英王立統合防衛・安全保障研究所（RUSI）のマルコム・チャルマース（Malcolm Chalmers）教授の書いた 韓国での戦争を準備する（Preparing for War in Korea）から
第二次朝鮮戦争はどのようなものになるか
●急速に展開し混乱させる戦いになるので、あらかじめ考え準備しておく
●始まり -- もしも平壌が戦争を不可避だと確信したら北朝鮮が先制攻撃をするだろう。-- あるいは、もしも北朝鮮がグアムやカリフォルニア近辺にテスト・ミサイルを飛ばして挑発した場合、アメリカが核・ミサイル軍事施設に限定した先制攻撃をするかもしれない。
●動員のリスク -- 北朝鮮に妥協を引き出させるために、アメリカが本気であることを思わせるために、あたかも戦争準備であるかのような動員を命令するかもしれない。同時に、非軍人や軍人家族らの米軍基地からの避難もありうる。しかし、韓国政府が戦争準備に同意することは難しいだろう。韓国の同意が無くとも、米国だけの動員でも北朝鮮に対する強制力は持ちうる。
●米国の動員により、平壌のみならず、韓国や日本国民も生命の危険を信じるようになるだろう。ソウルや攻撃対象の都市から大量の避難民が生じ、経済的被害が結果し、アメリカに対する批判が増大するだろう。この危険を避けるために、北朝鮮への影響力を犠牲にしても、動員は騒がれずに行われるだろう。
●北朝鮮が戦争開始責任を持つことは、アメリカにとって同盟国の支持を受けることに役立つ。さもなければ、できれば、少なくとも主要同盟国の同意をあらかじめ取っておくことが望ましい。ただしアメリカはできるだけ完全にできるだけ早く北朝鮮の反撃能力を壊滅させなければならない。
●アメリカが先制攻撃を決意した場合、少数のパートナーしかあらかじめ知らされないだろう。日本や韓国も、秘密保持のために制限された警告しか受けないだろう。
●もしもアメリカが韓国政府の同意無しに先制攻撃をするなら、ニューヨークを守るためにソウルを犠牲にするということ意味すると取られるだろう。その時、米韓同盟が存続し続けることは難しくなるだろう。技術的には韓国の同意無しに先制攻撃ができても、アジアにおけるアメリカの立場は悪化するという政治的効果を生むだろう。
●イラク、リビア、シリアなどにしたような限定攻撃は、北朝鮮に対して可能か？ 北朝鮮の現状を分析すると、平壌は限定攻撃を全面戦争の開始だと考え、早期の反撃を加えるだろう。初期の段階でできるだけのダメージを与えて、韓国と日本に（それらを通してアメリカに）早く平和を求める方が身のためだと思わせようとするだろう。
●北朝鮮は数十年にわたりアメリカへの奇襲を計画してきたので、限定攻撃は北朝鮮を全面戦争へと駆り立てるだろう。
●限定攻撃のもつ危険を考慮すると、アメリカは北朝鮮の軍事インフラを徹底的に急激に破壊する攻撃をするかもしれない。空爆やサイバー攻撃によって、北朝鮮が反撃できないように攻撃を加えるかもしれない。韓国は韓国軍の動員を同意せざるを得ないだろう。
●北朝鮮は、長年計画してきた反撃作戦を実行する。戦争初期の段階で莫大な被害を与え、韓国とアメリカが戦争を継続させようとする意志を挫かせようとする。北朝鮮はソウルと在韓米軍基地周辺に大量のミサイルを撃ち、化学兵器も使われるだろう。北朝鮮は大きな反撃を受けるが、広範にわたる地下組織をつかってかなり長期にわたり持ちこたえるだろう。
●北朝鮮は、敵にたいして休戦を同意するための脅しとして、核兵器は最期に使うだろう。しかし体制の存続が危ぶまれると思うなら、アメリカにショックを与えるために初期の段階で核兵器を使うこともあり得る。
●戦争初期の段階では、最初の一週間で、両サイドで何十万人もが死亡するだろう。更に多くが負傷しトラウマを受ける。数百万名が難民となり避難する。核兵器が初期の段階で使われた場合、被害はさらに大きくなる。
●うまく守られている北朝鮮の地下基地を陥落させるには空爆では足りない。大規模な北朝鮮への侵略準備がすぐに始まるだろう。韓国軍の通常兵器が北朝鮮に対する攻撃の一部として使われるかもしれない。アメリカは戦争の開始直後から韓国軍の援助を期待するだろう。
●アメリカと韓国は、北朝鮮の地上にある核施設やミサイル施設のほとんどを壊滅した後、休戦を決定することができるだろう。実際上、それを確認することができるのは地上にいる軍隊だけだろう。多数のアメリカ人を含めて数十万人の死者を出した後、アメリカは、北朝鮮に金体制が続き核開発を再開することを許すような政策に同意することはできないだろう。
●北朝鮮は、自力を韓国に浸透させ、北朝鮮への侵略準備をサボタージュし最大限の混乱を引き起こさせようとするだろう。ただし、北朝鮮には十分な空軍がないので、北朝鮮が通常の南への侵略をすることは選択肢としてないだろう。
●北朝鮮と北に対立する同盟との間に軍事力の差があるので、韓国軍の侵略の後に北朝鮮軍は数ヶ月後あるいは数週間後に壊滅するだろう。しかし北朝鮮は、イラクやアフガニスタンでアメリカが見せた弱点を突いて、占領に抵抗するだろう。例えば地理を良く熟知している北朝鮮がアメリカにたいして都市戦を続けると、占領の正当性を損なわせ、政治的解決への圧力がかけられる。広範囲にわたる蜂起が大規模な地下組織を使ってなされるかもしれない。
●北朝鮮の抵抗勢力と韓国軍が長い間戦うことを想定した準備がなされなければならない。占領の最初から秩序の維持をどうして保つかの重大な決定をしなければならないだろう。12万人いるといわれる政治犯の収容所からの解放は、安全を不安定にさせるだろう。北朝鮮のエリートたちは、個人の安全と福祉を守るために、南北統一の結果を恐れているので、自分の権力への挑戦に抵抗するだろう。
●アメリカのイラクでの占領政策の失敗は避けられるべきであるとしたら、韓国政府と韓国軍は北朝鮮のエリートのことに多く気遣う必要があるだろう。
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II. What Would War Look Like?
