Diplomatic Defeat
(Continuation from the previous chapter)
Tarumi:
The Japanese media may report on individual films, but there’s little coverage presenting the broader picture—like this large-scale campaign or the military parade I’ll discuss shortly.
In truth, this goes beyond movies.
On July 3, the State Council Information Office of China announced a series of cultural events (stage plays, singing concerts, etc.) related to the 80th anniversary.
This “Anti-Japan” grand campaign is expected to continue through autumn.
I’m genuinely concerned that if this situation continues, attacks on Japanese residents and Japanese schools abroad could happen again.
Sakurai:
On August 31 and September 1, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit will be held in Tianjin, just outside Beijing.
Tarumi:
Leaders from ten countries—China, Russia, four Central Asian nations, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus—will gather.
Then, on September 3, a massive military parade will take place at Tiananmen Square in Beijing as the climax of the “80th Anniversary of Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan.”
The Chinese Communist Party plans to have these summit leaders attend as honored guests.
It’s already confirmed that Russian President Putin will be in attendance.
It’s also been reported that U.S. President Trump has been invited, though the Chinese government has neither confirmed nor denied this.
It seems the South Korean president has also been invited.
North Korea may even join.
I expect quite a few national leaders, including from Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries, to attend.
Sakurai:
So, the anti-Japan campaign will be staged right in front of the eyes of the world.
Tarumi:
In China, this parade is being promoted as “the third great military parade by the three superpowers.”
Following Russia in May and the U.S. in June, China intends to make this the largest and most impressive in both scale and quality.
They boast that foreign leaders will witness the might of China and the strength of the People’s Liberation Army.
Sakurai:
Do you think President Trump will attend?
Tarumi:
I hope not, but if he does and stands beside Putin and Xi Jinping, from Japan’s perspective, it would evoke scenes reminiscent of the Yalta Conference—this time in Beijing.
For Japan, it would mean another “defeat” on the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II.
Not militarily, but diplomatically.
Sakurai:
That’s a dark joke.
Tarumi:
Exactly.
And after the military parade, “September 18” awaits us.
Sakurai:
In China, the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident on September 18 is believed to be the start of the war with Japan.
Tarumi:
This summer will be entirely dominated by historical issues in Japan-China relations.
Now, within China, there are even voices saying, “We should invite Prime Minister Ishiba.”
It may sound like a joke, but apparently Ishiba’s past remarks about war have often been ones the Chinese side welcomes.
Since German leaders have been invited to ceremonies related to the past war, they say, maybe it would be interesting to invite the Japanese prime minister too.
Sakurai:
Japan is truly being disrespected.
Tarumi:
In the past, China recognized Japan as a great power.
Now, they no longer think so.
That means they essentially have no policy toward Japan at all.
To put it bluntly, Chinese diplomacy is fundamentally focused only on the U.S.
As I mentioned earlier, China looks at things from a macro perspective.
The essence of China’s medium- to long-term diplomacy is to create the international order it desires.
Until now, that order was led by the U.S., so China sees diplomacy as a strategic struggle with America.
That’s their understanding.
Sakurai:
And now, President Trump appears before such a China.
Tarumi:
Trump’s tariffs are troublesome, but in reality, he’s a relatively easy partner for China.
Unlike the Biden administration, Trump shows no interest in systems, human rights, or democratization.
What Trump prioritizes with “America First” is reducing trade deficits, creating jobs, and reviving the U.S. economy.
He’s moving away from the role of world policeman.
As U.S. influence in the international community declines, its relations with Europe have also worsened.
Trade negotiations have strained U.S. relations with South Korea and Japan as well.
From China’s perspective, there’s never been a more favorable time.
As I said at the beginning, China thinks of Japan as something to bait lightly and keep nearby.
Rōi:
Why has it come to this?
It’s because, for 80 years after the war, Japan existed in an environment where it didn’t need to conduct independent diplomacy or national defense.
Just watch America’s mood and stay within the framework provided.
That’s why Japan lacks the kind of strategic thinking China engages in.
I feel that Chinese people look down on such Japanese.
Mr. Tarumi is recognized as the only diplomat who ever spoke up to China, but perhaps the reason Japan has said so little until now is that there was a prevailing notion that “we don’t need to say anything.”
Tarumi:
If I may quote The Analects, Japanese diplomacy—not just toward China, but also toward the U.S.—has always followed the principle of “Harmony is to be valued.”
But The Analects also says “Be in harmony but not in agreement.”
