suzukyさんがリツイート
kazukazu88
@kazukazu881
ここらへん、イギリス通じゃないと、なんだか、よくわからんね。
suzuky
@suzuky
kazukazu88
@kazukazu881
11 時間11 時間前
その他
ブレイディさん、英国の政治についての事実誤認が多い。「ブレグジットは労働者階級の反乱でした」と言って、その例として出してくるのがロンドンとブライトンの労働者って椅子から崩れ落ちそうになる。そして、ブレグジットに投票した層が総選挙でコービン労働党に投票したのも事実として違う
ここらへん、イギリス通じゃないと、なんだか、よくわからんね。
suzuky
@suzuky
だって政治学を勉強したことない人なんだもの。あの本の価値は現場インタビューであって、分析はNG。
4:59 - 2018年5月10日
政治学どれくらい勉強するとどうなるのかね？
最近わかったのは、政治学の教授でもかなりテキトーなひとが多い、ということ。
kazukazu88
@kazukazu881
単純な事実として、コービン労働党の「躍進」と言われる2017年の選挙では、労働者階級の票は伸ばしたのではなく、５％も落とした。おかげで、労働者階級だけの票のシェアでは、メイの保守党の方がコービン労働党よりも大きい。
このABとかC１とかC２とかいうのは、
階級をあわしているわけだね。
kazukazu88
@kazukazu881
フォローする @kazukazu881をフォローします
その他
こういう投票結果になったのは、Brexitの影響が多くて、残留派が主に労働党に流れ、Brexit支持者が主に保守党に流れたから。
The Conservatives' position on Brexit, coupled with the absence of Nigel Farage, saw the UKIP vote collapse and the majority of its support go to the Tories.
More than half of UKIP's 2015 voters who voted again in 2017 switched to the Conservatives, compared with only 18% to Labour and a further 18% who stayed loyal.
Despite uncertainty over its position on the single market, Labour was seen as the best bet by those wanting to keep closer ties with Europe.
残留派は、労働党に、離脱派は、UKIP党支持者が、ナイジェル・ファラージなきUKIP党から、保守党に流れたわけだね。
kazukazu88
@kazukazu881
結果として、都市部・大学都市でコービン労働党が流れ、地方では主に保守党が伸ばした。なので、Brexitは保守党の緊縮政策に対する労働者の反乱で、Brexitに投票した人々はコービンに流れたというのは事実とむしろ逆。地方の労働者は保守党に流れ、都市部の高学歴高中流層がコービン労働党に流れた。
都市部、高学歴が労働党に、ってのはそうなんだろうね。
離脱派はどっちかというと保守党へ。
ただ、「Brexitは保守党の緊縮政策に対する労働者の反乱」という見解は、
Problems ignored
There are of course important issues around working-class disaffection, leading many Labour “heartlands” to reject the party’s recommendation to remain. Jeremy Corbyn’s hesitant leadership of the party is an issue here: most Labour voters actually appeared not to know where the party stood on the referendum.
But there are clearly much larger problems within working-class communities which manifest on this occasion as anxiety about immigration. The question is not really whether these groups knew what Labour’s position was, but rather whether they cared.
The EU referendum debate largely ignored them. It was conducted among elites—just as the decision to hold it made by the prime minister, David Cameron, was based solely on the hope of curbing discontent within his own party.
It was not much more than a year ago. The result of the EU referendum was still being pored over, and the political moment seemed to be all about two things: a view of much of the leave vote as a cry of pain and resentment from parts of the country beyond London, and the urgent need to do something. ｖ
Even if the prime minister has failed to make good on her promises of a rebalanced country, the Brexit moment embodies one aspect of her vision: the fact that, for the first time in decades, people and places that were long overlooked – sneered at, even – now sit at the core of our national politics. Though the Labour party’s acceptance of Brexit and its failure to come up with much of an alternative might seem maddening, its position on the EU is not just down to the Eurosceptic instincts of Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell. Clearly, it is also locked into its position by the fact that most of the constituencies it holds – seven out of 10, according to credible estimates – voted to leave Europe, and the assumption that a critical number of the people who live in them are still of the opinion that Brexit has to happen, no matter what.
Brexit:
Causes & Consequences
By Matthew J. Goodwin
Local jurisdictions with large numbers of pensioners and a history of voting for UKIP recorded very high turnouts and Leave shares. This was particularly so in parts of eastern England with large numbers of left behind voters. Brexit also attracted majority support in approximately 70% of Labour-held seats, winning especially strong backing in poorer northern postindustrial areas. At the other end of the spectrum stood London, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and the university towns, such as Oxford and Cambridge. Of the 50 local jurisdictions where the vote to remain in the EU was strongest, only 11 were not in London or Scotland, and most were areas with large universities. In a country that was now divided on unfamiliar lines, London — home to the political, business, and media elite — was profoundly at odds with the country that it had come to dominate and overshadow. London wholeheartedly embraced Europe, even as most of England emphatically rejected it.
Who voted for Brexit? How the EU referendum divided generations and social classes
Statistics from YouGov and Lord Ashcroft have shown which way people of varying class, age, ethnicity and religion all voted
SHARE
COMMENTS
ByBen GlazeDeputy Political Editor
19:52, 24 JUN 2016
The rich and middle-classes were more pro-EU.
The AB group backed Remain by 57% to 43%, while the poorer C2DE category was almost two-thirds in favour of quitting, voting Out by 64% to 36%, according to Lord Ashcroft .
Traditional working class voters in South Wales, the Midlands and across northern towns revolted against Labour’s pleas for Remain.
めずらしい見解ではないみたいだね。
イギリスのことはようわからんけどね、素人にはね。
更新
THERE are many theories about why Britons voted last June to leave the European Union. They include hostility to immigration, dislike of Brussels bureaucrats, worries about sovereignty, an anti-elite mood, the discontent of those left behind by globalisation, a long history of Euroscepticism and a stridently anti-EU press. Yet analysis of hard survey data is rare. The great virtue of “Brexit:
Using data as opposed to hunches yields interesting results, even if many confirm conventional wisdom. One concerns who mostly voted for Brexit. The answer is old people, non-graduates and those from lower social grades. Although members of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), founded to take Britain out, tend to be male, there was no gender bias. Nor were Brexit voters necessarily poor: many were in the home counties and south as well as the less well-off north and east.
A second is the importance of immigration. When David Cameron promised a referendum in his speech at Bloomberg in January 2013, he made no reference to this. Even many Tories who, unlike Mr Cameron, campaigned for Brexit stressed regaining sovereignty, not reducing the numbers coming into the country. But the authors put more credence on the goal of Nigel Farage, UKIP’s then leader: to make people see migration and Europe as the same.
Indeed, a third conclusion is the central role of UKIP and Mr Farage. It was the rise of UKIP, more than his own restive backbenchers, that drove Mr Cameron to offer the referendum. And far from causing damage, splits within the Leave campaign may even have helped. Mr Farage could appeal to those once dismissed by Mr Cameron as “fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists”, while Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, two leading Tory Brexiteers, could win over the more globally minded.
素人の見解も、”専門家”や”通”の見解も鵜呑みにしないのが一番大事みたいですね。