SO WHAT MIGHT a conflict look like if it did take place? War is inherently unpredictable. But thinking and preparing can help to broaden planning horizons, assisting leaders to make better-informed decisions before (and during) what would inevitably be a fast-moving and confusing conflict.
Beginnings
There are a variety of ways in which war could start. North Korea could strike first if it believed that the US were moving towards a surprise attack. This scenario could play out if, as a signal of resolve, the US reinforced its forward military presence, thereby convincing Pyongyang that war had become inevitable and that it should strike first.
Alternatively, a US attack could be triggered by North Korea demonstrating new capabilities, for example through test missiles hitting the ocean near Guam or California, which might precipitate a ‘now or never' decision by Trump. The US might then launch a preventive attack against North Korea. This could be limited in scope, targeting certain nuclear- and missile-related facilities, but would more likely take the form of a large-scale offensive.
The Risks of Mobilisation
In order to enhance the credibility of US threats of preventive military action, and thereby to strengthen its ability to coerce North Korea into making concessions, the US might order a mobilisation of its forces, as if in preparation for a full-scale conflict. Simultaneously, it could also order an evacuation of non-essential personnel (including family members) from US bases, advise US and allied civilians in South Korea to leave, and urge the South Korean and Japanese governments to intensify civil defence preparations.
While a comprehensive mobilisation effort could have substantial value in terms of military preparedness, damage limitation and political coercion, it is hard to see the South Korean government agreeing unless it had already been convinced of the case for preventive military strikes. In the absence of such agreement, a combination of US civilian evacuation and military reinforcements might have some coercive value in relation to North Korea. But, the more convinced that Pyongyang were to become of the risks of war, the more the people of South Korea (and Japan) might come to believe that their own lives were at risk. A credible mobilisation for war could then result in large-scale evacuation of Seoul and other potential targets, growing economic disruption, and a massive political backlash against the US, the combined effect of which would be to undermine the credibility of US military threats. Given these risks, any US prior mobilisation for a preventive war is likely to be kept relatively low-key, even at the cost of foregoing the coercive effect which it could, in principle, achieve.
Consultation
In order to maximise support from allies, the US would have a strong interest in assigning the blame for starting a war to North Korea or, if this were not possible, in obtaining prior consent from key allies before launching preventive attacks. Yet these diplomatic interests might compete with the operational imperative for destroying North Korea's retaliatory capability as completely and as quickly as possible.
If the US decides to launch a preventive attack, therefore, consultation with allies may be very limited. Given the operational advantages of surprise, a decision to authorise a strike might be known only to a very select group of decision-makers. Key political partners – in Congress and in key allied countries – may have only a few hours' notice of strikes. The leaders of China and Russia may only hear about an attack as it takes place. Even those allies who would be most likely to want to adjust their defence postures in preparation, such as Japan and South Korea, may have limited warning if the US wishes to preserve strict informational security.
If the US were to launch a preventive strike without the agreement of the South Korean government, in order to prevent the emergence of an ICBM threat to its own homeland, it would be seen as signifying a willingness to ‘sacrifice Seoul to protect New York'. It is hard to see how the US–South Korea alliance could survive such a trauma, and the US's global reputation as a reliable ally, committed to common security, would be severely damaged. Therefore, even if it is technically possible for Washington to start a war without Seoul's agreement, the political effects of doing so could be devastating for the US's position as a major power in Asia.
Is a Limited Strike Possible?
