Are China and Japan Heading Toward Conflict?
What To Do About Tensions in Asia
via mozu
さらっと。
GREEN:Stepping back one level, does that mean that there's going to be a war? I'd say extremely low probability, even if there is an accident or something like that,
日中戦争はあるか、緊張は高まっているし、事故はありえないわけではないが、戦争が起きる可能性はは低い、と。
そうだろうね。
EIKENBERRY: It does, yes. Japan's concerns right now -- they have one concern with -- as we all do -- with the Korean peninsula and with North Korean threat, but I think their deeper long-term concern is the rise of China and the rise of China's military capabilities behind that.
日本の懸案は、朝鮮半島であり、より長期的には中国の台頭であろう、と。
私見では、朝鮮半島には巻き込まれるな、ということであり、中国の軍事的台頭は、対抗していく必要がある。
GREEN:
We don't have a joint and combined alliance with the Japanese the way we do with NATO or with Korea. The Japanese didn't want it. And for decades, it was the Japanese that worried about being entrapped in our war in Vietnam or in China and Korea. And now, you know, for about the past decade, we've started worrying a little bit about maybe being entrapped in their war for the first time.
The answer is to move towards more jointness, more joint exercises, more concept of operations, so that we're inside the Japanese decision-making loops and we're making decisions together and we're dissuading China. The worst thing we could do is to step back and sort of leave it to the Japanese to sort out or to somehow broker, which would only encourage Japanese hedging, which is unhelpful, and Chinese hopes that perhaps there's a way to drive a wedge between us.
朝鮮戦争やベトナム戦争のときには、日本のほうが巻き込まれたくなかったわけでであるが、今度はアメリカが日中の紛争に巻き込まれることに懸念している。やるべきことは、日本と協調して、決定の過程に加わっていくことで、傍観していているだけなら、中国の思う壺にはまってしまう、と。
ーーーそうでしょうね。
EIKENBERRY:
Now, the tough part about this for us is that we do have an alliance with Japan, and that alliance specifically covers the Senkakus and Diaoyu. And if, according to the treaty, that if the Japanese are attacked in the Senkaku-Diaoyu, then we have a treaty obligation there.
Now, we don't go to war based upon lawyers' interpretations of treaties, of course.
The United States of America is a great power and great powers don't go to war over rocks. Having said that, though, these are not just rocks to the Japanese and the Chinese. We know how sensitive this issue is.
アメリカは大国であり、大国は、岩のために戦争はしない、と。もっとも、尖閣は中国と日本にとっては単なる岩以上の意味がある。
---向こうの立場に立てば、当然でしょうね。
例えば、産経が仮に、アメリカが岩のために戦争すると思っているちょっとやばい。
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Tokyo -- Beijing's position is that, as long as Tokyo will admit there's a dispute here, then we can sit down and talk, and Tokyo has not found the way at this point to reach that formula, but I'd be optimistic that they could with some clever diplomacy.
中国の立場は、紛争があることを認めさせることができれば、話し合いに応じる、というもの。
BADER
On the civilian side, I mean, both Hagel and Kerry made clear statements that the way our ADIZ works is you only have a reporting requirement if you are flying towards the country, towards the United States. If you're just transiting the zone, no reporting obligation whatsoever. And the Chinese announcement makes no such distinction, so a plane -- you know, an ANA flight from Tokyo down to Singapore that cuts through the zone nominally has to report or the Chinese can scramble something to see what's going on, which is not a healthy situation.
防空識別圏について、中国に向かっていない飛行機まで報告義務をかすのはむちゃくちゃだ、と。
BADER: I mean, the FAA's view was, we don't use our civilian aircraft as experiments or, you know, that they're -- we don't put civilians at risk because of diplomatic purposes. And I understood what the FAA was doing. It was the -- I'm not sure, Richard. I don't know the answer to that. It was just badly coordinated. I don't know if I'd go beyond that.
EIKENBERRY: On my last United flight to Beijing, I actually supported the FAA position.
それでも、事故はありえるから、アメリカの民間機に報告させるようにしたのは、間違ってはいない、と。
And if I could real quick, the -- the Chinese, as Karl said, want Japan to acknowledge de jure, not just de facto, that there's a dispute. I think the Japanese could do that, but they can't do it under coercion, and we shouldn't want them to do it under coercion.
尖閣について、中国としては、事実上のみならず、法律上も紛争があることを認めさせたい。
But if there's some basis to remove that coercive tool, there might then be a basis for Japan and China to have some -- I mean, the game would be Japan would call on China to go to the international court, knowing the Chinese wouldn't go, but they will have made -- so there is room for us to play, but it can't be ecumenical in the sense we need to recognize that the Chinese coercion is a major problem for all of us in this.
