Saudi Arabians hold anti-regime rally in Eastern Province
アラビア湾側東部地方にはシーア派が多く、原油資源が豊富だが、一般サウジ市民、特にもシーア派市民には貧困が多い。 社会インフラの不備による生活環境は「原油富裕アラブ」のステレオタイプからは程遠い。
王国支配層内での内部闘争が表には出ないが、実際には激しく、外向政策にも大きく影響している。
ゆっくりとした社会改革を始めている現国王派はアラブ派だと謂われている。一方、保守的なイスラム派は、現国王の改革政策に強く反対しており、国王亡き後は大きな動きに出ると予測されている・
シリア反政府派への資金武器投入で政権倒しに長く動いてきたのは、実際には現国王派ではないとされる。サウジ国王の存命中はシリア政権も持ち堪えるであろう、と言うアナリストもいる・
Expat workers in KSA to get more rights - ministry
KSA favoured Gulf destination for migrants - poll
パスポート保管、国内移動の不自由、雇用主・スポンサー変更の不自由、休暇中の家族呼び寄せ／巡礼禁止などの規制が取り消されると言う。 本来パスポートは個人の所有物ではなく、国家所有物なので他国権力が保管する事自体が国際法に反すると言われるが、一方パスポート保管しないで起こる犯罪も少なくはない。
こうしたサウジアラビアの労働条件や限られた権利にも関わらず、諸外国から同国へ働きに出たい労働移民の間での人気は相変わらず高い。
昨年以来顕著なサウジアラビアの社会改革が、外国人居住者、労働者の権利へも及ぶ。
興味深い注目ニュース
Saudi king sacks cleric who attacked social reform
次はサウジだと云われるのは、このためかも知れない。サウジ社会改革を始めた政府王家と超保守と言われるイスラム教ワハビ派の拮抗。ではその「ワハビ派イスラム」とは誰が何時、どの様に打立て始まり、サウジ社会に浸透していったのか．．．に注目したい。
Saudi tourism sector to create 1.6 million jobs by 2015
観光業での雇用創出が最も手軽で、逸早くとりあえずは失業対策にはなるのだが．．． 技術産業化できないと結局は長期的な解決にはならないだろう。
Saudi's Alwaleed Rotana to Move to Bahrain
シーア派多数人口を少数派スンニ王族が治めるバハレーンでは1年以上抗議デモが続いている。マナマを選んだ理由は、シーア派民衆が抗議しているのは反対に、比較的言論の自由がある、反対意見間での対話の空気がある、と王子は言う。 バハレーンの昨年の抗議民衆制圧には、GCC諸国政府協力軍配備前に、サウジは逸早く密かに軍を送っていた。現在、治安警察を指揮するのは、元ロンドン警察副長官だ。バハレーンはサウジ社会のガス抜き街としても知られている。
アルジャジーラがもう落ち目で先行き知れていたのを見抜いて、新たに24時間ニュースチャンネルを立ち上げるサウジのアルワリード王子は、そのロターナ テレビ本社をカイロからバハレーンのマナマに正式に移転する処理を終えた。 ロターナテレビは既にLBC、フォックスグループなど１２チャンネルを展開。興味深いのは、かの ニュース コープがロターナの20％を所有してる点だ。
ドーハのカタール政府がもつアルジャジーラ、サウジがもつドバイのアルアラビーヤ、アブダビがつい最近開始したスカイニュース アラブ版に対抗し、来年ロターナもニュースチャンネルを開始するが、観てみれば、裏にはやっぱり同じ顔ぶれの世界のメディアを握るタイクーンがしっかり報道情報管理をしている。
Saudi opposition to Iran fades on $100 oil goal
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/saudi-opposition-iran-fades-on-100-oil-goal-427603.html?page=0
Saudi Arabia’s biggest cut in oil output in three years is a sign OPEC’s largest producer is finding common cause with its long-time rival Iran.
The kingdom reduced supply by 400,000 barrels a day, or about 4 percent, last month, Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi said Oct 8, reversing increases that it started in April, when declining Libyan exports sent North Sea Brent to a 2 1/2-year high. Crude prices have fallen 14 percent since then as the North African nation revived production and the International Energy Agency lowered its forecast for global demand.
Cutting output brings Saudi Arabia closer to Iran, which this year urged Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to restrict supplies. Tension between OPEC’s two top producers escalated in March as Persian Gulf nations accused Iran’s Shiite leaders of supporting unrest in Bahrain and other Sunni-led monarchies, a charge Iran denies. Relations soured further when Iran opposed a Saudi proposal at OPEC’s conference in June to pump more oil.
