女は、弱いし小さいし、頭も悪いから、給金が男より低いのは当たり前だ、と欧州議会の男性議員。
女性議員から、非難を浴びている。
ーーーまあ、欧州議会でもこんなおっさんが議員やっているわけですね。
History meant the history of the nation, its peoples and their origins. When social and cultural history came along, it changed the subject from presidents or prime ministers to Hollywood or garment workers.
McNeill’s epic The Rise of the West (1963) was the high-standard bearer for this kind of encompassing view of the planetary past composed of civilisational blocs competing for global supremacy. This was not global history, though many subsequent global historians cut their teeth studying other civilisations. Rather, it was a story that brought in the Rest to help explain the West.
All narratives are selective, shaped as much by what they exclude as what they include.
It is hard not to conclude that global history is another Anglospheric invention to integrate the Other into a cosmopolitan narrative on our terms, in our tongues. Sort of like the wider world economy.
The older patriotic narratives had tethered people to a sense of bounded unity. The new, cosmopolitan, global narratives crossed those boundaries. But they dissolved the heartlanders’ ties to a sense of place in the world. In a political climate dominated by railing against Leviathan government, big banks, mega-treaties with inscrutable acronyms such as TPP, and distant Eurocrats, the pretentious drive to replace deep stories of near-mourning with global stories of distant connection was bound to face its limits. In the scramble to make Others part of our stories, we inadvertently created a new swath of strangers at home.
The story of the globalists illuminates some at the expense of others, the left behind, the ones who cannot move, and those who become immobilised because the light no longer shines on them.
In short, we need narratives of global life that reckon with disintegration as well as integration, the costs and not just the bounty of interdependence.
All narratives are selective, shaped as much by what they exclude as what they include.
Sometimes what is more important is what somebody does not say as opposed to what he actually says
保坂祐二「慰安婦は戦争犯罪、再協議せよ」 http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20170302-00000007-cnippou-kr … 「30年代からWW2が終わるまでに・・慰安婦を連れ回った軍隊は日本とナチスドイツしかなかった」 吉見マジックですね。1945年で切るのがポイント。
Populism doesn’t; it calls for kicking out the political establishment, but it doesn’t specify what should replace it. So it’s usually paired with “thicker” left- or right-wing ideologies like socialism or nationalism.
Populists are dividers, not uniters, Mudde told me. They split society into “two homogenous and antagonistic groups: the pure people on the one end and the corrupt elite on the other,” and say they’re guided by the “will of the people.” The United States is what political scientists call a “liberal democracy,” a system “based on pluralism—on the idea that you have different groups with different interests and values, which are all legitimate,” Mudde explained. Populists, in contrast, are not pluralist. They consider just one group—whatever they mean by “the people”—legitimate.
“Hence the frequent invocation of conspiracy theories by populists: something going on behind the scenes has to account for the fact that corrupt elites are still keeping the people down. … [I]f the people’s politician doesn’t win, there must be something wrong with the system.”
One might expect this argument to fail once populists enter government and become the establishment. But no: Populists—ranging from the revolutionary socialist Hugo Chavez in Venezuela to the religious conservative Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey—have managed to portray themselves as victims even at the height of their power, blaming their shortcomings on sabotage by shadowy domestic or foreign elites.
Populists “tend to define the people as those that are with them,” Mudde said.
Stylistically, populists often use short, simple slogans and direct language, and engage in “boorish behavior, which makes [them] appear like the real people,”
The moral dimension of populism “explains why someone like Donald Trump, who clearly is not a commoner, can nevertheless pretend to be the voice of the people,” Mudde told me. “He doesn’t argue, ‘I am as rich as you.’ What he argues is, ‘I have the same values as you. I’m also part of the pure people.’”
But what does often happen is that populists, when they come to power and “actually have to deal with things on a daily basis, they often become more moderate as they gradually learn that bomb-throwing doesn’t work when they’re trying to get things done,” Norris said. “And then they often lose their popularity over time as a result because they no longer have that appeal” of political outsiders.
This occurs even as the popularity of populists exposes widespread dissatisfaction with the existing state of representative democracy. Populists are problematic for free societies, but they’re also responding to profound problems in those societies; they succeed when they tap into people’s genuine grievances about the policies pursued by their leaders.
1)被害者としての国民、人民、庶民の声を僭称して、
2)既成勢力、既存の権力組織、エリート階層に対抗ないし撲滅を目指す運動
「交渉記録を残しておかないとあとで問題になった時、困る。行政経験の積み上げという面からも資料を残すことは大事だ」
ただ外部から覗かれるのは困る、というのが財務省の基本的な立場である。決裁文書などは公文書として保管するが、経過や政治家など外部対応などが詳細に書かれた文書は「担当者の私的メモ」とする。情報公開の対象から外すための工作である。
「私的メモ」といっても担当者個人が持っているのではない。関係者が共有できるファイルになっている。取り扱い区分は「私物」なので、捨てたり焼却しても法に触れない、という便利な扱いだ。
佐川局長は「交渉記録はない」「保存期間は終了している」と強調するが、「廃棄した」とは言っていない。
文書はまだ残っているのだろう。本省も財務局も担当者は毎年のように変わる。いま問題が紛糾しているのだから、財務省にとって当時を知る大事な文書のはずだ。
財務省は「私的メモ」を理由に公開を拒否するだろう。その際、国会は国政調査権を発動して文書を押さえることができるが、国政調査権の発動は与党の協力がなければできない。