Politicians have been wagging the dog—subordinating foreign policy to domestic politics

オクトーバーサプライズ

オクトーバーサプライズ（October surprise）とは、アメリカ合衆国大統領選挙が実施される年において、本選挙投票の1ヶ月前の10月に選挙戦に大きな影響を与えるサプライズ（出来事）のことを指す[1]。
最も注目を浴びたのが1980年アメリカ合衆国大統領選挙であり、この選挙以降米マスメディアの間で「10月の驚く出来事」という意味で頻繁に使われるようになった。

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外国政権と密かに接触して、悲惨な結果がもたされたのは、なにもフリン氏に始まるものじゃないですよ、と。

Nixon’s people had acted fast. Using Kissinger’s intelligence and working through Anna Chennault (the Chinese-born widow of World War II Lieut. Gen. Claire Lee Chennault, she had become a prominent conservative activist), they urged the South Vietnamese to derail the talks, promising better conditions if Nixon were to be elected. President Johnson was informed of the meddling—through wiretaps and intercepts, he learned that Nixon’s campaign was telling the South Vietnamese that he was going to win and “to hold on a while longer.” If the White House had gone public with the information, the outrage might have swung the election to Humphrey. But Johnson hesitated, fearing that “Nixon’s conniving” was just too explosive. “This is treason,” he said. “It would rock the world.” Johnson stayed silent, Nixon won, and the war went on.


 Understanding the true nature of 1968’s October Surprise—that is, the one the Times didn’t feel was fit to mention—is key to understanding much of what came next: Having derailed the best chance to end the war, Nixon and Kissinger had to figure out a way to force Hanoi back to the negotiating table. So they began to bomb Cambodia, hoping it would force North Vietnam’s hand. But the bombing was illegal, so it had to be done in secret. Pressure to keep it secret spread paranoia within the administration about leaks to the press—especially after Daniel Ellsberg released the Pentagon Papers—leading to a series of covert actions resulting in the Watergate scandal and Nixon’s downfall. The war, meanwhile, dragged on pointlessly for years, before finally ending on terms that were pretty much exactly like those on the table in 1968, after costing hundreds of thousands more deaths and the destruction of Cambodia. Some surprise.

ジョンソン大統領が、ベトナム戦争の終わらせようとしたのに、ニクソンーキッシンジャーが共和党政権なら、終戦について、もっと、いい条件だしているやると言って、戦争を引き伸ばし、その後、再度、交渉につかせようと、北爆、多大な犠牲を出した、と。

Politicians have been wagging the dog—subordinating foreign policy to domestic politics—at least since Gen. Andrew Jackson invaded Spanish Florida in 1817 as part of a successful bid to assert slaveholder power over the national government. FDR, JFK, and of course LBJ all used militarism to best domestic opponents. But 1968 marked a fundamental sea change, with extreme political division at home changing the relationship of the domestic to the foreign. The more the Vietnam War—prolonged by Nixon and Kissinger’s maneuverings—polarized American society, giving rise to a growing grassroots conservative movement that would eventually coalesce behind Ronald Reagan—the more war, or at least the drum beat of war, was needed to leverage that polarization to political advantage


Grenada, Panama, the 1986 bombing of Libya, the first Gulf War, Bosnia, and so on revealed more about domestic politics—especially the need to, if not overcome then at least manage domestic divisions, anti-militarism, and dissent—than they did about global US interests. However self-aware and instrumental such a leveraging of militarism for domestic political gain is, it can only go on so long—Bill Clinton bombed Baghdad, killing civilians, to check his political opponents, who at that moment were trying to impeach him over his sex scandals—before reality itself becomes distorted.

アメリカでは、自分たちに有利に事を運ぼうとしたり、国内における肝心な事柄をもみ消そうとして、外国に戦争をしかけるというのはよくあることで、外交・戦争が、国内事情に従属してしまうことはよくあることなんだよ、と。

ルーズベルト、ケネディ、ジョンソン・・・レーガン、クリントンも不都合なこととのもみ消しや、国内の政敵を出し抜くために軍国主義的行動にでていたよ、と。


（歴史問題）