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Michael Thomas Cucek
@MichaelTCucek
Via @SheilaSmithCFR an article worth reading through to the end on Chinese maritime tactics
http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/vietnam-and-china-a-dangerous-incident/
中越の南シナ海での紛争のドキュメンタリーをみると、中国の民間人を使った膨張主義は２００７年からすでに始まっている、と。
Cold War Structures and Tectonic Shifts
Longstanding U.S. commitments to East Asia complicate an already complex region.
By Clint Work
February 12, 2014
こっちのほうがちょっと面白い。
Historically the essential makeup of the alliance structure has been two-fold. First, the U.S. provides a fundamental security guarantee to both Tokyo and Seoul backed by the full panoply of U.S. conventional and nuclear forces. Second, the two allies remain subordinate partners within the U.S. strategic framework, characterized by truncated sovereignty and occasionally intense pressure to adhere to (or at least not significantly deviate from) U.S. interests.
対共産主義の冷戦状態の下の米日、米韓の同盟構造というのは、米国の国益にそうように、日韓が米国に従属して、日韓の主権がそがれた状態であったわけで、それは、それで、よかったわけですね。
ところが、
They were no longer adopting Japan’s formerly advanced products in a “harmonious intra-industrial division of labor,” but were engaging in a highly competitive race to stay ahead. To be sure, Japan remains an important economic partner. Moreover, Korea’s transition has been marked by continued U.S. pressure and severe crisis. Still, Seoul has achieved greater relative autonomy from U.S. political pressure and Japanese technological hegemony. Crucial to this process has been South Korea’s relationship with China.
Starting in 1991, Seoul and Beijing opened mutual trade offices, followed by full normalization of relations a year later. The realignment would spur a rapid boost in investment and trade over the next twenty years based on the obvious complementarities between the countries’ economies. Beyond the sheer size, proximity, and gravitational pull of the burgeoning Chinese market, it was a source of natural resources, cheap labor and low-cost consumer goods for the ROK’s technologically advanced, export-oriented economy. Conversely, the ROK served China as a lower cost competitor to Japan, providing both medium- and high technology-goods and significant foreign direct investment. By 2004, China surpassed the U.S. as South Korea’s largest trade partner. In 2012, China received 24.8 percent of the ROK’s exports and was the source of 15.5 percent of its imports, and export numbers are on the rise. Meanwhile, South Korea is China’s fifth largest export destination, third largest source of imports, and third largest source of FDI.
Seoul is most concerned with peace and stability on the peninsula, a view it shares with Beijing. As a result, both have begun to engage in greater strategic dialogue based on these shared priorities.
韓国に関して言うと、日本が先頭になってひっぱていく経済体制から、独立して、独自に付加価値のある製品を製造できるように、なおかつ、中国との経済関係を深めていき、さらに、戦略的にも、半島の平和の安定が最大の関心事であり、それは中国の国益と合致するわけですね。
In broad stokes, then, the post-Cold War period has witnessed a sort of return to the significant historical affiliation between (South) Korea and China, yet with additional economic, political and even strategic ties. As a result, Seoul, the proverbial shrimp among whales, is caught between two crucial yet divergent relationships: a longstanding strategic alliance with the U.S. (and by extension Japan) and an economic, cultural and deep historical relationship with China.
アメリカとの同盟関係はいまだに必要なものの、中国との、歴史的、文化的、戦略的、経済的、切っても切れない関係が深化していきているわけですね。
ここらへん、中韓関係の歴史的 思想的 経済的 戦略的近親性を、しっかりとらえているのは偉いですね。
他方、
If historically Korea’s cultural achievements have been situated in a larger Sinitic order, Japan’s unique culture was formed outside of it. .
日本は中華圏とは異なる文化圏にあるわけですね。
Nevertheless, much like Korea, Japan’s modern history has been marked by abrupt changes triggered by larger external shifts in the international system. This is the result of Japan’s geostrategic location and its severe economic vulnerability, most notably its almost complete dependence on outside sources for raw materials and energy resources. Over its modern history Japan has attempted two separate grand strategies in search of security. First, it pursued its own empire in response to the fracturing of the Sino-centric order by Western Imperialisms, a strategy ending in firebombed cities, atomic assault, and foreign occupation. Second, following World War II it traded full sovereignty as an appendage of American power for protection and the freedom to pursue rapid economic growth.
