when a peculiar mix of revolutionary Marxism and Korean nationalism dominated campus politics.
As time went by, their suspicions about the U.S. have subdued while their sympathy for the North Korean model diminished or disappeared completely, but some vestiges of their useful radicalism are still palpable. All things equal, these people tend to see the U.S. with more suspicion than their predecessors from the conservative administrations of the 2008-2017 period. Such ideology-driven tendencies are often grossly exaggerated by their right-wing opponents, but they exist nonetheless.
So, the fear of the coming confrontation between Washington and Seoul – common among policy planners – is well-founded. This confrontation might have been aggravated by the ideological differences and personal traits of the two countries’ leaders, but it is largely determined by the divergence of U.S. and ROK strategic interests.
アメリカにとって、北朝鮮の非核化は本気
トランプは落とし前はつけてもらうタイプ
このままだと、圧力維持・強化から、軍事行動への道もあり得る。
他方、韓国にとって、非核化より半島の当面の安定が大事。また、文在寅は反米世代で、米に懐疑的
米韓関係の雲行きが悪くなるかも、と。
これが、ZakZakじゃなくて、ランコフ氏の記事というところがミソ。
もしかして ♪ もしかして ♫ (^_-)