In other counterproliferation campaigns, for example against Iraq, Libya and Syria, the US and Israel have used limited strikes against nuclear-related facilities as a means of delaying nascent nuclear programmes. Such an option is also likely to be considered in the case of North Korea.
The destruction of a limited number of nuclear- and missile-related facilities could lead to a setback in North Korea's ability to pursue its programmes at the pace of recent years, while also helping to convince the Pyongyang regime that the US was serious about its willingness to deliver on its military threats.
Yet, in such a scenario, North Korea would likely feel that it had no choice other than to retaliate in some way to ensure that it was not simply being seen as capitulating to US demands. Provided that it was reasonably confident that the US strike was a limited one, the regime might not launch an all-out retaliatory response, knowing that this would lead to an all-out conflict and the end of the North Korean state. Instead, in these circumstances, a more likely response would be more limited and proportional, perhaps involving an attack on US military bases with conventional missiles, designed (from its point of view) to restore deterrence. Yet it is hard to believe that the US would at that stage be prepared to stop the escalatory process.
There are many variants of a limited strike option, and many possible North Korean responses. Given North Korea's current, substantial retaliatory capabilities, however, all would carry significant risks for the Western allies. And the less limited the option, the greater the risk that North Korea would assume that it was the beginning of a larger-scale offensive and escalate rapidly in retaliation, calculating that inflicting as much damage as possible at an early stage would be its best hope of persuading South Korea and Japan, and through them the US, to sue for peace.
While North Korea has been planning for a possible US surprise attack for decades, its forces are not maintained at the highest level of readiness because of the economic costs involved in doing so. Yet a limited attack would encourage North Korea to move on to a full war footing, dispersing leaders to secure locations and increasing the readiness of its missile and artillery forces, making it more difficult for follow-on US strikes to succeed.
A Large-Scale Offensive
Given the risks involved in a limited attack, a US attack is more likely to begin on a large scale, and rapidly build to a comprehensive attack on North Korea's military infrastructure. A US strike would start with air strikes and cyber attacks, perhaps supplemented by special forces operations, with the intention of disabling or destroying as much of North Korea's military infrastructure as possible before a retaliatory response can be mounted. Within days, the US could assemble a formidable strike force, using long-range B-2 bombers based in the US together with carrier-based aircraft and sea-based cruise missiles. North Korea's command-and-control infrastructure would be priority targets in such an attack, along with its nuclear and missile capabilities. The US would also likely target North Korea's large and dispersed offensive conventional and chemical capabilities at an early stage.
Even if it had previously warned against military action and was consulted only after a US decision had been made, the government of South Korea would likely have no choice but to allow its own forces (which are, in any case, assigned to US wartime command under current arrangements) to be deployed as part of an integrated US-led effort. Any hesitation in doing so would increase the extent of damage on its own people and territory. South Korean forces would bring substantial capabilities for attacking time-sensitive North Korean targets with short-range missiles, manned aircraft and special forces.
In response, the North Korean leadership would likely activate longstanding retaliatory plans, in the hope that its best chance for survival would be to inflict massive damage in the first hours of the war, breaking the will of South Korea and the US to continue before they have committed their forces to action. North Korea is estimated to have some 10,000 artillery pieces, as well as 500–600 short-range missiles, in hardened tunnels within range of South Korea. In the event of an attack by the US, it is widely expected that the Korean People's Army would attempt to unleash a massive barrage of artillery shells and Scud missiles on the Seoul area, and on the US and South Korean military bases surrounding it, in order to inflict large-scale casualties and disrupt US and South Korean attempts to mobilise their ground forces. The use of chemical weapons is likely to be an important element in this counter-offensive, perhaps learning from the experience of the Syrian government's repeated use of these weapons as a weapon of terror during its civil war. According to the South Korean government, North Korea has between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of chemical weapons, including anthrax, smallpox and, possibly, sarin nerve agent.1 Once it begins to use its artillery systems, the North would be subject to unrelenting counter-barrage attacks, with some estimates suggesting an attrition of around 1% per hour.2
But its extensive network of underground bunkers would allow it to maintain a credible offensive capability for a significant period of time.
North Korea might also deliberately hold back elements of its arsenal – including some of its nuclear-armed missiles – as part of a threat to ‘escalate to de-escalate', with the hope that the risk of nuclear war could persuade its opponents to agree to an early ceasefire.3 The prospects for such a strategy would depend crucially on whether it was reasonably confident that its nuclear force could be preserved in the face of successive waves of US and South Korean attack.
If the regime had limited confidence in the chances of survival for its nuclear force, it would be more likely to use it in the early stages in the hope of capitalising on the shock value.