Harmony is important, but “not in agreement” means you shouldn’t lose your essence just to conform.
That mindset is exactly what we need today.
The essence of being a diplomat is to pursue the national interest.
Since we’re paid by taxpayers, even while seeking cooperation with other nations, we must speak up—say the unpleasant things if necessary—for our national benefit.
That’s how I have always worked.
Sakurai:
The patriots at the end of the Edo period had a national vision: “Let go of domains, unite as Japan.”
They looked at the world and seriously considered how Japan should survive within global strategies.
After the war, under GHQ occupation, even our constitution was changed, and we lost the opportunity to learn true history.
Bluntly put, we were told: “Don’t think about national affairs—just do business.”
Now, the Japanese can only think within that narrow framework.
Tarumi:
That’s exactly right.
Sakurai:
With the shift under the Trump administration, we’ve come to face the threat of China on our own.
And Japan, when faced with this crisis, is simply floundering.
Looking back, former Prime Minister Abe decided not to hold a Japan-China summit under the conditions demanded by China after taking office.
Eventually, Xi Jinping had to relent, and Japan showed firmness.
But under the Kishida administration and beyond, the summit itself became the goal.
And Prime Minister Ishiba, when members of Nippon Kaigi visited his office, reportedly asked, “Can’t we do something about the A-class war criminals at Yasukuni Shrine?”
Saying such things makes him look pro-China.
As a result, China doesn’t take Japan seriously.
Japan today cannot be firm with those it truly needs to confront.
Tarumi:
And not just with China—but with the U.S. as well.
We’re always worried about appearances, unable to say anything firm.
For example, when Prime Minister Ishiba first met President Trump, he referred to Trump as “a leader chosen by God,” in light of Trump surviving an assassination attempt.
Perhaps, as a Christian, Ishiba has that religious outlook, or maybe he thought he needed to flatter Trump for the sake of the Japanese people.
Sakurai:
NATO’s Secretary-General Rutte once called President Trump “Daddy” in an attempt to curry favor. It’s pathetic to watch.
Prime Minister Ishiba Will Be Judged by History
Tarumi:
It’s nothing short of tragic.
I believe President Trump will be judged by history, maybe in 10, 50, or 100 years.
For better or worse, there’s no doubt he’ll be evaluated as a politician.
And when that time comes, it’ll be noted that some prime minister from East Asia once flattered him by saying he was “chosen by God.”
Even if he said it for Japan’s national interest, as a politician, he must consider how history will judge such remarks.
Unlike Abe, who demonstrated presence through diplomacy, Ishiba may be ignored altogether in Japanese history textbooks.
Sakurai:
I do believe Prime Minister Ishiba will be judged by history.
Tarumi:
At the very least, when I became ambassador to China, I was always conscious of “how history would judge me.”
Diplomats and politicians bear the responsibility of shaping a nation’s history.
Without such awareness, all they can do is try to win favor.
Sakurai:
Prime Minister Abe was skilled at handling President Trump, but he never fawned like Ishiba.
For example, when he heard that China wouldn’t buy U.S. corn, he offered to buy it on Japan’s behalf.
Though the agreement was to buy in phases—I, II, III, IV—he offered to buy phases I and II early, and Trump, misunderstanding this as “Shinzo will buy it all,” gleefully announced it at a press conference.
But Abe simply said he’d buy what was already agreed upon, just ahead of schedule.
If that made Trump happy, so be it.
Tarumi:
Exactly. That’s enough. No need to pander.
Sakurai:
Take tariff negotiations, for example—Germany’s Chancellor Merz handled it very well.
It’s said he speaks with Trump by phone almost weekly.
If there’s a flood in Texas, he says “That’s terrible,” and when a tax reform bill passes, he says “Congratulations.”
He maintains communication.
On the other hand, Prime Minister Ishiba is bad at phone calls and doesn’t even know what to say diplomatically.
That’s why someone like him should never have become prime minister.
It’s a tragedy for Japan.
Tarumi:
Speaking of phone calls—during the COVID era, when all human exchanges had ceased, Xi Jinping still engaged in wide-reaching phone diplomacy with leaders in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.
Sakurai:
China is shrewd.
I doubt the Japanese prime minister even thinks about distant small countries.
Tarumi:
To the Global South, getting a call from a major power like China is a big deal.
Sakurai:
Even 10 minutes is enough.
A phone call takes little time or cost.
It’s a matter of will.
Tarumi:
China’s diplomatic posture, in that sense, must be acknowledged.
There’s still so much Japan could be doing.