で、日本は資源が少ないですから、その対策として、自ら帝国を作る道をとったが、これ大失敗、そこで、、アメリカの属国となって、防衛してもらって、経済成長をとげたわけですね。
Since the end of the Cold War and even before it, Japan has moved toward a more assertive role in the region. On the one hand, with the decline of its relative power and increased involvement elsewhere, Washington has pushed Tokyo to take on a greater share of its own defense. On the other hand, Japan’s emergent Heisei Generation, no longer under the shadow of Japan’s imperial and wartime past, is eager to take on a more “normal” role in the international system.
で、アメリカが衰退しているのと、他でも戦争しているせいで、日本にもっと負担を負え、という圧力があると同時に、日本の側も、普通の国になりたがっていた。
What would Tokyo do without Washington’s extended deterrence? The argument is often made that they would militarize even more vigorously, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons, thus spurring regional proliferation. However, it is hard to see how Tokyo could balance against China alone, and it would have a difficult time building a balancing coalition. Others in the region (read: South Korea) not only view balancing against China as counter to their national interests, but also remain profoundly skeptical of Japanese militarization. Japanese policymakers are not unaware of this dynamic.
日本は、アメリカなしでは中国に対抗するのもむりなわけですけど、韓国は、中国と対抗するのは、国益には反するとみており、また、日本の軍事化は毛嫌いしているわけですね。
Tokyo views the Japan-U.S. alliance as the “indispensable” deterrent, yet its concerns about having to go it alone spur it to get what it can while the protection remains. Unfortunately, this more assertive stance increases Beijing’s own sense of insecurity (for example, the U.S.-Japan missile defense system, while ostensibly directed against Pyongyang, lowers the deterrent value of Chinese missiles) and, in its estimation, justifies an assertive response. This then confirms U.S. concerns about an aggressive China, justifying its continued presence in the region to balance against the same. In short, the protection provided by the alliance permits Japanese behavior that exacerbates the very tensions and security dilemma it is supposed to protect against.
ここが面白い、というか、そうか？と思うところなわけですが、アメリカとの同盟関係があるから、日本は強気にでるが、そうすると、それに対抗して中国が強気にでるが、そうなると、アメリカも中国に対抗して地域で、はったりかまさないといかん、ということになる、と。つまり、同盟の保護があるから、日本は、緊張悪化させるような行動にでるのだ、と。
For Seoul, it is more interested in cooperation with Beijing, less amenable to serving as a strategic artery for Tokyo and Washington, and clearly circumspect regarding Tokyo’s moves toward collective self-defense. Even in the case of the DPRK, it is intent on taking greater ownership of the negotiating process and expanding the scope of priorities beyond just denuclearization. For Tokyo, it is searching for a role that more accurately reflects its status as one of the world’s premier powers. However, it is searching for this more normal identity while remaining subordinate to the U.S. Therefore, while Tokyo share’s Washington’s concern about China’s rise, U.S. protection prevents it from developing a policy all its own. In other words, one wonders if Prime Minister Shinzo Abe could be as assertive without the full backing of U.S. forces. Without such backing, a more cooperative engagement might be the only realistic and worthwhile option.
ふーーーーむ。
とにかく、前提として、安倍は、やっかいものだ、というのがすでに定着したね。
韓国が経済的政治的戦略的に中国に吸い寄せられ、吸い込まれていくのではないか、という匂いは、感じ取っているんだろうね。
日本は日米同盟関係に甘えている、みたいな見方だが、アメリカは自分を買いかぶりすぎているところはありはしないか、とも思う。
まあ、アメリカは中国といざこざを起こしたくないわけで、中国との緊張を高める日本との関係から手を引きたかっている。それは、それで、国民の生命財産を守るべき国家としては理解できる。
日本としては、かりにアメリカが裏切っても、あるいは静かに手をひいても、やっていける道をさぐるべきであって、安倍ちゃんの中国韓国の周辺国との関係を深化していく外交はそれでいいと思う。
だからといって、囲い込んだり、封じ込め、というのではなく、中国も自由、法の支配、民主主義、国際ルールの遵守の道へ友好的に取り込んでいく、という態度が必要である。
中国とは尖閣問題があるわけだが、これだって、形式的には、日本が国際司法裁判所に共同提起しよう、と提案することで決着はつく。
地域の新しい大きな枠組みを作っていくべきである。
