India's Nuclear Blunder
The bomb doesn't offer much against China, and driving Pakistan to arm itself left New Delhi with less freedom of action.
Zachary Keck
August 26, 2013
TL に流れてきたので読んだら２０１３年のなんだけれど。面白かった。インドの核武装はドチだった、というのだが、中国に対抗して核武装したわけだが、中国の目的は限定的なので、インドが核武装したからといって、国境のいざこざがなくなったわけでもなく、かえって、隣国パキスタンを刺戟して、核武装させてしまった。核武装しなかったら、パキスタンは小さくなっていたであろうに、核武装して、カシミールなど国境でいざこざを起こし、また、インド国内でも代理攻撃をするなど、強気にでている、と。
北朝鮮やパキスタンなど弱小国にとっては、伝家の宝刀になるが、核武装したらどうなるかは、さまざまなシナリオは考えておく必要はあるでしょうね。
The bomb doesn't offer much against China, and driving Pakistan to arm itself left New Delhi with less freedom of action.
Zachary Keck
August 26, 2013
Where Bhabha’s analysis went wrong was in failing to specify what kind of threat China posed to India. As was clear at the time, and remains true today, China holds limited objectives along the border with India. This was evident from how it prosecuted the war. Although Beijing struck with heavy force, and quickly annihilated India’s defending troops, it didn’t push this advantage further into India proper. Instead, it announced a unilateral ceasefire.
China’s limited objectives significantly limits the utility of India’s nuclear arsenal in defending the border. Contrary to Bhabha’s assertion, nuclear weapons only provide an absolute deterrent against large scale attacks. As India’s interactions with China have demonstrated, low-level violence between nuclear-armed adversaries is wholly possible. And, since low-intensity operations are sufficient for China to achieve its goals vis-à-vis the border with India, Delhi’s pursuit of a nuclear arsenal has done little to address the security threat that first led it to seek the bomb.
Making matters worse, India’s decision to pursue the bomb also had the unintended consequence of weakening its position relative to Pakistan by pushing Islamabad to acquire its own nuclear deterrence.
Armed with nuclear weapons, Islamabad has been able to pursue its objectives in the Kashmir by supporting militants in the area, as well as allowing Pakistani troops to directly stir up trouble along the border. Even more troubling, nuclear weapons have emboldened Pakistan to support proxy attacks deep inside the Indian homeland.
A Pakistan without nuclear weapons would never act in such reckless a manner given the prevailing power asymmetry.
Without nuclear weapons, Pakistan would have to be extremely judicious in its provocations, given the potential there would be for India to launch a devastating conventional attack that would undermine the Pakistani military’s self-perpetuated myth that it protects the country.
TL に流れてきたので読んだら２０１３年のなんだけれど。面白かった。インドの核武装はドチだった、というのだが、中国に対抗して核武装したわけだが、中国の目的は限定的なので、インドが核武装したからといって、国境のいざこざがなくなったわけでもなく、かえって、隣国パキスタンを刺戟して、核武装させてしまった。核武装しなかったら、パキスタンは小さくなっていたであろうに、核武装して、カシミールなど国境でいざこざを起こし、また、インド国内でも代理攻撃をするなど、強気にでている、と。
北朝鮮やパキスタンなど弱小国にとっては、伝家の宝刀になるが、核武装したらどうなるかは、さまざまなシナリオは考えておく必要はあるでしょうね。
