Iran and Saudi Arabia Square Off
The Growing Rivalry Between Tehran and Riyadh
October 11, 2011
Yesterday afternoon, the U.S. government charged Mansoor Arbabsiar, a dual U.S.–Iranian citizen, and Gholam Shakuri, an alleged member of the Iranian Quds Force (a division of the Revolutionary Guards), with conspiracy to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States, Adel Al-Jubeir, and to attack both the Saudi and Israeli embassies in Washington, D.C. Although the nature of Iranian government involvement remains to be seen, the indictment is just the latest story in the intricate cold war now developing between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The two countries, at odds since the 1979 revolution in Iran and ever more so in the wake of the Arab Spring, are competing for dominance in global energy markets and nuclear technology and for political influence in the Persian Gulf and the Levant. Their conflict, with its sectarian overtones, has the potential to weaken pro-democracy forces in the Middle East and North Africa, empower Islamists, and drag the United States into military interventions. To avoid all this, the United States will need strategic imagination to devise ways to mitigate and manage the rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran.
Iran and Saudi Arabia are neither natural allies nor natural enemies but natural rivals who have long competed as major oil producers and self-proclaimed defenders of Shia and Sunni Islam, respectively. Until the Iranian revolution in 1979, their rivalry was managed and controlled by the United States, with whom they were both strategic allies. But after the Shah was overthrown, Saudi Arabia’s leadership became frightened by the Ayatollah Khomenei’s denunciation of the Saudi monarchy as antithetical to Islam and his ambition to export to the revolution to the Arab world. Saudi Arabia remained an ally of the United States; Iran became an implacable foe. Thereafter, the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia became defined by the new U.S. strategy -- ally with Saudi Arabia to offset Iran.
As a result, Iran sees Saudi Arabia as a wealthy, ambitious proxy of the United States and Saudi Arabia views Iran as a major source of instability in the region, believing that it seeks to establish a so-called Shia Crescent to dominate Arab Sunnis. The rivalry has shaped both countries' policies as they have attempted to contain and combat each other’s influence. They have accused each other of blatant interference in their internal affairs, including indirect support for acts of terrorism against each other.
NOTE:
米軍のイラク多数はシーア派政権擁立
米軍撤退後のイランのへのイラクの影響：イラク シーア政権
イランのシリア少数派アラウィット アサッド政権支持
サウジのシリア反政府スンニ、サラフィスト支援
イランのエジプト反政府民主化民衆支持：エジプト、ファティマイツ（シーア）要素？
サウジのエジプト旧政権、ムバラク支持
サウジのバハレーン少数派スンニ王政政府支持：サウジ軍事支援
イランのバハレーン多数派シーア 反政府派支持
イスラエル核武装
⇒ イランの原発導入→ 潜在的核武装
⇒サウジの原発導入→イラン対抗核武装
＊西洋欧米のMENAイスラム地域のスンニ/シーア分断挑発戦略