China Might Cause a Nuclear Domino in Asia 中国の軍拡でアジア核武装ドミノ

N. Korea Won’t Cause a Nuclear Domino in Asia (But China Might)
If there is a nuclear arms race in Asia, China’s conventional military power will be to blame.

zachary-keck_q
By Zachary Keck
May 31, 2014

via mozu

North Korea would be particularly unlikely to break this taboo by launching a nuclear attack against South Korea or Japan. To begin with, it will have an extremely small nuclear arsenal given its financial constraints. Moreover, it will also have little in the way of early warning capabilities. This is important because attacking Seoul or Tokyo with nuclear weapons would almost certainly invite a retaliatory nuclear strike from the U.S. And, given the small size of its nuclear arsenal and its inability to detect incoming U.S. nuclear missiles, its entire nuclear arsenal would be wiped out in a U.S. first strike. At that point, it would be defenseless against a conventional attack aimed at overthrowing the regime, which Washington would have every reason to carry out should Pyongyang break the nuclear taboo.

South Korea and Japan understand all this and therefore would not endure the enormous costs (especially to their international reputations, alliances with the U.S., and relations with China) inherent in acquiring a nuclear weapon. An isolated state like North Korea can endure massive international sanctions. Nations with economies highly integrated in the global economy ― such as South Korea and Japan ― cannot afford to be cut off from the outside world. That’s why South Korea is investing in conventional capabilities that would allow it to deal with North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.

Although North Korea is unlikely to precipitate a nuclear arms race in Asia, China’s growing military capabilities and assertive diplomatic posture very well might. Indeed, just as history has demonstrated that states don’t need nuclear arsenals to deter rivals from attacking them with nuclear weapons, it has also demonstrated that nuclear weapons are extremely effective in deterring conventional military attacks. Thus, states that face rivals with overwhelming conventional military power have a strong incentive to acquire nuclear weapons to negate their rivals’ conventional superiority.



Thus, if current trends in the Sino-Japanese conventional balance continue, going nuclear will be an increasingly attractive option for Tokyo, particularly if it loses faith in America’s willingness or ability to defend it.

　違う論者によって同趣旨の記事があったね。


　北朝鮮の核は怖くない、北が核兵器を最初に使ったら、仕返しにアメリカが北を核兵器でぶったおすし、その後、政権撲滅のため、通常兵器による攻撃を北に仕掛けるが、北は耐えられないから、北は核を先手に使うことはない。

　核兵器を使わせないために核兵器は必要とは限らないが、しかし、核兵器というのは、通常兵器からの攻撃を未然に防ぐには有効である。したがって、仮に中国がこのまま軍備増強して、日本がアメリカからの防衛では十分でないと感じたとき、日本は核武装に踏み出すだろう、と。