The following is from an authentic article by Genkotsu Takufumi published in the monthly magazine Voice in November 2016.
The people who subscribe to newspapers such as Asahi and watch programs on their subsidiary TV stations and NHK must be made aware of the facts that his work reveals.
Not only that, but many people are also chanting for "friendship between Japan and China" and other such slogans.
As a resident of Osaka, I am horrified every day to realize that the number of Chinese people in Osaka has increased dramatically in just a few years.
I encounter Chinese people whenever I go out to Umeda for business.
My friend, who moves around Osaka City much more often than I do for various errands, says that every time he does so, he wonders if it is safe for him to do so.
The people who subscribe to newspapers such as Asahi and watch programs on their subsidiary TV stations and NHK must be made aware of the facts that his work reveals.
Not only that, but many people are also chanting for "friendship between Japan and China" and other such slogans.
As a resident of Osaka, I am horrified every day to realize that the number of Chinese people in Osaka has increased dramatically in just a few years.
I encounter Chinese people whenever I go out to Umeda for business.
My friend, who moves around Osaka City much more often than I do for various errands, says that every time he does so, he wonders if it is safe for him to do so.
Nov. 14, 2016
I was reading an article I had left out of the VOICE this morning, and my friend who had read this monthly publication earlier said.
Your words have reached the editorial board members of this book.
Among the many facts written in Genkotsu Takufumi's extertion, starting from page 92, I would like to share the following passages with you.
These are the facts that are a must-read for the Japanese people and people around the world.
Preamble Omitted
Emphasis in the text other than the headline is mine.
Spying on the Self-Defense Forces
Since 1992, when China distributed the "Communist Party of China's Central Seven Documents" to all of its provinces and military forces to actively collect foreign intelligence, China has been conducting intelligence operations to this day.
China considers the transfer of technology from Japan essential for its national defense, and it has been lobbying for technology transfers to those involved in advanced technology and defense-related companies.
In the past, China has been involved in several cases, such as the Wang Yao-Ran Incident in 1976 (in which Yao-Ran, who ran a trading company in Hong Kong, was instructed by Chinese intelligence agencies to gather information on military and industrial technology in Japan in return for continued trade with China, and used several Japanese collaborators to carry out intelligence activities), and 1987 (Chinese and pro-China group leaders who had been manipulated at the former Soviet embassy in Japan, along with Yokota Air Base employees and military critics, sold U.S. Air Force materials to the former Soviet Union and China over eight years).
In 2004, a consulate employee at the Consulate-General of Japan in Shanghai was caught in a honey trap at a karaoke bar and killed himself, fearing that he would be blamed for giving the government offices from which all consulate employees came and that he would be required to disclose the information system.
In 2006, a self-defense official of the Maritime Self-Defense Force's Kami-Taoma Security Station who fell for a honey trap at the same karaoke bar as the consulate staff member was interrogated for repeatedly taking inside information without permission and traveling to China without permission, and one of them committed suicide.
In 2007, structural drawings of the Aegis system came into Chinese hands (when the wife of a Chinese national who is a second-class sea sergeant was investigated for violation of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, information about the Aegis was discovered on a hard disk seized by Kanagawa Prefectural Police. The then chief of the Maritime Staff resigned after the wife of a Chinese national was deported but went into hiding in Japan again). Still, there have been many more "allegations" of Chinese spies working for the Self-Defense Forces, including "allegations" of information leaks at the Ministry of Defense Intelligence Headquarters (2013), "allegations of spying on students at the National Defense Academy" (2014), and so on. (2014), to name just a few.
I was reading an article I had left out of the VOICE this morning, and my friend who had read this monthly publication earlier said.
Your words have reached the editorial board members of this book.
Among the many facts written in Genkotsu Takufumi's extertion, starting from page 92, I would like to share the following passages with you.
These are the facts that are a must-read for the Japanese people and people around the world.
Preamble Omitted
Emphasis in the text other than the headline is mine.
Spying on the Self-Defense Forces
Since 1992, when China distributed the "Communist Party of China's Central Seven Documents" to all of its provinces and military forces to actively collect foreign intelligence, China has been conducting intelligence operations to this day.
China considers the transfer of technology from Japan essential for its national defense, and it has been lobbying for technology transfers to those involved in advanced technology and defense-related companies.
