空

Koreasparkling‏
@torumyax

Tahara: "There is no political pressure on the media in Japan. I personally ousted 3 prime ministers in the past".

FCCJの記者会見で、デービッド・マクニールが報道に対する政治圧力について質問し、田原総一朗が「政治圧力は無い」と、（想像＞マクニール涙目ｗ）

日本には具体的政治圧力はないと思っています。なぜならば、わたくしは3人総理大臣を失脚させています。でも私は逮捕もされていない。で、政治圧力はないんだけども、実は、ほとんど新聞社やテレビ局の幹部が自主規制をするんです。こういうことをすると、政府ににらまれるんじゃないか、と。で、９９％新聞社やテレビ局の自主規制だと思います。

もしも総理大臣や官房長官が具体的な圧力をかけたとすれば、わたしくはとんでもないことする、やめろ、といいます。で、総理大臣を失脚させます。


I think in the case of Japan there is no such thing as political pressure on the media. I had myself personally criticized and as a result ousted three prime ministers in the past but I have never been arrested and from this example I think you can understand there is no such things as political pressure on the media.However what exists is, be it newspapers or television stations, it is the executives of the media who exercise self-regulation so they think if they report such and such things, the government will be upset with them and therefore in many of the cases where the media opt not for report certain things in 99% of the cases this is voluntary regulation or restraint where newspapers or TV make their decision on their own not to report .

It there were to be cases where either prime minister or chief cabinet secretary were to put pressure on me or the media then I would immediately tell either prime minister or the chief cabinet secretary to stop and I would immediately take action to ask them out of office.

Koreasparkling‏
@torumyax

Australian Foreign Minister:"It is vital that all nations unite against the threats of Pyongyang"　豪外相寄稿、日本の立場とほぼ同じ。

OCTOBER 11 2017

Failure to check North Korea's nuclear ambitions could embolden other nations

Julie Bishop

実質的には同じことを言っているわけだけど、こっちのほうがうまいかな、という印象はうける。

The essence of the collective strategy backed unanimously by the Security Council and the international community is to compel North Korea to return to the negotiating table and to abandon its illegal weapons as long as the economic pressure is maximised.

北朝鮮が交渉のテーブルにもどって、不法な武器を放棄するまでは、一致団結して、圧力を強めるんだ、と。

安倍ちゃんの言い方だと、「（いまは）対話はしないんだ！」が強調されて、北朝鮮もカチンとくるかもしれんしーー北朝鮮は何に対してもカチンとくるがーーーなんで、対話をしないんだああ、という勢力に隙を与える。

豪州の言い方だと、圧力を加えて向こうが譲歩したら対話しますよ、という論理がはっきりしている。

box someone or something in

to trap or confine someone or something. He boxed her in so she could not get away from him. They tried to box in the animals, but they needed more space. Don't try to box me in.
See also: box
box someone in
Fig. to put someone into a bind; to reduce the number of someone's alternatives. I don't want to box you in, but you are running out of options. I want to box in the whole staff, so they'll have to do it my way.

Koreasparkling‏
@torumyax

Terry is right. ヘリテージ研究員（Bruce）「軍事オプションはゼロではない。増えている」元アナリスト（Terry）「核保有国認めるとブラックメールしてくる」

NEW YORK, Oct. 5 (UPI) -- North Korea's provocations are not being taken lightly in Washington, where policymakers are weighing military options despite the potentially catastrophic consequences.

Speaking at a public roundtable at The Korea Society in New York on Thursday, Bruce Klingner, a former CIA deputy division chief for Korea, said he's hearing "military options are increasing, not decreasing" in the Trump administration.

"The probability of a military option is not zero," Klingner said, adding there is talk "inside government" of the "five options to solve North Korea in 18 months."


"Then are we really going to act, because we said we will? Because if we don't we lose credibility. We are forced into a position where we have to act," she added. "It's unhelpful. We look like a paper tiger."

Terry also ruled out recognizing North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, a demand Pyongyang has been seeking in informal talks with former U.S. officials, including Terry and Klingner, who both met North Korean diplomats in Stockholm in July.

Once recognized as a nuclear weapons state, North Korea could "resort to nuclear blackmail, kick out U.S. forces on the peninsula, and bank on the United States not to come to the aid of Seoul," Terry said. "Why risk San Francisco for Seoul?"

