Now, Let Us Turn to the Core Topic: China's Military Strategy and Policy
August 4, 2018
(Continuation from the previous entry)
— Let’s now move into the core topic of China’s military strategy and policy. Over the past 20-plus years, China has drastically increased its defense spending and expanded its military power. Under the Xi Jinping administration, have there been any major shifts in its military strategy?
"Before I answer that, let me first explain that Xi Jinping is a uniquely positioned political leader among China’s top leadership in terms of his deep and special ties with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Xi has maintained close relations with the military since his youth within the Communist Party. Now that he is the country’s top leader, his emotional attachment and loyalty to the military remain exceptionally strong—a trait that clearly distinguishes him from previous leaders like Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao."
— What served as the catalyst for Xi Jinping’s special bond with the military?
"As widely known, Xi’s father was Xi Zhongxun, one of the Eight Immortals of the Chinese Communist Party. During the Cultural Revolution, however, Xi Zhongxun’s home was raided by the Red Guards, he was imprisoned, and Xi Jinping’s younger sister was killed. Xi himself was ‘sent down’ to the countryside like many of his peers and worked diligently as the leader of a Communist Party production brigade in Shaanxi Province.
This experience deeply shaped Xi. He came to strongly believe in party discipline and social control, and he developed a profound aversion to social instability and chaos."
— What happened to Xi Jinping after the Cultural Revolution?
"He entered and graduated from Tsinghua University. His first formal interaction with the military began in 1979, when he became secretary to Geng Biao, a renowned PLA general who had fought in both the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. Geng later transitioned to diplomacy and served as ambassador to six countries—a very rare career path.
Xi worked as Geng’s secretary until 1982, during which time Geng held key posts including Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Minister of Defense, and Vice Premier. Through this period, Xi gained firsthand experience not only in politics, diplomacy, and party affairs, but also learned deeply about the Party–military relationship and built close ties with numerous military officers."
— Is it common for other top CCP leaders to develop such strong ties with the military during their rise to power?
"No. In this respect, Xi Jinping’s path to supreme leadership is quite unique. In recent decades, most top leaders have focused exclusively on party affairs or administrative duties, with little or no direct involvement with the PLA. Xi's intimate connection with the military sets him apart."
A Special Bond
— Xi Jinping later served for many years in southern China’s Fujian Province, didn’t he?
“Yes, and during that time, he further deepened his ties with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). When Xi first began working in Fujian, he was appointed Vice Mayor of Xiamen. Notably, the headquarters of the PLA’s 31st Group Army was located in Xiamen, and the relationships Xi developed with the military personnel there would endure for many years.
He later served as Party Secretary of Fuzhou, and by 2000, he became Governor of Fujian Province. During this period, he also held several military-related posts, including Party Secretary of the Fuzhou Military Region and Deputy Director of the Fujian Provincial National Defense Mobilization Committee.
In 2002, when he became Party Secretary of Zhejiang Province at the age of 49, he continued to hold concurrent military positions, such as First Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Military District Party Committee, Deputy Director of the Nanjing Military Region National Defense Mobilization Committee, and Director of the Zhejiang Provincial National Defense Mobilization Committee.
It was around this time that, among rising candidates within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) viewed as future top leaders, Xi began to be recognized as having a uniquely strong bond with the PLA.”
— What impact did Xi’s long-standing and close ties with the military have afterward?
“First, as Xi began consolidating power, he promoted many of the military personnel he had become close with during his time in Fujian and elsewhere into key positions. These were figures from the 31st Group Army and others he had worked with in Fujian.
Even in top-level appointments at influential institutions like the PLA National Defense University and the Academy of Military Sciences, Xi’s personal connections played a significant role.
Today, many of those long-standing associates now reside in Beijing, supporting the Xi Jinping regime while also contributing to the formulation of China’s comprehensive military strategies and doctrines. Some have even become members of the Central Military Commission, where they are actively involved in developing operational military plans for the PLA as a whole.”
The Chinese Dream
— The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) units stationed in Fujian Province are directly responsible for military operations against Taiwan, correct?