During this first phase of the war, heavy casualties – both military and civilian – would be expected on both sides. Tens – and perhaps hundreds – of thousands would be killed by the end of the week, and many more wounded and traumatised.4 Large parts of both North Korea and South Korea would become scenes of carnage, with millions of refugees seeking shelter in areas spared from the initial destruction, and many of these attempting to flee to neighbouring countries.5 If nuclear weapons were used, the damage could be much greater. A single nuclear weapon used on Seoul could lead to hundreds of thousands of additional fatalities within a week, and many more injured and sick.6
Invasion
Air strikes will not be enough to overcome well-protected underground capabilities (including missile and nuclear facilities), and preparations for a large-scale invasion of North Korea are likely to begin immediately, alongside intensive special forces operations. The 630,000-strong South Korean forces possess an impressive array of sophisticated conventional capabilities, many of which could be used as part of a combined offensive against the North. The US would assume that these forces would become available very soon after the war starts, and would help to swing the balance of forces in its direction even before large US-based ground forces could be brought into theatre.
In principle, the US and South Korea could decide to cease fire after they had succeeded in destroying most of the North's visible (above-ground) nuclear and missile capability. In practice, only forces on the ground would give them a high degree of confidence that they had been successful. Moreover, with tens and possibly hundreds of thousands already dead, including many Americans, it would be hard for the US to agree to a political settlement that left the Kim family in charge in the North, able – and no doubt determined – to resume its nuclear programme as rapidly as possible.
For its part, North Korea would look at options to infiltrate its own forces into South Korea to sabotage preparations for invasion and cause maximum disruption. A larger-scale conventional invasion of the South is unlikely, however, since it would expose the North's ground forces to the vastly superior US and South Korean air and ground capabilities. North Korea's lack of capable air forces (and the likely destruction of much of its capability in the first hours of the war) means that a conventional invasion of the South is simply not a viable option.
Occupation
Given the qualitative gap in capabilities between North Korea and the alliance standing against it, a collapse in the largest formations of its 950,000-strong force is likely within months, if not weeks, of an invasion being launched, giving way to an occupation by South Korean and allied forces. Like other powers facing the might of US conventional power in recent decades, however, North Korea is likely to seek to counter an occupation through other means, exploiting
the weaknesses of the US approach to war that have been so clearly demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan. An extended campaign of urban warfare, for example, could play to US weaknesses and home-team strengths, undermining the political legitimacy of the occupation and increasing pressure for a political settlement. A wider insurgency campaign against occupying forces and collaborators led by former regime commanders and using the massive network of underground facilities and stores to sustain itself – and working with concealed Korean People's Army units which had survived the initial assault – could mobilise support from significant elements of the population, ensnaring US and South Korean occupying forces in an extended war of attrition.
Preparations would therefore need to be made for the possibility that, with significant US support, large contingents of South Korean troops could be fighting against resistance forces in North Korea for some time. Within the first days and weeks of an invasion, crucial decisions will have to be made on how to maintain order in newly occupied areas. Based on experience in other parts of the world, the sudden disintegration of a state's repressive apparatus is likely to lead to large-scale looting of state property and widespread revenge killings and property seizures. The release of political prisoners from internment camps – now estimated to total some 120,000 people – might further destabilise local security, as wronged individuals return to their communities to confront their accusers.7 North Korean elites are known to fear the consequences of reunification for their individual security and wellbeing, and would be likely to resist challenges to their power.8
America's recent experience provides salutary lessons for South Korea on how not to conduct an occupation. The Coalition Provisional Authority's decision to dissolve the Iraqi armed forces and Ba'ath Party, taken in May 2003, created a political and security vacuum which was rapidly filled by those seeking to pursue personal and sectarian agendas, followed by an organised insurgency led by ex-Ba'athist military officers. If these mistakes are to be avoided, the South Korean government and military may need to be willing to do more to accommodate the concerns of North Korean elites than the US was in relation to Saddam's allies in 2003. In all probability, this would take place in the context of a rapid political reunification of the two states. Within the broad framework of a commitment to creating a single state, however, a range of transitional arrangements – involving, for example, some degree of federalisation – might be considered in the interests of political stabilisation.
1. Dennis P Halpin, ‘Armageddon: The Devastating Consequences of a Second Korean War', National Interest, 14 April 2017.
2. Roger Cavazos, ‘Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality', NAPSNet Special Report, 26 June 2012.
3. Plans to ‘escalate to de-escalate' are thought to be an important element in Russian preparations for war with conventionally superior opponents, such as NATO. See, for example, Elbridge Colby, ‘Russia's Evolving Nuclear Doctrine and its Implications', Notes de la Fondation pour la recherche strategique (No. 1, 12 January 2016).
4. For example, see Franz Stefan-Gady, ‘What Would the Second Korean War Look Like?', The Diplomat, 19 April 2017. For a good discussion of the uncertainties involved in such estimates, see Cavazos, ‘Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality'.
5. For example, see Chetan Peddada, ‘A Sneak Peek at America's War Plans for North Korea: The Pentagon Has Been Running War Games for Years, and the Results Aren't Pretty', Foreign Policy, 7 September 2017.
6. The Economist, ‘How a Nuclear War in Korea Could Start, and How it Might End', 5 August 2017.
7. Amnesty International, ‘North Korean Prison Camps Very Much in Working Order', 22 November 2016.
8. Bruce W Bennett, Preparing North Korean Elites for Unification (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017).