トランプさんが強気の発言をする、それに応じて、金正恩が挑発する、となれば、今度はそれに応じて、米国としてもなんらかの行動を取らざる得ない、ところに追い込まれる、さもなければ、アメリカは、こけおどし、張り子の虎と見られて、信頼を失う、と。　


おれもそう思うなあ。あれだけのこと言って挑発されても、何もしないんじゃ、単なる馬鹿ってことになっちゃうもんなあああ。

Koreasparkling‏
@torumyax

その他 KoreasparklingさんがDonald J. Trumpをリツイートしました
トランプ「私は、我らが素晴らしい国務長官、レックス・ティラーソンに、小さなロケットマンと交渉しようって時間の無駄だよって言った。。。」

Donald J. Trump認証済みアカウント @realDonaldTrump
I told Rex Tillerson, our wonderful Secretary of State, that he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man...
7:38 - 2017年10月1日

こういうのは、平和的解決の道を最後まで探ったんだ、というのを示すためにも必要な動きですね。

Koreasparkling‏
@torumyax
フォローする
その他 KoreasparklingさんがForeign Policyをリツイートしました
The author's got a very very good point. "deterrence won't work"
北の核を「認めて」対旧ソ連にしたように抑止論、というのは間違いよ、と論破。半島統一を目標とした政策の方がずっとマシ、転換せよ、と。Koreasparklingさんが追加

let’s take a closer look at some of deterrence’s real requirements before we slide absentmindedly in that direction.

First, there is the matter of Kim’s rationality. In a sense, he is very rational — not in an American or Western context, but in a very North Korean, ideological one. He and his family have told us exactly what they have wanted to do, and they have done it. They said they would acquire the means to unify the Korean Peninsula, to fight and win a nuclear war, and kick out the Americans. They said they would use talks to extort money from the United States, China, and South Korea. Alas, nobody of consequence seemed to take seriously what North Korea actually wrote or said. We treated North Korea as we wanted it to be, not as a strategic actor in its own right, with its own strategy and its own logic.

How　can we be confident that Kim’s supposed rationality translates to an understanding of U.S. deterrence signaling? There is no evidence that it does. To say that Kim is deterred because he hasn’t attacked the South is to say essentially nothing. The Kim family never before had an intercontinental ballistic missile that could carry nukes. We have entered a new phase that requires new intelligence and analysis that takes Kim’s own goals into account. The assumption that he is playing defense — he just wants to avoid becoming another Muammar al-Qaddafi — is faulty and a projection of how we, not the actual leaders of North Korea, think.

Second, one needs to take a great leap into Cold War revisionism to believe that deterrence is stable. The United States and the Soviet Union had many now-forgotten near misses, and fought a host of proxy wars at great cost. Allied crises of confidence were the norm, and we were willing to risk our soldiers and bases being nuked by the Soviets to prove to our allies that we were in it with them. Are we prepared to do the same now?

Then there is the matter of how well we understood the Soviets before we rejected preventive war or appeasement. We had been allies during World War II. Containment’s author, George Kennan, had lived in Moscow for years, during which time he assessed the Soviet way of thinking. Do we even have an equivalent when it comes to Kim? American strategists concluded that the Soviets were in the end cautious and therefore could be contained. No one can draw that conclusion when it comes to Kim.

Third, there is the issue of a bipartisan commitment to very high defence dnse expenditures during the Cold War, a basic agreement on the utility of nuclear weapons, and on creative efforts to engage in political and ideological warfare against the Soviets. Today, some of the very people calling for containment were in power when our president and Congress decimated our military. Did they not think to advise the president, that with the growing North Korea threat, it might be a good idea for the commander-in-chief to use his considerable powers of persuasion to call for a military budget adequate to the challenge or to abandon the dream of a nuclear “global zero”?

The United States has no strategic political and information warfare capability, and Congress is certainly not debating these new functions as it reflects on the State Department’s new organization charts.

Fourth, there is the matter of the wages of containment. Here is just a snapshot of what deterrence and containment would require:

We would need to put Kim on the defensive all of the time to prevent his provocations. That would mean a significant change in posture for Japan, South Korea, and the United States, from defense to offense. The three countries would need tremendous intelligence resources, consistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, offensive striking power, and the ability to wage unconventional warfare, to put Kim on notice that he is not safe, so that he spends on defense. The United States would eventually have to pull out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty so as to build more offensive striking power. The president would need the bipartisan support to punish countries benefitting from North Korean proliferation (President George W. Bush decided not to strike the nuclear reactor that North Korea built in Syria). Remarkably, some new realist deterrers are arguing for restrictions on presidential power. How can we deter and contain a dangerous, offensive-minded enemy with such restrictions?

A fulsome debate about these requirements is heretofore absent between the administration and Congress or on the op-ed pages of the major papers of record. For those who are calling for more missile defense, none is in the offing, and efforts to create the capability to hit intercontinental ballistic missiles in their boost phase were killed off long ago.

