We should now again question and denounce the cost and the magnitude of responsibility for the 30-year delay since the Tiananmen Square incident and the loss of this precious 30 years of the Heisei era in Japan's perception of China, from the perspective of "What made Japan do it?
The following is a continuation of the previous chapter.
The Chinese economy has grown enormously over the past 30 years since the Tiananmen Square incident has "proven" the validity of the "Chinese model" as a growth philosophy in the 21st century.
The "One Belt, One Road" concept that Xi Jinping's leadership began advocating in 2014, three years after Halper's book in Japanese, is nothing less than implementing this model.
If this is the case, we need to rethink how serious the problem is that the West, mainly European countries, is so readily jumping on board the "One Belt, One Road" bandwagon.
Japan Lost 30 Valuable Years
Finally, I would like to consider the logic of the Chinese side in deciding to suppress the students by force in the case of the Jinanmen Revolution.
In this context, it is necessary to note that China has always tried to overcome the "Western Impact" (impact from the West) that it has historically received from the "outside world" (Western countries) in the "Chinese way.
The first "Western Impact" China has received is the material threat of the Western world, industrial technology, and military power. The means of domestic systemic change to counter these threats were the Xinhai Revolution (1912), the Communist Revolution (1949), and the "reform and opening up" (1978).
Even Xi Jinping's "Great Revival of the Chinese Nation" has at its core the powerful motive of "overcoming Western Impact" at work.
Therefore, China will take any means to realize this dream.
Tiananmen Square was a milestone in this direction.
It demonstrated to the world that it would never accept democratization directly imported from the West.
The "second milestone" may be the "One Belt, One Road" or establishing a military base in the South China Sea.
With economic friction and the struggle for technological supremacy with the United States, they can't accept American leadership and "take the plunge" like Japan has.
In other words, "China will never make the same mistake as Japan, which succumbed to the hegemony of the U.S. and became the loser in world history."
The second "Western Impact" is the values espoused by the West, such as the emphasis on democracy and human rights, to which China, out of a need for a countervailing philosophy, has turned to Confucianism as a "universal value system.
For example, to rationalize the Xi Jinping dictatorship in the post-Marxist era, a revival of the "ideology of heavenly destiny," which legitimizes the absolute and coercive rule of power, is being promoted.
Or, it is precisely because this ideology has continued to take root in Chinese society up to now that the Tiananmen Square incident was covered up and that economic growth alone was able to support that system.
It is undoubtedly a "miracle of world history," albeit in a negative sense.
In fact, it can be said that this is the result of the "resilience of Chinese civilization," which is trying to push back the "Western Impact" at any cost.
The third "Western Impact" is modern international law and order.
In contrast, China's history shows that the Chinese World Order, which does not recognize the existence of an equal partner, is a civilizational tradition.
Establishing the nine-dash line, which designates the entire South China Sea as its sea, and constructing artificial islands and military bases are examples of China's steady progress in making the South China Sea a fact of life.
Thus, the Tiananmen Square incident clearly demonstrated 30 years ago that China does not accept "external logic" and will live as a nation different from the Western countries.
Japan should have learned the lesson of the Tiananmen Square incident much earlier.
Finally, after a delay of 30 years, based on the shift in the U.S. Trump administration's strategy toward China, various discussions have begun, albeit belatedly, to follow suit.
Personally, I cannot shake the feeling that it is already too late.
In fact, for more than 20 years, I have consistently advocated the need for this.
The "lost 20 years," or the 30-year delay since the Tiananmen Square incident, and the 30 years of the Heisei era, are precious time that Japan has lost in terms of its perception of China, and we must now ask ourselves again, "What made Japan do this?
The struggle for supremacy between the U.S. and China may continue for the next 20 to 30 years, or even longer in some cases.
Japan's immediate choices are clear.
Japan's immediate choice is to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance even further to deter China and effectively protect Japan's sovereignty and independence.
Japan must now make its stance clear.
The question, however, is what will happen after this security policy of deterrence against China is successfully implemented.
At that time, a larger or more assertive China would still exist after Japan, and the U.S. would be completely transformed from the world's policeman to the world's policeman.
It is also possible that the U.S. will have completely retired from being the world's policeman and will have adopted a "half-body posture" in Asia.
If China has not entirely overcome the Tiananmen Square incident by then, Japan will be faced with a power that can no longer be described by the mere term "security threat.
The "immediate security policy" must also take this situation into account.
We must seriously discuss and immediately begin work on how we can maintain the Japan-U.S. alliance for as long as possible and, at the same time, build up the comprehensive viability of an independent nation, including diplomacy, capable of defending itself with its own strength and skills.
Only such a Japan can prevent the rise of the "abyssal ties" between the U.S. and China I mentioned earlier.
We must remember that we are standing on the brink of a new era of peace and reconciliation.
2024/6/7 in Nagoya