第二次朝鮮戦争はどのようなものになるか
●急速に展開し混乱させる戦いになるので、あらかじめ考え準備しておく
●始まり -- もしも平壌が戦争を不可避だと確信したら北朝鮮が先制攻撃をするだろう。-- あるいは、もしも北朝鮮がグアムやカリフォルニア近辺にテスト・ミサイルを飛ばして挑発した場合、アメリカが核・ミサイル軍事施設に限定した先制攻撃をするかもしれない。
●動員のリスク -- 北朝鮮に妥協を引き出させるために、アメリカが本気であることを思わせるために、あたかも戦争準備であるかのような動員を命令するかもしれない。同時に、非軍人や軍人家族らの米軍基地からの避難もありうる。しかし、韓国政府が戦争準備に同意することは難しいだろう。韓国の同意が無くとも、米国だけの動員でも北朝鮮に対する強制力は持ちうる。
●米国の動員により、平壌のみならず、韓国や日本国民も生命の危険を信じるようになるだろう。ソウルや攻撃対象の都市から大量の避難民が生じ、経済的被害が結果し、アメリカに対する批判が増大するだろう。この危険を避けるために、北朝鮮への影響力を犠牲にしても、動員は騒がれずに行われるだろう。
●北朝鮮が戦争開始責任を持つことは、アメリカにとって同盟国の支持を受けることに役立つ。さもなければ、できれば、少なくとも主要同盟国の同意をあらかじめ取っておくことが望ましい。ただしアメリカはできるだけ完全にできるだけ早く北朝鮮の反撃能力を壊滅させなければならない。
●アメリカが先制攻撃を決意した場合、少数のパートナーしかあらかじめ知らされないだろう。日本や韓国も、秘密保持のために制限された警告しか受けないだろう。
●もしもアメリカが韓国政府の同意無しに先制攻撃をするなら、ニューヨークを守るためにソウルを犠牲にするということ意味すると取られるだろう。その時、米韓同盟が存続し続けることは難しくなるだろう。技術的には韓国の同意無しに先制攻撃ができても、アジアにおけるアメリカの立場は悪化するという政治的効果を生むだろう。
●イラク、リビア、シリアなどにしたような限定攻撃は、北朝鮮に対して可能か？ 北朝鮮の現状を分析すると、平壌は限定攻撃を全面戦争の開始だと考え、早期の反撃を加えるだろう。初期の段階でできるだけのダメージを与えて、韓国と日本に（それらを通してアメリカに）早く平和を求める方が身のためだと思わせようとするだろう。
●北朝鮮は数十年にわたりアメリカへの奇襲を計画してきたので、限定攻撃は北朝鮮を全面戦争へと駆り立てるだろう。
●限定攻撃のもつ危険を考慮すると、アメリカは北朝鮮の軍事インフラを徹底的に急激に破壊する攻撃をするかもしれない。空爆やサイバー攻撃によって、北朝鮮が反撃できないように攻撃を加えるかもしれない。韓国は韓国軍の動員を同意せざるを得ないだろう。
●北朝鮮は、長年計画してきた反撃作戦を実行する。戦争初期の段階で莫大な被害を与え、韓国とアメリカが戦争を継続させようとする意志を挫かせようとする。北朝鮮はソウルと在韓米軍基地周辺に大量のミサイルを撃ち、化学兵器も使われるだろう。北朝鮮は大きな反撃を受けるが、広範にわたる地下組織をつかってかなり長期にわたり持ちこたえるだろう。
●北朝鮮は、敵にたいして休戦を同意するための脅しとして、核兵器は最期に使うだろう。しかし体制の存続が危ぶまれると思うなら、アメリカにショックを与えるために初期の段階で核兵器を使うこともあり得る。
●戦争初期の段階では、最初の一週間で、両サイドで何十万人もが死亡するだろう。更に多くが負傷しトラウマを受ける。数百万名が難民となり避難する。核兵器が初期の段階で使われた場合、被害はさらに大きくなる。
●うまく守られている北朝鮮の地下基地を陥落させるには空爆では足りない。大規模な北朝鮮への侵略準備がすぐに始まるだろう。韓国軍の通常兵器が北朝鮮に対する攻撃の一部として使われるかもしれない。アメリカは戦争の開始直後から韓国軍の援助を期待するだろう。
●アメリカと韓国は、北朝鮮の地上にある核施設やミサイル施設のほとんどを壊滅した後、休戦を決定することができるだろう。実際上、それを確認することができるのは地上にいる軍隊だけだろう。多数のアメリカ人を含めて数十万人の死者を出した後、アメリカは、北朝鮮に金体制が続き核開発を再開することを許すような政策に同意することはできないだろう。
●北朝鮮は、自力を韓国に浸透させ、北朝鮮への侵略準備をサボタージュし最大限の混乱を引き起こさせようとするだろう。ただし、北朝鮮には十分な空軍がないので、北朝鮮が通常の南への侵略をすることは選択肢としてないだろう。
●北朝鮮と北に対立する同盟との間に軍事力の差があるので、韓国軍の侵略の後に北朝鮮軍は数ヶ月後あるいは数週間後に壊滅するだろう。しかし北朝鮮は、イラクやアフガニスタンでアメリカが見せた弱点を突いて、占領に抵抗するだろう。例えば地理を良く熟知している北朝鮮がアメリカにたいして都市戦を続けると、占領の正当性を損なわせ、政治的解決への圧力がかけられる。広範囲にわたる蜂起が大規模な地下組織を使ってなされるかもしれない。
●北朝鮮の抵抗勢力と韓国軍が長い間戦うことを想定した準備がなされなければならない。占領の最初から秩序の維持をどうして保つかの重大な決定をしなければならないだろう。12万人いるといわれる政治犯の収容所からの解放は、安全を不安定にさせるだろう。北朝鮮のエリートたちは、個人の安全と福祉を守るために、南北統一の結果を恐れているので、自分の権力への挑戦に抵抗するだろう。
●アメリカのイラクでの占領政策の失敗は避けられるべきであるとしたら、韓国政府と韓国軍は北朝鮮のエリートのことに多く気遣う必要があるだろう。
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II. What Would War Look Like?
