韓国元将官ら アメリカが韓国を防衛するかは疑わしい

North Korean Threats Deepen Southern Nuclear Insecurities
EAST ASIASECURITYSOUTH KOREA
July 04, 2013
By Richard Weitz

As the United States becomes vulnerable to a North Korean nuclear strike, the credibility of its extended deterrence guarantees to its Asian allies is called into question. Some South Koreans, including some of the former ROK general officers at the conference, already doubt that the U.S. officials would defend them against a DPRK attack if North Korea could destroy Los Angeles in retaliation. They want to acquire their own national nuclear deterrent, whose use in response to an attack against them would be much more credible than that of a third party.

北朝鮮がロサンジェルスに反撃できるようになったら、アメリカは韓国の防衛にくるか疑問に持つ人が、元将官を含めて韓国にはいる、と。

ーーー非常に冷静ですね。

some influential South Korean strategists believe these extended guarantees have lost some credibility due to the decline in the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the Obama administration’s clear preference for using conventional forces or missile defenses while deemphasizing the potential role of nuclear weapons in U.S. military operations. They have been calling for either the United States to return tactical nuclear weapons to the South or for the ROK to develop its own nuclear arsenal. In addition, they have become convinced that the DPRK is determined to acquire a nuclear weapons arsenal, so that they believe the ROK needs a similar nuclear capability to deter potential DPRK military threats.

アメリカの核弾頭も減ってきたし、核兵器より通常兵器に移行してきたから、核の傘っていってもどうだかなああ、というわけでしょうね。

Specifically, the plan allows for retaliation “against the point where the attack originated” and possibly against “a second point.” South Korea will have the lead role in any military response, but Seoul should consult with the United States before retaliating and must request the use of any U.S. assets.

韓国って攻撃するときもやっぱ、ボスである、アメリカに相談しなくちゃいけないんだね。

they reason that, if the U.S. nuclear weapons were already in South Korea, the DPRK leadership might be more deterred since the weapons would be more visible and could more plausibly be fired, perhaps accidently, following a DPRK attack. By this logic, the North Koreans could be even more credibly deterred if the ROK possessed its own nuclear weapons, since the South Korean government and military would be even more inclined to retaliate to a nuclear attack against its population or territory.

韓国の手による核兵器があれば、韓国は使う反撃に使う可能性が大きいと考えて北朝鮮からの核攻撃をより抑止できるだろう、と。

だろうね。

韓国が核兵器もったら、

It[North Koera] wants nuclear weapons in order to exert its own deterrence on the United States, negating potential U.S. threats to attack the North. If the ROK deployed nuclear weapons, the most likely DPRK response would be to target them preemptively rather than agree to eliminate its own nuclear weapons program.

北朝鮮は先制攻撃しちゃうよ、と記事の筆者はいうんだが、そんなことするのは、アメリカとかイスラエルだけじゃねえの？

In the past, U.S. officials managed to end the clandestine nuclear weapons programs of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea by warning them that the United States could respond by annulling its pledges to defend them. Although ROK-U.S. relations have never been better, the Obama administration needs to subtly remind South Koreans of this possibility if the movement for ROK nukes genuinely takes off.

　もし、韓国や日本が核武装するといいだしたら、なら、有事のとき守ってやらないよ、と脅せ、と。

ーーーこれだよ。


　アメリカは平和を望んでいるというより、同盟国との間でも、優位を保とうとして必死なのである。

　韓国が先に核武装してくれれば、　日本の右翼のアメリカに対する愛人妄想も打破してくれるかもしれない。ここは韓国に頑張ってもらいところ。