In the past, China has been involved in several cases, such as the Wang Yao-Ran Incident in 1976 (in which Yao-Ran, who ran a trading company in Hong Kong, was instructed by Chinese intelligence agencies to gather information on military and industrial technology in Japan in return for continued trade with China, and used several Japanese collaborators to carry out intelligence activities), and 1987 (Chinese and pro-China group leaders who had been manipulated at the former Soviet embassy in Japan, along with Yokota Air Base employees and military critics, sold U.S. Air Force materials to the former Soviet Union and China over eight years).
In 2004, a consulate employee at the Consulate-General of Japan in Shanghai was caught in a honey trap at a karaoke bar and killed himself, fearing that he would be blamed for giving the government offices from which all consulate employees came and that he would be required to disclose the information system.
In 2006, a self-defense official of the Maritime Self-Defense Force's Kami-Taoma Security Station who fell for a honey trap at the same karaoke bar as the consulate staff member was interrogated for repeatedly taking inside information without permission and traveling to China without permission, and one of them committed suicide.
In 2007, structural drawings of the Aegis system came into Chinese hands (when the wife of a Chinese national who is a second-class sea sergeant was investigated for violation of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, information about the Aegis was discovered on a hard disk seized by Kanagawa Prefectural Police. The then chief of the Maritime Staff resigned after the wife of a Chinese national was deported but went into hiding in Japan again). Still, there have been many more "allegations" of Chinese spies working for the Self-Defense Forces, including "allegations" of information leaks at the Ministry of Defense Intelligence Headquarters (2013), "allegations of spying on students at the National Defense Academy" (2014), and so on. (2014), to name just a few.
In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake, China dispatched a rescue team of only 15 people, while more than 200 reporters visited the area.
It is fair to assume that these reporters were dispatched to scout the movements of the Self-Defense Forces.
Spies sent to Japan target Chinese business people and celebrities, members of organizations that claim to be friendly to China and Japan, Japanese people engaged in trade, and the mass media, etc., and they conduct their operations by using Japanese agents etc., without agency personnel being at the forefront.
In addition, the Ministry of State Security conducts Chinese intelligence gathering, which requires Chinese Communist Party members who leave the country to submit periodic reports on matters that have occurred in the country they are visiting.
Considering that there are currently as many as 50,000 Chinese Communist Party members staying in Japan, as we will discuss later, this intelligence network is nothing more than a threat.
I interviewed Chinese students who are members of the Communist Party about the contents of the report, and they all laughed and said, "It doesn't say much. They all laughingly replied, "I don't write anything important."
However, even information that the person himself thinks is unimportant can be a different story when bundled together.
Even a simple complaint or boast can reveal the inner workings of an organization and provide an opening for the Chinese to take advantage of.
Since many of the best and brightest people who enter top companies and universities are members of the Chinese Communist Party, even if they are the most junior employees, the vast amounts of fragmented information they report are put together like a jigsaw puzzle and unraveled as new facts.
While extremely inefficient, we and the providers themselves are not easily aware that information is being collected.
If there were no real meaning, this type of intelligence would be discontinued, but the fact that it continues to be used today shows that this method is effective.
This article continues.
It is fair to assume that these reporters were dispatched to scout the movements of the Self-Defense Forces.
Spies sent to Japan target Chinese business people and celebrities, members of organizations that claim to be friendly to China and Japan, Japanese people engaged in trade, and the mass media, etc., and they conduct their operations by using Japanese agents etc., without agency personnel being at the forefront.
In addition, the Ministry of State Security conducts Chinese intelligence gathering, which requires Chinese Communist Party members who leave the country to submit periodic reports on matters that have occurred in the country they are visiting.
Considering that there are currently as many as 50,000 Chinese Communist Party members staying in Japan, as we will discuss later, this intelligence network is nothing more than a threat.
I interviewed Chinese students who are members of the Communist Party about the contents of the report, and they all laughed and said, "It doesn't say much. They all laughingly replied, "I don't write anything important."
However, even information that the person himself thinks is unimportant can be a different story when bundled together.
Even a simple complaint or boast can reveal the inner workings of an organization and provide an opening for the Chinese to take advantage of.
Since many of the best and brightest people who enter top companies and universities are members of the Chinese Communist Party, even if they are the most junior employees, the vast amounts of fragmented information they report are put together like a jigsaw puzzle and unraveled as new facts.
While extremely inefficient, we and the providers themselves are not easily aware that information is being collected.
If there were no real meaning, this type of intelligence would be discontinued, but the fact that it continues to be used today shows that this method is effective.
This article continues.
2024/6/12 in Kanazawa