SO WHAT MIGHT a conflict look like if it did take place? War is inherently unpredictable. But thinking and preparing can help to broaden planning horizons, assisting leaders to make better-informed decisions before (and during) what would inevitably be a fast-moving and confusing conflict.
Beginnings
There are a variety of ways in which war could start. North Korea could strike first if it believed that the US were moving towards a surprise attack. This scenario could play out if, as a signal of resolve, the US reinforced its forward military presence, thereby convincing Pyongyang that war had become inevitable and that it should strike first.
Alternatively, a US attack could be triggered by North Korea demonstrating new capabilities, for example through test missiles hitting the ocean near Guam or California, which might precipitate a ‘now or never' decision by Trump. The US might then launch a preventive attack against North Korea. This could be limited in scope, targeting certain nuclear- and missile-related facilities, but would more likely take the form of a large-scale offensive.
The Risks of Mobilisation
In order to enhance the credibility of US threats of preventive military action, and thereby to strengthen its ability to coerce North Korea into making concessions, the US might order a mobilisation of its forces, as if in preparation for a full-scale conflict. Simultaneously, it could also order an evacuation of non-essential personnel (including family members) from US bases, advise US and allied civilians in South Korea to leave, and urge the South Korean and Japanese governments to intensify civil defence preparations.
While a comprehensive mobilisation effort could have substantial value in terms of military preparedness, damage limitation and political coercion, it is hard to see the South Korean government agreeing unless it had already been convinced of the case for preventive military strikes. In the absence of such agreement, a combination of US civilian evacuation and military reinforcements might have some coercive value in relation to North Korea. But, the more convinced that Pyongyang were to become of the risks of war, the more the people of South Korea (and Japan) might come to believe that their own lives were at risk. A credible mobilisation for war could then result in large-scale evacuation of Seoul and other potential targets, growing economic disruption, and a massive political backlash against the US, the combined effect of which would be to undermine the credibility of US military threats. Given these risks, any US prior mobilisation for a preventive war is likely to be kept relatively low-key, even at the cost of foregoing the coercive effect which it could, in principle, achieve.
Consultation
In order to maximise support from allies, the US would have a strong interest in assigning the blame for starting a war to North Korea or, if this were not possible, in obtaining prior consent from key allies before launching preventive attacks. Yet these diplomatic interests might compete with the operational imperative for destroying North Korea's retaliatory capability as completely and as quickly as possible.
If the US decides to launch a preventive attack, therefore, consultation with allies may be very limited. Given the operational advantages of surprise, a decision to authorise a strike might be known only to a very select group of decision-makers. Key political partners – in Congress and in key allied countries – may have only a few hours' notice of strikes. The leaders of China and Russia may only hear about an attack as it takes place. Even those allies who would be most likely to want to adjust their defence postures in preparation, such as Japan and South Korea, may have limited warning if the US wishes to preserve strict informational security.
If the US were to launch a preventive strike without the agreement of the South Korean government, in order to prevent the emergence of an ICBM threat to its own homeland, it would be seen as signifying a willingness to ‘sacrifice Seoul to protect New York'. It is hard to see how the US–South Korea alliance could survive such a trauma, and the US's global reputation as a reliable ally, committed to common security, would be severely damaged. Therefore, even if it is technically possible for Washington to start a war without Seoul's agreement, the political effects of doing so could be devastating for the US's position as a major power in Asia.
Is a Limited Strike Possible?
In other counterproliferation campaigns, for example against Iraq, Libya and Syria, the US and Israel have used limited strikes against nuclear-related facilities as a means of delaying nascent nuclear programmes. Such an option is also likely to be considered in the case of North Korea.