"That’s exactly right. And this connection has significantly influenced Xi Jinping’s stance as China’s top leader. Because of Xi’s especially deep ties with PLA commanders responsible for Taiwan operations in Fujian, he has developed both a strong interest in and detailed knowledge of military plans for a Taiwan invasion. Consequently, he has adopted a particularly hardline position against any political or diplomatic movement toward Taiwanese independence."
— You mentioned that Xi’s military ties are unprecedented compared to his predecessors. Has this led to any distinctive features in his style of governance?
"Yes. One of the key concepts Xi has promoted is ‘Military-Civil Fusion’ (军民融合). This idea stems from his foundational belief in the primacy of the military. It holds that the prosperity of the nation depends on an integrated relationship between the armed forces and civilian sectors, essentially fusing them into a single entity. It reflects a leadership philosophy in which the military is not only central but takes precedence—leading the civilian sector, rather than being subordinated to it."
— That sounds almost like the opposite of the principle of ‘civilian control of the military’ seen in the United States and Japan.
"Exactly. Xi has also emphasized the slogan ‘Strong Military, Prosperous Nation’ (强军兴国). This phrase encapsulates the belief that national revitalization and prosperity are achieved through the enhancement of military power. For Xi, the military is the main engine of national strength. He often invokes slogans such as ‘The Chinese Dream’, ‘China’s Rejuvenation’, and ‘The Greatness of China’—all of which are designed to inspire the idea that China should become a powerful, globally influential, and economically mighty nation. And underpinning all of these concepts is one thing: a powerful military. The PLA is tasked with securing the strategic stability China needs both at home and abroad. That role has not changed."
— So even the seemingly soft slogan ‘China’s Rejuvenation’ carries implications of military expansion?
"Yes. While the phrase ‘China’s Rejuvenation’ may sound moderate or even uplifting, it carries a deeply rooted and aggressive subtext. It’s effectively a call to prepare for conflict in order to redress historical grievances. These grievances stem from what is taught in Chinese textbooks as the ‘Century of Humiliation’, a term that defines the period from the First Opium War in 1840 to the defeat of Japan in 1945, which paved the way for the Communist Party’s rise to power.
During this century, China suffered a series of defeats and unequal treaties: the Qing Dynasty's concessions to foreign powers, the loss in the Second Opium War, and the 1894–95 defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, among others. Among the nations responsible for this ‘humiliation,’ Japan ranks first in China’s historical narrative.
Thus, the legacy of these historical grievances—what Chinese leaders see as unresolved resentment and national indignity—plays a major role in shaping China’s current external strategies, particularly its increasingly assertive stance toward Japan."
— So, the Xi Jinping regime’s notion of “China’s Rejuvenation” contains the element of avenging the “Century of Humiliation,” with Japan as its main target. That would mean China’s anti-Japanese strategy is deeply rooted and heavily distorted by historical resentment.
"That’s exactly right. Even the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 is considered one of the sources of the current Chinese Communist Party’s hostility toward Japan. As widely known, the Boxers were an anti-foreign secret society that attacked foreign legations in Beijing and other cities. The Qing Dynasty itself eventually supported them. In response, a coalition of eight nations, including the U.S., European powers, and Japan, suppressed the rebellion—but Japan’s military played the most prominent role.
The Chinese Communist Party has since crafted a historical narrative starting with the Boxer Rebellion, through the 1931 Manchurian Incident, and into the full-scale Sino-Japanese War, using this narrative to stoke anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese public. The ultimate purpose is to consolidate domestic support for the Communist Party itself.
This historically driven resentment toward Japan is deeply entrenched and continues to manifest today, particularly in China’s aggressive military actions surrounding the Senkaku Islands."
— Then from Japan’s standpoint, trying to ease tensions with China through present-day policy and rhetoric alone would be extremely difficult, wouldn't it?
"Indeed. But it’s important to note that Japan is not the only country subjected to this behavior. China also exhibits antagonistic attitudes toward the United States, drawing on the historical memory of having fought American forces during the Korean War, America’s long-standing alliance with Taiwan, and the fact that they were de facto enemies during the Vietnam War.
Both Japan and the United States now face a Chinese Communist Party regime that uses historical grievances—particularly those involving national humiliation and revenge—as a justification for its rule and an instrument of domestic legitimacy. That’s the core challenge."
