I decided to copy and type the following article little by little in order to enhance my ability to write in English. In principle, a part of the article will be shown once a week.
Social Problems as Social Movements
Armand L. Mauss
(W)e must not say that an action shocks the common conscience because it is criminal, but rather than that it is criminal because it shocks the common conscience. We do not reprove it because it is a crime, but it is a crime because we reprove it.
(Emile Durkheim, 1933:81)
As this quotation shows, sociologists have known at least since the time of Durkheim that social problems originate in public opinion rather than in objective reality. They have been applying this insight fruitfully in recent years to the study of crime and deviance (e.g., Becker, 1963; and Schur, 1965), but only rarely and by allusion have they applied it to the study of social problems more generally. Indeed, Herbert Blumer (1971) is one of the very few social scientists to have clearly called for this approach to social problems (see also Kitsuse and Spector, 1973; and Spector and Kitsuse, 1973), but so far his call has not been taken very seriously in the textbooks on social problems. The standard textbooks reflect only an occasional recognition of the Durkheim-Blumer insight, and none of them attempts a systematic theory of social problems on this basis.
With but few exceptions, most textbook authors seem to hold that social problems derive from the nature of reality itself---that is, that certain social conditions are inherently problematic. While some authors recognize that public opinion or collective definitions may play a part, they still seem generally to regard public opinion as a mere catalyst that draws the attention of the masses to social conditions already, by their nature, undesirable and in need of change. One of the best-established standard textbooks in the field, for example, defines a “social problem” as follows:
…a condition affecting a significant number of people in ways considered undesirable, about which it is felt something can be done through collective action. (Horton and Leslie, 1974:4)
This definition raises many questions which, to some extent, the authors attempt to answer: What is a “significant number” of people? Considered “undesirable” by whom? Whose “collective action”? In spite of the enormous relativity in answers to such questions, however, the authors seem to have little doubt that at least some social conditions are “undesirable” by anyone’s definition and are therefore social problems in an obvious and objective sense. They tell us, for example, that a “population explosion is a serious problem” these days (Horton and Leslie, 1974:9), they do not say to whom it is a problem. They remark elsewhere (p.10) that “social problems are the logical, normal, and inevitable products of present social values and practices,” which seems to mean that social problems are objective realities created by social institutions rather than by public opinion. While recognizing that the mass media and other vehicles of public opinion may play a part in generating social problems, there authors claim (p.11) that “unless real grievances exist, no amount of publicity will create a problem.” Presumably, then, some grievances are objectively “real.” In short, while according to some importance to public opinion and collective definition, these authors seem to regard many social problems as ultimately real and objective phenomena in society.
Social Problems as Social Movements
Armand L. Mauss
(W)e must not say that an action shocks the common conscience because it is criminal, but rather than that it is criminal because it shocks the common conscience. We do not reprove it because it is a crime, but it is a crime because we reprove it.
(Emile Durkheim, 1933:81)
As this quotation shows, sociologists have known at least since the time of Durkheim that social problems originate in public opinion rather than in objective reality. They have been applying this insight fruitfully in recent years to the study of crime and deviance (e.g., Becker, 1963; and Schur, 1965), but only rarely and by allusion have they applied it to the study of social problems more generally. Indeed, Herbert Blumer (1971) is one of the very few social scientists to have clearly called for this approach to social problems (see also Kitsuse and Spector, 1973; and Spector and Kitsuse, 1973), but so far his call has not been taken very seriously in the textbooks on social problems. The standard textbooks reflect only an occasional recognition of the Durkheim-Blumer insight, and none of them attempts a systematic theory of social problems on this basis.
With but few exceptions, most textbook authors seem to hold that social problems derive from the nature of reality itself---that is, that certain social conditions are inherently problematic. While some authors recognize that public opinion or collective definitions may play a part, they still seem generally to regard public opinion as a mere catalyst that draws the attention of the masses to social conditions already, by their nature, undesirable and in need of change. One of the best-established standard textbooks in the field, for example, defines a “social problem” as follows:
…a condition affecting a significant number of people in ways considered undesirable, about which it is felt something can be done through collective action. (Horton and Leslie, 1974:4)
This definition raises many questions which, to some extent, the authors attempt to answer: What is a “significant number” of people? Considered “undesirable” by whom? Whose “collective action”? In spite of the enormous relativity in answers to such questions, however, the authors seem to have little doubt that at least some social conditions are “undesirable” by anyone’s definition and are therefore social problems in an obvious and objective sense. They tell us, for example, that a “population explosion is a serious problem” these days (Horton and Leslie, 1974:9), they do not say to whom it is a problem. They remark elsewhere (p.10) that “social problems are the logical, normal, and inevitable products of present social values and practices,” which seems to mean that social problems are objective realities created by social institutions rather than by public opinion. While recognizing that the mass media and other vehicles of public opinion may play a part in generating social problems, there authors claim (p.11) that “unless real grievances exist, no amount of publicity will create a problem.” Presumably, then, some grievances are objectively “real.” In short, while according to some importance to public opinion and collective definition, these authors seem to regard many social problems as ultimately real and objective phenomena in society.