The destruction of a limited number of nuclear- and missile-related facilities could lead to a setback in North Korea's ability to pursue its programmes at the pace of recent years, while also helping to convince the Pyongyang regime that the US was serious about its willingness to deliver on its military threats.
Yet, in such a scenario, North Korea would likely feel that it had no choice other than to retaliate in some way to ensure that it was not simply being seen as capitulating to US demands. Provided that it was reasonably confident that the US strike was a limited one, the regime might not launch an all-out retaliatory response, knowing that this would lead to an all-out conflict and the end of the North Korean state. Instead, in these circumstances, a more likely response would be more limited and proportional, perhaps involving an attack on US military bases with conventional missiles, designed (from its point of view) to restore deterrence. Yet it is hard to believe that the US would at that stage be prepared to stop the escalatory process.
There are many variants of a limited strike option, and many possible North Korean responses. Given North Korea's current, substantial retaliatory capabilities, however, all would carry significant risks for the Western allies. And the less limited the option, the greater the risk that North Korea would assume that it was the beginning of a larger-scale offensive and escalate rapidly in retaliation, calculating that inflicting as much damage as possible at an early stage would be its best hope of persuading South Korea and Japan, and through them the US, to sue for peace.
While North Korea has been planning for a possible US surprise attack for decades, its forces are not maintained at the highest level of readiness because of the economic costs involved in doing so. Yet a limited attack would encourage North Korea to move on to a full war footing, dispersing leaders to secure locations and increasing the readiness of its missile and artillery forces, making it more difficult for follow-on US strikes to succeed.
A Large-Scale Offensive
Given the risks involved in a limited attack, a US attack is more likely to begin on a large scale, and rapidly build to a comprehensive attack on North Korea's military infrastructure. A US strike would start with air strikes and cyber attacks, perhaps supplemented by special forces operations, with the intention of disabling or destroying as much of North Korea's military infrastructure as possible before a retaliatory response can be mounted. Within days, the US could assemble a formidable strike force, using long-range B-2 bombers based in the US together with carrier-based aircraft and sea-based cruise missiles. North Korea's command-and-control infrastructure would be priority targets in such an attack, along with its nuclear and missile capabilities. The US would also likely target North Korea's large and dispersed offensive conventional and chemical capabilities at an early stage.
Even if it had previously warned against military action and was consulted only after a US decision had been made, the government of South Korea would likely have no choice but to allow its own forces (which are, in any case, assigned to US wartime command under current arrangements) to be deployed as part of an integrated US-led effort. Any hesitation in doing so would increase the extent of damage on its own people and territory. South Korean forces would bring substantial capabilities for attacking time-sensitive North Korean targets with short-range missiles, manned aircraft and special forces.
In response, the North Korean leadership would likely activate longstanding retaliatory plans, in the hope that its best chance for survival would be to inflict massive damage in the first hours of the war, breaking the will of South Korea and the US to continue before they have committed their forces to action. North Korea is estimated to have some 10,000 artillery pieces, as well as 500–600 short-range missiles, in hardened tunnels within range of South Korea. In the event of an attack by the US, it is widely expected that the Korean People's Army would attempt to unleash a massive barrage of artillery shells and Scud missiles on the Seoul area, and on the US and South Korean military bases surrounding it, in order to inflict large-scale casualties and disrupt US and South Korean attempts to mobilise their ground forces. The use of chemical weapons is likely to be an important element in this counter-offensive, perhaps learning from the experience of the Syrian government's repeated use of these weapons as a weapon of terror during its civil war. According to the South Korean government, North Korea has between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of chemical weapons, including anthrax, smallpox and, possibly, sarin nerve agent.1 Once it begins to use its artillery systems, the North would be subject to unrelenting counter-barrage attacks, with some estimates suggesting an attrition of around 1% per hour.2
But its extensive network of underground bunkers would allow it to maintain a credible offensive capability for a significant period of time.
North Korea might also deliberately hold back elements of its arsenal – including some of its nuclear-armed missiles – as part of a threat to ‘escalate to de-escalate', with the hope that the risk of nuclear war could persuade its opponents to agree to an early ceasefire.3 The prospects for such a strategy would depend crucially on whether it was reasonably confident that its nuclear force could be preserved in the face of successive waves of US and South Korean attack.
If the regime had limited confidence in the chances of survival for its nuclear force, it would be more likely to use it in the early stages in the hope of capitalising on the shock value.