Fifth, there is the matter of nuclear weapons. The three countries would have to move to a NATO-like structure of nuclear deterrence with systematic, strategic talks, nuclear information posture, and three-way nuclear posture exercises. Most likely, the United States would eventually have to accept one or both countries acquiring nuclear weapons (remember the French during the Cold War). We might be able to reassure allies, but likely they would eventually want their own strategic autonomy.

The administration has not called for a reversal of the Budget Control Act or for a massive effort to establish the means of deterrence. But if it did, would Congress accede? Would the new realists use their influence to change the minds of reluctant members of Congress?

Even if all these military requirements were met, the United States would have to prepare for regime collapse and stability operations. While all services have suffered under Obama’s budgetary jackhammer, arguably none have withered more than the U.S. ground force. A cursory glance at a map of the Korea Peninsula should sober the new realists up about what is needed if their preferred policies work.

Finally, there is the matter of the North Koreans themselves, suffering under the most repressive and abusive regime known to man. North Korea is essentially a big concentration camp. Are we ready to recognize and deter, and leave them to the tender mercies of Kim? What would that say about our much-vaunted commitment to “upholding a rules-based order,” for which many of the new proponents of containment have argued?
If the United States ramped up its defense spending to meet the requirements of deterrence, perhaps the new deterrers would be more persuasive. Add to this the resurrection of the United States Information Agency and other organizations that could pressure Kim persistently, and maybe a strategy could be fashioned　

北朝鮮は、核武装して、南北統一してアメリカを追い払う、と言っていたのだ。そして、北朝鮮は、これまで、言ってきたことをすべてやってきている。そんな相手にソ連同様に抑止し封じ込めの論理が通用すると思うか？　そのソ連とも戦争スレスレまでいったし、代理戦争もしてきた。ソ連のときはケナンなど専門家がいたが、金政権については、あれほどの専門家もいない。ソ連を封じ込めておくには、戦略的にかなり費用を費やしたが、北朝鮮についてもそれだけの防衛費をまかなう覚悟があるのか。抑止するには、北朝鮮を守りの体制においこまなくてはいけないが、それには、日本や韓国にも攻撃態勢を整備するに必要がでてくるし、冷戦時代にフランスが核武装したように、最終的には、日韓の核武装も覚悟しないとならない。北朝鮮は、国そのものが強制収容所なわけだけだ、常日頃人権だ、へったくれだ、と言っているのに、そんなことでええんかい、ーーーーみたいなかんじかな。

Koreasparkling‏
@torumyax

As is often the case with S Korea, Japan is missing from the map of Pyeongchang Olympic's website. 日本がない。
https://www.pyeongchang2018.com/en/dream-programme … (use PC)

Koreasparkling‏
@torumyax

イアン・ブレマー氏：「国連は殆ど北朝鮮問題解決の助けにならない。そもそも閉鎖性が北の政治的安定に寄与。米中韓は相互対立する利害を持ち、キム後体制にも合意がない。そもそもトランプ発言以前に北朝鮮は体制維持の為、核を手放すつもりは無い」
http://time.com/4951483/unga-2017-united-nations-north-korea-iran/ …


3 Ways the United Nations Is Helping the World (and 2 Ways It Can't)
Ian Bremmer
Sep 22, 2017

There are three reasons for that. First, the “carrot” the UN wields—the lifting of economic sanctions—holds little appeal for a regime that depends on isolation for political stability. Second, the principal players—the U.S., China, and South Korea—have their own, often conflicting concerns when it comes to dealing with the Kim regime. The UN can help the world arrive at a lowest common denominator solution, but only when that denominator exists. It doesn’t in this case, because these three countries can’t agree on an acceptable post-Kim outcome.

5 Reasons Things in North Korea Could Still Go Badly Wrong
Ian Bremmer
Aug 21, 2017

To recap: the U.S. demands North Korea stop developing nuclear weapons and missiles Pyongyang keeps threatening to use on the U.S. North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons and missiles to ensure its survival against an enemy it’s so terrified of it keeps threatening to nuke it. China would like things to remain relatively calm and unchanged, and South Korea just want to be left alone (Japan too)