“Despite their mutual antipathy, neither country wants prices to fall below $100,” Leo Drollas, the London-based chief economist at the Centre for Global Energy Studies, an oil consultant founded by former Saudi Oil Minister Zaki Yamani, said. “Iran needs oil as high as it can get it, while the Saudis can live with $90. As oil falls, they become reluctant bedfellows.”
中略
“If the Saudis want to push for more sanctions, they will need to show they are willing to replace any loss in production from Iran.”
While Saudi Arabia has boosted output capacity to 12.5 million barrels a day, Iran’s will decline by about 20 percent to 3 million barrels a day by 2020 as sanctions discourage foreign investment, according to the IEA.
The kingdom has increased supplies by 17 percent since the start of year as Libyan exports collapsed amid fighting to oust Muammar Qaddafi, JODI data show. Iran has kept output little changed in the past three months at about 3.6 million barrels.
OPEC failed to reach a consensus at its June meeting when six members including Iran opposed Saudi Arabia’s push to pump more oil. It was “one of the worst meetings we’ve ever had,” al-Naimi, 76, said after the Vienna talks. The country went ahead with an increase regardless. OPEC meets next on Dec. 14.
Saudi Arabia has stepped in before to balance the oil market as production from other OPEC nations floundered. The kingdom pumped a record 9.9 million barrels a day during the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988. It also increased supply in the first Gulf War and again in 2003 during the US-led invasion of Iraq. Each time, the nation trimmed exports as prices fell.
Oil tumbled to $10 a barrel in the year that followed its decision in late 1997 to push through an OPEC increase, punishing Venezuela, Nigeria and other members that were flouting their official quotas.
Brent will average $107.28 a barrel this quarter, according to the median estimate of 34 analyst forecasts compiled by Bloomberg. Saudi Arabia wants to keep oil between $90 and $100, Barclays Plc and Deutsche Bank AG said on Oct. 17.
“There is no indication whatsoever that the Saudis are considering using their considerable spare oil production capacity to displace Iranian oil, or make it more difficult for Iran to sell its oil,” said Bhushan Bahree, senior director for global oil at IHS-Cambridge Energy Research Associates in Cambridge, Massachusetts. “Besides, if Iran finds itself pressed in the marketplace, it can turn to new customers, or generate buying interest for its oil by discounting it.”
Middle East and Persian Gulf nations are looking to earnings from oil to fund social spending after pro-democracy movements overthrew rulers in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and spread to Yemen and Syria, according to Bank of America Corp. OPEC’s 12 members are forecast to earn an unprecedented $1 trillion in oil revenue this year, US Energy Department said.
“The Saudis typically make decisions based on what’s in their own best interest,” said Adam Sieminski, chief energy economist at Deutsche Bank in Washington. “Their second priority is to do what’s best for global economic conditions. The Saudis probably like seeing the price of Brent between $90 and $100, more than at either $75 or $125.”
NOTE:
欧米に対立扇動させられ続けるオペック２大ライバル産油国の共通利益
スンニ王国サウジアラビア
シーア共和国イラン
今月サウジアラビハここ３年間で最大の日産40万バレル減産に踏み切った。
欧米軍事介入リビヤ市民戦争以来、サウジは日産17%増産、1270万バレル/日
イランも若干の増産で360万バレル/日
アラブの春が中東諸国に拡がるにあたり、産油諸国は政権安定のため原油利益を社会インフラ建設投資に当てたいため、世界の原油需要減が見込まれる中、減産による原油価格高安定を目指す、ライバル二国サウジ/イラン共通の利益をみる。
サウジアラビアが好ましいとするのはバレル90～100ドル
Iran and Saudi Arabia Square Off
The Growing Rivalry Between Tehran and Riyadh
October 11, 2011
Yesterday afternoon, the U.S. government charged Mansoor Arbabsiar, a dual U.S.–Iranian citizen, and Gholam Shakuri, an alleged member of the Iranian Quds Force (a division of the Revolutionary Guards), with conspiracy to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States, Adel Al-Jubeir, and to attack both the Saudi and Israeli embassies in Washington, D.C. Although the nature of Iranian government involvement remains to be seen, the indictment is just the latest story in the intricate cold war now developing between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The two countries, at odds since the 1979 revolution in Iran and ever more so in the wake of the Arab Spring, are competing for dominance in global energy markets and nuclear technology and for political influence in the Persian Gulf and the Levant. Their conflict, with its sectarian overtones, has the potential to weaken pro-democracy forces in the Middle East and North Africa, empower Islamists, and drag the United States into military interventions. To avoid all this, the United States will need strategic imagination to devise ways to mitigate and manage the rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran.