During this first phase of the war, heavy casualties – both military and civilian – would be expected on both sides. Tens – and perhaps hundreds – of thousands would be killed by the end of the week, and many more wounded and traumatised.4 Large parts of both North Korea and South Korea would become scenes of carnage, with millions of refugees seeking shelter in areas spared from the initial destruction, and many of these attempting to flee to neighbouring countries.5 If nuclear weapons were used, the damage could be much greater. A single nuclear weapon used on Seoul could lead to hundreds of thousands of additional fatalities within a week, and many more injured and sick.6
Invasion
Air strikes will not be enough to overcome well-protected underground capabilities (including missile and nuclear facilities), and preparations for a large-scale invasion of North Korea are likely to begin immediately, alongside intensive special forces operations. The 630,000-strong South Korean forces possess an impressive array of sophisticated conventional capabilities, many of which could be used as part of a combined offensive against the North. The US would assume that these forces would become available very soon after the war starts, and would help to swing the balance of forces in its direction even before large US-based ground forces could be brought into theatre.
In principle, the US and South Korea could decide to cease fire after they had succeeded in destroying most of the North's visible (above-ground) nuclear and missile capability. In practice, only forces on the ground would give them a high degree of confidence that they had been successful. Moreover, with tens and possibly hundreds of thousands already dead, including many Americans, it would be hard for the US to agree to a political settlement that left the Kim family in charge in the North, able – and no doubt determined – to resume its nuclear programme as rapidly as possible.
For its part, North Korea would look at options to infiltrate its own forces into South Korea to sabotage preparations for invasion and cause maximum disruption. A larger-scale conventional invasion of the South is unlikely, however, since it would expose the North's ground forces to the vastly superior US and South Korean air and ground capabilities. North Korea's lack of capable air forces (and the likely destruction of much of its capability in the first hours of the war) means that a conventional invasion of the South is simply not a viable option.
Occupation
Given the qualitative gap in capabilities between North Korea and the alliance standing against it, a collapse in the largest formations of its 950,000-strong force is likely within months, if not weeks, of an invasion being launched, giving way to an occupation by South Korean and allied forces. Like other powers facing the might of US conventional power in recent decades, however, North Korea is likely to seek to counter an occupation through other means, exploiting
the weaknesses of the US approach to war that have been so clearly demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan. An extended campaign of urban warfare, for example, could play to US weaknesses and home-team strengths, undermining the political legitimacy of the occupation and increasing pressure for a political settlement. A wider insurgency campaign against occupying forces and collaborators led by former regime commanders and using the massive network of underground facilities and stores to sustain itself – and working with concealed Korean People's Army units which had survived the initial assault – could mobilise support from significant elements of the population, ensnaring US and South Korean occupying forces in an extended war of attrition.
Preparations would therefore need to be made for the possibility that, with significant US support, large contingents of South Korean troops could be fighting against resistance forces in North Korea for some time. Within the first days and weeks of an invasion, crucial decisions will have to be made on how to maintain order in newly occupied areas. Based on experience in other parts of the world, the sudden disintegration of a state's repressive apparatus is likely to lead to large-scale looting of state property and widespread revenge killings and property seizures. The release of political prisoners from internment camps – now estimated to total some 120,000 people – might further destabilise local security, as wronged individuals return to their communities to confront their accusers.7 North Korean elites are known to fear the consequences of reunification for their individual security and wellbeing, and would be likely to resist challenges to their power.8
America's recent experience provides salutary lessons for South Korea on how not to conduct an occupation. The Coalition Provisional Authority's decision to dissolve the Iraqi armed forces and Ba'ath Party, taken in May 2003, created a political and security vacuum which was rapidly filled by those seeking to pursue personal and sectarian agendas, followed by an organised insurgency led by ex-Ba'athist military officers. If these mistakes are to be avoided, the South Korean government and military may need to be willing to do more to accommodate the concerns of North Korean elites than the US was in relation to Saddam's allies in 2003. In all probability, this would take place in the context of a rapid political reunification of the two states. Within the broad framework of a commitment to creating a single state, however, a range of transitional arrangements – involving, for example, some degree of federalisation – might be considered in the interests of political stabilisation.
1. Dennis P Halpin, ‘Armageddon: The Devastating Consequences of a Second Korean War', National Interest, 14 April 2017.
2. Roger Cavazos, ‘Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality', NAPSNet Special Report, 26 June 2012.
3. Plans to ‘escalate to de-escalate' are thought to be an important element in Russian preparations for war with conventionally superior opponents, such as NATO. See, for example, Elbridge Colby, ‘Russia's Evolving Nuclear Doctrine and its Implications', Notes de la Fondation pour la recherche strategique (No. 1, 12 January 2016).
4. For example, see Franz Stefan-Gady, ‘What Would the Second Korean War Look Like?', The Diplomat, 19 April 2017. For a good discussion of the uncertainties involved in such estimates, see Cavazos, ‘Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality'.
5. For example, see Chetan Peddada, ‘A Sneak Peek at America's War Plans for North Korea: The Pentagon Has Been Running War Games for Years, and the Results Aren't Pretty', Foreign Policy, 7 September 2017.
6. The Economist, ‘How a Nuclear War in Korea Could Start, and How it Might End', 5 August 2017.
7. Amnesty International, ‘North Korean Prison Camps Very Much in Working Order', 22 November 2016.
8. Bruce W Bennett, Preparing North Korean Elites for Unification (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017).