これはどうかなあ。日本にとって、半島の非核化は切実でしょ。

で、中国を含めた関連諸国の共通の目標,Our Single-Most Important Concern というのは明らかで、半島の非核化でしょ。

しかし、外交、制裁では北朝鮮は核兵器を諦めない。

となれば、壊すのが得意のアメリカがソウルへの被害を最小限にして、バンカーバスターやらなんやらで、北朝鮮の軍事基地や核兵器サイロをボコボコにする。

難民流出や、米軍の北朝鮮の駐留をおそれる中国が、その後の北朝鮮の後始末をする。

post-Kim outcomeについては、　金政権と核兵器がなくなれば、その後の北朝鮮は、中国の傀儡政権でもなんでも、日米韓はかまわないんじゃないの？　

なんなら、中国軍が北朝鮮に駐留してあげれば？

Koreasparkling‏
@torumyax

なかなかやるなぁ。国連総会中に、日米韓会合に際して、北朝鮮と取引する相手に対する制裁を発表。同時に中国中央銀行も取引停止、EUも新たな制裁を暫定決定、と。実質的効果は別として、インパクトがなかなか。



God Bless Trump & the USA

Koreasparkling‏
@torumyax

KoreasparklingさんがDonald J. Trumpをリツイートしました
昨晩、韓国の文大統領と話した。彼に例のロケット男はどうしてるか聞いたぜ。北朝鮮ではガソリンスタンドに行列だってさ。残念なこった！Koreasparklingさんが追加
Donald J. Trump認証済みアカウント @realDonaldTrump
I spoke with President Moon of South Korea last night. Asked him how Rocket Man is doing. Long gas lines forming in North Korea. Too bad!
4:56 - 2017年9月17日

時事、毎日は正解なんだろうね。





朝日は　”too bad” を　「とても悪いこと」だ、と訳してしまった。「ガソリンを求める行例がとても悪いこと」というのはちょっとへんな感じはしなかったのだろうか？

訳してみて、へんだったら、辞書をひくとか、


too bad

お気の毒な、残念な

英語の問題でもあり、日本語の問題でもあるわけだね。



こちらは記事はすでに消えているが、”Long gas lines forming”を長いガスラインとしているが、なんだかよくわからない。

"gas line "で画像検索すると、


みたいな画像があるので、おおっ、中国からきている石油パイプをどうかしようってつもりか、とも思ったが、

"long gas line" で画像検索すると、


やっぱり、ガソリンを求める行例　なんでしょうね。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　

Toru
KoreasparklingさんがAFP news agencyをリツイートしました
AFP seems to be translating directly & correctly from Korean version of the text. "beaten to death like a rabid dog"Koreasparklingさんが追加

AFP news agency認証済みアカウント @AFP
North Korean organisation calls for US to be "beaten to death" like a "rabid dog" for pushing fresh UN sanctions http://u.afp.com/4EKy

Note: this is not official North Korean statement. It's from "the Korea Asia-Pacific 'PEACE' Committee (KAPPC) " NK is very careful.




狂犬を棒で叩き殺すように、アメ公を叩き殺し、アメリカを灰と化し、闇の中へなげこんでやれ、カンラカラカラ、と、朝鮮アジア太平洋平和委員会

But the KAPPC statement accused Tokyo of "dancing to the tune of the US" and warned of a "telling blow" against Japan, noting the missile test that overflew the Asian island nation last month.

The North's launch of an intermediate range missile over Hokkaido triggered alarm bells, sparking emergency sirens and mass text alerts in northern Japan.

"The four islands of the archipelago should be sunken into the sea by the nuclear bomb of Juche," KAPPC warned, referring to the North's national philosophy of "Juche" or self-reliance.

米国のいいなりになりやがって、日本も北朝鮮の原爆で海の底に沈めてやれ、と。

Any threat to the United States or its territories - including Guam - or our allies will be met with a massive military response, a response both effective and overwhelming."

Koreasparkling‏
@torumyax

KoreasparklingさんがKoreasparklingをリツイートしました
Now, KJU must be trying hard to figure out if a missile launch into Sea of Japan/se is applicable to a "Any threat".Koreasparklingさんが追加
Koreasparkling @torumyax

なので、今、金正恩はクッソ悩んでいると思います。日本海に向けてのミサイル発射は"ANY THREAT"に該当するのか、トランプ政権（マティス）はブラフしてるだけなのか。。。相当悩むと思います。
16:36 - 2017年9月11日

If DPRK launches missiles into Japanese territory and US does nothing about it, Japan should definitely go nuclear.

いま時代の分岐点にいるくらいの自覚がない、といかん、と思っている。

Koreasparkling‏
@torumyax

お、マケインも：「金正恩のアグレッシブな行為は絶滅という対価を支払うことに繋がると認識すべきだ。韓国の核配備の声も検討だ。中国にも言わなければならない。貿易で痛みがあろうとも、何かが変わらなければならない、と。」


John McCain: North Korea must know price for aggression is 'extinction'

By Eli Watkins, CNN
Updated 1607 GMT (0007 HKT) September 10, 2017

Washington (CNN)Sen. John McCain on Sunday called for the United States to step up its presence around North Korea and make clear to its leader, Kim Jong Un, that aggressive acts would lead to the annihilation of his country.