日本としては、中国が応じないことを承知で、中国に国際司法裁判所で決着をつけよう、というやり方もある、と。
ーーそうですね。
憲法の精神からいっても、戦略からいっても、得策なのになぜそれができないのか、不思議でならない。
左翼も右翼もどうなっているんだろう？
また、アメリカに言われてからやるのか？
BADER: The dispute between China and Japan is not about the Senkakus. The Senkakus is an excuse. I mean, from the Chinese perspective, I think there are three things, number one, is a visceral, gut resentment of Japan for its historic role vis-a-vis China in the last century. Number two is a tactical desire to use -- to paint Japan as reverting to the 1930s, because they're trying to slow down Abe's building up of the security capabilities. So it's gut, and it's also highly calculated. And the third piece of it is just terror on the part of the Chinese leaders of being -- of appearing to be soft on Japan, because of the impact that that might have on their leadership.
尖閣が問題ではなくて、中国は、歴史的経緯から日本が憎いんだろう、それに、戦術的に日本が戦前に回帰しているとするほうが安倍の政策遂行を遅らせるには得策だし、日本に強くでないと国内的に非難される、と。
中国が、経済的に軍事的に力をつけてきて、拡張主義を遂行する局面に入って、近隣諸国との緊張が高まっている、というのが、私の意見。
GREEN:
But I would say it's important to briefly, very briefly define what he's doing. And people talk about it as being aggressive. And the shrine visit certainly didn't help with management of that issue for him.
But if you set that aside for a moment and just look at his actual policies, he's increasing the defense budget by about 0.8 percent this year after 11 years of decline. The Chinese defense budget has been double-digit for almost two decades. He said -- not that he's going to revise the constitution -- that will take time, he knows it -- he's going to change some of the interpretations to allow a more collective defense with the U.S., so that we can have the kind of virtual joint and combined relationships and plan together and do more together that we do with Korea or Australia or Canada or any number of allies. He's actually slowed down that process, to the frustration of many in the Pentagon.
So it's important to keep it in perspective. He's not, you know, looking out for demons to slay. He's spending, as I said, 80 percent of his economy on what keeps him in power in a parliamentary system, which is growing the economy, and in that, not so unlike Xi Jinping.
阿部は実際には、経済に力をいれており、軍事的に大胆なことをやっているわけではない、と。
その通りなんですけど、英語圏の阿部＝悪魔の宣伝の効果がでているんでしょうね。もっとも、阿部も”お友達”の人選がいつものごとく悪い。
BADER:
Anyway, the Philippine case is challenging that. My guess is the Philippine will not do too badly in the outcome of the case. It won't be an unambiguous outcome, but they may do fairly well in it. And the Chinese will ignore the outcome.
But I think it will help spur a debate within China. There are a lot of lawyers in China, there a lot of people who are looking at these kinds of issues, and I think it will help the people who within China take international law seriously, who take globalization seriously, and it will provide an argument, not for immediate, you know, surrender to the Philippine position.
Now, this doesn't really go to the sovereignty issues. I cannot picture a situation where the parties go to U.N. tribunals on sovereignty issues. Look, I mean, the Japanese have offered to go to the world court on the Takeshima-Dokdo issue, and the South Koreans have refused. South Koreans would almost certainly win in the case where they go, but they refuse, even though they'd win. I mean, there's -- the nationalism trumps the logic and the immediate advantage in most of these cases.
ーーこれはショックで、竹島が国際司法裁判所で提訴されたら韓国が勝つだろう、と思われているわけですね。
韓国が独島といっているのは、鬱陵島の側近の岩であり、竹島とは別の島であることは、日韓の歴史書、地図をみれば明らか。韓国は戦後ドサクサに紛れて侵略したのである。
日本側の情報発信の足りなさと、顔色外交の悪い面が出てしまっている。
竹島、尖閣、領土問題は国際司法裁判所に提訴すべし。
GREEN: If there's -- if there's a diplomatic process that could help, aside from confidence-building, which Karl and I have discussed, between the militaries, it's all about fish. And Japan and Korea were at odds over Dokdo or Takeshima, but in '98, they signed a fisheries agreement, and the issue subsided until the fisheries agreement started falling apart. And it was local fishermen in Japan that started raising this issue.
Taiwan just reached an agreement with Japan. Taiwan also claims the Diaoyutai-Senkakus. That fisheries agreement has calmed down a lot of Taiwanese fishermen who were trying to agitate and cause trouble. So if there's an area for diplomacy that would make a difference, in addition to military-to-military confidence-building, it might be fish.
竹島問題というは、漁業協定の問題でもある、と。
これは面白い見方ですね。とすれば、日韓の政治家たちがあまりにも不能なわけですが、実際はどうなんでしょう。