Iran and Saudi Arabia are neither natural allies nor natural enemies but natural rivals who have long competed as major oil producers and self-proclaimed defenders of Shia and Sunni Islam, respectively. Until the Iranian revolution in 1979, their rivalry was managed and controlled by the United States, with whom they were both strategic allies. But after the Shah was overthrown, Saudi Arabia’s leadership became frightened by the Ayatollah Khomenei’s denunciation of the Saudi monarchy as antithetical to Islam and his ambition to export to the revolution to the Arab world. Saudi Arabia remained an ally of the United States; Iran became an implacable foe. Thereafter, the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia became defined by the new U.S. strategy -- ally with Saudi Arabia to offset Iran.
As a result, Iran sees Saudi Arabia as a wealthy, ambitious proxy of the United States and Saudi Arabia views Iran as a major source of instability in the region, believing that it seeks to establish a so-called Shia Crescent to dominate Arab Sunnis. The rivalry has shaped both countries' policies as they have attempted to contain and combat each other’s influence. They have accused each other of blatant interference in their internal affairs, including indirect support for acts of terrorism against each other.
NOTE:
米軍のイラク多数はシーア派政権擁立
米軍撤退後のイランのへのイラクの影響：イラク シーア政権
イランのシリア少数派アラウィット アサッド政権支持
サウジのシリア反政府スンニ、サラフィスト支援
イランのエジプト反政府民主化民衆支持：エジプト、ファティマイツ（シーア）要素？
サウジのエジプト旧政権、ムバラク支持
サウジのバハレーン少数派スンニ王政政府支持：サウジ軍事支援
イランのバハレーン多数派シーア 反政府派支持
イスラエル核武装
⇒ イランの原発導入→ 潜在的核武装
⇒サウジの原発導入→イラン対抗核武装
＊西洋欧米のMENAイスラム地域のスンニ/シーア分断挑発戦略
サウジアラビア次期皇太子候補、ナイエフ王子が有望
Prince Nayef, likely to become heir to Saudi king
Reuters
5:28 a.m. CDT, October 22, 2011
http://www.kfor.com/news/nationworld/sns-rt-us-saudi-nayeftre79l0m5-20111022,0,241460.story
DUBAI (Reuters) - Saudi Arabia's powerful interior minister, Prince Nayef, now likely to become heir to the throne after the death of Crown Prince Sultan, has led a crackdown on al Qaeda militants trying to drive out Westerners and overthrow the ruling al Saud family.
This has made Nayef, who is about 77 and is considered a conservative even by Saudi standards for his close ties with the austere Wahhabi sect of Islam, a pivotal figure in the world's biggest oil exporter.
The royal court announced the death of Prince Sultan, who was thought to be aged about 86, in New York of colon cancer at dawn on Saturday.
As second deputy prime minister, Nayef is first in line to become crown prince, but he would have to be confirmed in that position by the Allegiance Council, a body of royals set up by King Abdullah after he came to the throne in 2005.
Nayef, already one of the most senior princes, has supervised the daily affairs of the kingdom, the birthplace of Islam, in the absence of both the king, who has suffered from back problems, and Sultan in the past.
His emergence as the most active senior member of the ruling family has caused liberal Saudis some disquiet because of his close ties to the powerful clergy of the kingdom's austere Wahhabi school of Islam.
But if he became king, Nayef might move toward the center ground of a political system that prizes consensus, allowing the slow process of economic and social reforms initiated by King Abdullah to continue.
Nayef was born in the western city of Taif around 1934 and is the half-brother of King Abdullah and son of the state's founder, King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud.
He became governor of Riyadh at the age of 20 and has been interior minister since 1975. He was appointed second deputy prime minister in 2009 when Sultan left the country to convalesce after medical treatment.
NOTE:
Nayef ナイエフ王子：内務大臣、第二副首相
サウジスタンダードからでさえ『保守派』とされるワハビ派だが、仮に王位継承した場合、現国王の例と同様、中道寄り立場をとる可能性も考えられる。
2005年シューラ評議会選挙の女性参政権に関し、早過ぎる、として論争を終わらせた事で知られる。
