Clinton and his little puppy dog Tony Blair

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mozu
@mozumozumozu
The Limits of American Realism by Roger Cohen - NYT http://j.mp/1OoDiIp リアリズムに関するウォルト氏の記事への応答。ベビーブーマー意識まるだし。


The Opinion Pages | OP-ED COLUMNIST

The Limits of American Realism

リアリストが失敗した例として、セルビアのケースが挙げられている。

The moral case was, however, overwhelming, beginning with the Serbian use in 1992 of concentration camps to kill Bosnian Muslim men deemed threatening, and expel Muslim women and children. These methods culminated at Srebrenica in 1995 with the Serbian slaughter of about 8,000 male inhabitants. In the three-year interim, while realists rationalized restraint, Serbian shelling of Sarajevo blew up European women and children on a whim. Only when President Clinton changed his mind and NATO began concerted bombing was a path opened to ending the war.

ここらへん、詳しくないからわからんが、しかし、この件についても、


Noam Chomsky and Edward Said on Kosovo
APRIL 12, 1999STORY

NOAM CHOMSKY

It turns out — I didn’t know this before — that the Serbian Parliament had called for — before the bombing, had called for UN forces to be in Kosovo as observers, whereas the US was insisting on NATO forces. Well, that’s consistent with US contempt for and hatred for the United Nations or for any other international institution. But it does put a rather different cast on the situation. There were clearly negotiating opportunities and options that could be pursued.

The US picked one option. It was an option which was guaranteed, practically, to make the situation far worse. I won’t express my opinion. Let me just quote the US NATO commander. On March 26th, Wesley Clark, two days after the bombing started, he said, in his words, it was “entirely predictable” that as a result of the bombing there would be a vast escalation of Serbian atrocities on the ground.　


The bombing — the effects of the bombing, rather predictably — not entirely predictably, as the NATO general stated — rather predictably, were to sharply increase the damage to the populations, the harm to the populations, very severely, all populations. Other effects were to wipe out a very promising and courageous democratic movement in Belgrade, which was the best hope for getting rid of this gangster Milosevic, with whom we’d been dealing.

国連の介入といった他の方法があり、専門家の軍人は、ひどいこと＝帰結になるのを予想しているのに、アメリカが余計な介入した、といういつもの構図があるみたいだし。

NOAM CHOMSKY: There is a National Defense — I forget the name of it — in 1995, which proposed that — it’s been partially declassified — which proposed that the United States should maintain an irrational posture. We should look like a dangerous, irrational state, because that will frighten people, and we should use the nuclear arsenal that way. The more uncertain they are, the more power we have.

Now, there’s actually an Orwellian phrase for this, which is repeated by Clinton and his little puppy dog Tony Blair and Madeleine Albright and everyone else. The phrase is, “We have to preserve the credibility of NATO.” That’s the main argument that’s given. Well, try to decode that. I mean, are they worried about the credibility of Denmark? You know? Or of Italy? You know, no. "Credibility of NATO" means credibility of the United States. Now, what does "credibility" mean? Well, credibility means, like what any Mafia don would understand, if somebody doesn’t pay, you know, what they’re supposed to do in a grocery store, the don has to maintain credibility. Other people have to understand that you don’t do this, you know. Credibility means be frightened of the enforcer. So, and that — once you carry out the translation, I think you can see what’s going on, and I think it’s exactly what Edward said. That’s a major motivation. You have to preserve the credibility the enforcer. And, I mean, if you do it by being irrational and violent and destructive, well, you know, that’s where the cookie crumbles.

ちなみに、当時からチョムスキー節はかわってないね。

アメリカがヤクザの親分、親分にショバ代払わない奴はどうなるかを見せつけてやる必要があり、そのためには、アメリカ様はやばくて、理不尽のように思わせる必要もあり、凶暴に軍事力を行使することで、皆の衆が真似をしないように、脅しているわけですね。

北朝鮮が狂人を装って、水爆実験するのと大差ないから、その意味ではアメリカほど北朝鮮の行動を理解している国は少いのかもしれない。


（lapdog ポチ poodle)