Washington needs to "make sure that Kim Jong Un knows that if he acts in an aggressive fashion, the price will be extinction," McCain said on CNN's "State of the Union."

"The Korean defense minister just a few days ago called for nuclear weapons to be redeployed," McCain told anchor Jake Tapper, adding he thought "it ought to be seriously considered."
He said China was not doing enough to curtail its support of North Korea and that the US should use economic leverage to influence Beijing.
"I also think that we've got to tell the Chinese, it will hurt the United States if we lose some trade with you, but I'm telling you now, something is going to have to change," McCain said.

Koreasparkling‏
@torumyax

and worrying fact is that SK president Moon is "left-leaning" which means, in SK, he is very much a Korean racial "minjok" nationalist.

In Korea, both the left-wing and the right-wing are nationalists

Cloudy forecast for Moon’s ‘Sunshine Policy 2.0’
20 July 2017

n South Korean politics, liberal political parties often support a policy of engagement with North Korea. This is because left-wing politicians tend to value minjok (the Korean race) over the North–South ideological and political divide. In a broader sense, liberals embrace ethno-nationalism — the notion that sharing the same bloodline is superior to temporary national partition. Conservatives on the other hand support regime-based nationalism, which puts emphasis on being South Korean and stresses the differences in social and political values between the two Koreas.

　文在寅が人権派とかいわれることがあるが、謝罪も補償もされていない米軍慰安婦のおばあさんについて救済の手をさしのべた、などの話をきいたことがない。それでいて何度も謝罪と補償をうけた、日本軍慰安婦のおばあさんの話は聞こう、とー反日ナショナリズムに資することには協力するわけである。

要するに、彼は、民族主義者のである。

英語圏メディアではそのことがよく自覚されていないのではないか。

Koreasparkling‏
@torumyax

"NK's aim is to rule the Korean Peninsula, and rid it of foreign forces."
Yes. 「北朝鮮の最終的な狙いは朝鮮半島支配、外国勢力排除」

North Korea doesn’t want merely to enrich the ruling regime, end sanctions, and be fully accepted as a nuclear power by the international community. Its aim is to rule the Korean Peninsula, and rid it of foreign forces.

But there’s no rush. Kim, in his thirties now, expects to be in power for life. Decades after Donald Trump and other US presidents have receded into history, Kim should still be supreme leader, albeit maybe with grey hair.


For now, Kim’s problem is that the US is pledged to defend South Korea. But is that pledge iron-clad? Would the US waver if its own cities were in range of North Korean nuclear-tipped missiles? Kim hopes to put the security arrangement into doubt.

いずれにせよ、半島とはかかわらないほうがいいね。

北が南を統一しようと、日本には関係ない。

強いていうと、米韓が、半島から核兵器廃絶するなら、それでよし、そうでなければ、日本が核武装するしかないんじゃないの？

Related

Kim's intention is not just about preventing regime change.

Koreasparkling‏
@torumyax

「太陽の下で」って北朝鮮の隠し撮り映画撮った監督：「軍事介入も交渉も有効な選択肢ではない」で、提案は、「勝手に孤立したまま放置しろ（もし文明国が北の人権犯罪を許せるならば）」　＜興味深い。（この記事、日本語訳されますかね）

The key mistake is to read them as a version of us. We walked in the same columns, carrying the same portraits of leaders, but we'd go home and tell jokes about these leaders. This is not about North Korea. In Orwell's "1984," the characters are always trying to escape Big Brother's gaze to get some privacy. In North Korea, it's the other way round. People are born with the dream of finding themselves in Big Brother's line of sight, of being noticed.

Mansky looked for signs of the trademark late Soviet irony, the doublethink that allowed our parents, and for some time also us, to survive in an absurd system. He didn't find any. That left him convinced that the indoctrination of North Koreans was absolute. While they realized the regime's propaganda was fake, their belief in the necessity of that fakery was absolute.

完全に洗脳されていて、交渉の余地なし、と。

ーーーここらへんどうなんだろうなあ。

外から見ると、日本人は12才の洗脳されたガキンチョにしか見られなかったが、戦時中の日本でも、政権に懐疑的だった勢力はあったし、政権に対立する左翼分子などはあった。

かつ、戦後は劇的に変わった。

また、現在でも、


などの報道もある。


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