The following is from an article by Mineo Nakajima, President of Akita International University, which appeared in the Hanada Selection, a monthly magazine now on sale, entitled "The Normalization of Diplomatic Relations Between Japan and China" was a mistake. ["WiLL"] (edited by Kazuyoshi Hanada, responsible for the October 2012 issue)
It is a must-read for the people of Japan and the rest of the world.
It was China that was rushing to establish diplomatic relations.
The formation of the Tanaka cabinet in July 1972 was a way of fostering new political momentum immediately after the collapse of the government of Eisaku Sato, who had long been in charge of conservative politics. At the same time, it was linked to a significant diplomatic issue, the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China. And Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira visited China as early as September of the same year. In a stroke of brilliance, the normalization of diplomatic relations was achieved.
At the time, all the mass media in Japan, except for the Sankei Shimbun, were demanding the establishment of diplomatic relations with China almost unconditionally, in the midst of the changes in international society since the shocking proximity between the U.S. and China in the summer of The previous year, as if to say, 'Don't miss the bus,' the avalanche phenomenon inclined toward China.
I can still see the then LDP leaders, including Mr. Miki Takeo, Mr. Tanaka Kakuei, and Mr. Ohira Masayoshi, lined up on the stage in a scrum at a hotel in Tokyo, along with Xiao Xiangqi, a mere counselor-level representative of the Office of Trade Commissioner for China-Japan Memorandum, on the platform.
To that extent, Japan was so unilaterally inclined to the Chinese side that it completely lacked in strategy and tactics in its diplomacy with China, as well as in the long-term outlook for Japan-China relations and what the future should be.
Forty years later, if we look calmly at not only the Senkaku Islands issue, but also the Yasukuni issue, the problem of the perception of history, and the recent build-up of China's military power, as well as the subject of public sentiment on both sides of Japan and China, we should seriously question whether the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and China 40 years ago was the right thing to do.
At the time, as a member of the Council on International Relations, which was established as a private advisory body to the Chief Cabinet Secretary, I had the unique opportunity to be involved in shaping policy on Japan-China relations from the time of the Sato administration.
The members of the Council, mostly academics like myself, included Mr. Umesao Tadao, Mr. Tadao Ishikawa, Mr. Eto Shinkichi, Mr. Nagai Yonosuke, and Mr. Kamiya Fuji. In contrast, the younger members added Mr. Masakazu Yamazaki, Mr. Eto Jun, Mr. Masataka Kosaka, and myself. As the youngest member of the board, I was appointed as the secretary of the board.
The background to this is often mentioned in Sato Eisaku Diary (in six volumes, Asahi Shimbun, 1997-99) and Kusuda Minoru Diary (Chuokoron Shinsha, 2001).
Although we agreed on recognizing the People's Republic of China as the legitimate government, we believed that relations with Taiwan, the Republic of China, were so important to Japan that we should establish diplomatic relations with China, while also making due adjustments to our relationship with Taiwan.
For the first time in Prime Minister Sato's policy speech to the Diet in January 1971, this idea was expressed when he used the term "People's Republic of China" to describe his administration policy.
Before and after this, there was also the issue of the so-called "Hori letter," or Governor Minobe Ryokichi took a letter from Liberal Democratic Party Secretary-General Hori Shigeru, addressed to Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, with him on his visit to China.
To be continued in this article.
