中央日報
金正日総書記、０２年にブッシュ大統領へ親書
2005.06.23 16:46:07
北朝鮮の金正日（キム・ジョンイル）国防委員長が０２年１１月、ブッシュ米大統領に朝米関係の正常化を促す親書を送ったが、米国はイラク侵攻の準備のため、これを無視したことが分かった。 金委員長がブッシュ大統領に親書を送った事実が明らかになったのは今回が初めて。
グレッグ元駐韓米国大使とジョンズ・ホプキンス国際大学院のオーバードーファー教授は２２日、「北朝鮮をつかむべき瞬間（Ａ Ｍｏｍｅｎｔ ｔｏ Ｓｅｉｚｅ ｗｉｔｈ Ｎｏｒｔｈ Ｋｏｒｅａ）」と題したワシントンポスト紙への寄稿文で、「２００２年１１月に北朝鮮を訪問した際、金正日国防委員長からブッシュ大統領に伝えてほしいという親書を受け、これをホワイトハウスと国務省関係者に伝達した」と明らかにした。
金委員長はこの親書で、「もし米国がわれわれの主権を認めて侵攻しないという約束をすれば、新しい世紀の要求に歩調を合わせて、核問題を解決できるとみる」とし、「米国が大胆な決定をすれば、われわれはそれに相応する措置を取る」と主張したと、グレッグ元大使とオーバードーファー教授は伝えた。
２人は「しかしブッシュ政権は北朝鮮の和解提案を無視した」とし、「北朝鮮はその数週間後、国際原子力機関（ＩＡＥＡ）視察団を追放し、凍結した原子炉を稼働し始めた」と述べた。
グレッグ元大使とオーバードーファー教授は「米国は、北朝鮮が先週、韓国の鄭東泳（チョン・ドンヨン）統一部長官を通じて出した提案を逃してはならない」と強調した。
ワシントン＝金鍾赫（キム・ジョンヒョック）特派員 <kimchy@joongang.co.kr>
The Washington Post
A Moment to Seize With North Korea
By Donald Gregg and Don Oberdorfer
Wednesday, June 22, 2005; A21
東亜日報
金総書記の親書に「悪い行動には補償ない」と米は黙殺
JUNE 24, 2005 05:55
「ドナルド・グレッグ元駐韓米大使が米朝間の対話チャンネル作りの重要性を強調すると、北朝鮮は、ホワイトハウスあてに送る金正日（キム・ジョンイル）の親書を作った」
グレッグ（アジアソサエティー会長）氏とともに０２年１１月、平壌（ピョンヤン）を訪問したオーバードーファー米ジョンズ・ホプキンス大教授は、２３日の電話インタビューで、当時、北朝鮮の姜錫柱（カン・ソクジュ）第１外務次官から、金総書記の親書を受け取って、ホワイトハウスに渡した経緯をこのように説明した。
グレッグ氏とオーバードーファー教授は前日、米紙ワシントンポストに共同で寄稿した「北朝鮮をつかまえるべき瞬間」というコラムを通じて「親書」を渡した事実を公開している。
――親書はどう処理したか。
「当時、金桂冠（キム・ゲグァン）北朝鮮外務次官に招かれて、平壌を訪問中だったが、１１月３日に親書を受け取った。ケリー米国務省次官補（東アジア太平洋担当）の平壌訪問（１０月）で、２回目の北朝鮮核危機が発生してから２～３週間後だった。ワシントンに戻った後、当時のハドリー米ホワイトハウス国家安保会議（ＮＳＣ）副補佐官に親書を渡した。韓国語の表現を知人を通じて英訳したものも一緒に渡した。金総書記の親書を私に渡した人は姜第１外務次官だ。同氏は『親書は金総書記がブッシュ米大統領に送るものだ』と話した」
――こうした重要な文書に署名がないのはおかしい。
「外交的に口頭メッセージ（verbal message）として通用する方式だ。正式な文書の形を避けたのは、後ほど、否認しようとした意図があったものと見受けられる」
――ブッシュ政府は、どんな出方をしたか。
「ハドリー副補佐官は『米国は悪い行動に補償しない』と話した。その後、ブッシュ政権は、ジュネーブ枠組み合意の破棄を理由に、対北朝鮮への重油供給を中断した」
――何故３１ヵ月が過ぎた今になって公開したのか。
「北朝鮮は秘密維持を要請し、米国は対応しないことで一貫した。しかし、金総書記－鄭東泳（チョン・ドンヨン）統一部長官の会談という好材料を生かすため、公開を決心した」
――親書に「今回発生した核問題は…」という部分がある。２回目の北朝鮮核危機の原因となった高濃縮ウラン（ＨＥＵ）計画のことのようだが…。
「姜第１外務次官は当時、ＨＥＵの存在を認めなかったが、否認もしなかった」。
金正日総書記、０２年にブッシュ大統領へ親書
2005.06.23 16:46:07
北朝鮮の金正日（キム・ジョンイル）国防委員長が０２年１１月、ブッシュ米大統領に朝米関係の正常化を促す親書を送ったが、米国はイラク侵攻の準備のため、これを無視したことが分かった。 金委員長がブッシュ大統領に親書を送った事実が明らかになったのは今回が初めて。
グレッグ元駐韓米国大使とジョンズ・ホプキンス国際大学院のオーバードーファー教授は２２日、「北朝鮮をつかむべき瞬間（Ａ Ｍｏｍｅｎｔ ｔｏ Ｓｅｉｚｅ ｗｉｔｈ Ｎｏｒｔｈ Ｋｏｒｅａ）」と題したワシントンポスト紙への寄稿文で、「２００２年１１月に北朝鮮を訪問した際、金正日国防委員長からブッシュ大統領に伝えてほしいという親書を受け、これをホワイトハウスと国務省関係者に伝達した」と明らかにした。
金委員長はこの親書で、「もし米国がわれわれの主権を認めて侵攻しないという約束をすれば、新しい世紀の要求に歩調を合わせて、核問題を解決できるとみる」とし、「米国が大胆な決定をすれば、われわれはそれに相応する措置を取る」と主張したと、グレッグ元大使とオーバードーファー教授は伝えた。
２人は「しかしブッシュ政権は北朝鮮の和解提案を無視した」とし、「北朝鮮はその数週間後、国際原子力機関（ＩＡＥＡ）視察団を追放し、凍結した原子炉を稼働し始めた」と述べた。
グレッグ元大使とオーバードーファー教授は「米国は、北朝鮮が先週、韓国の鄭東泳（チョン・ドンヨン）統一部長官を通じて出した提案を逃してはならない」と強調した。
ワシントン＝金鍾赫（キム・ジョンヒョック）特派員 <kimchy@joongang.co.kr>
The Washington Post
A Moment to Seize With North Korea
By Donald Gregg and Don Oberdorfer
Wednesday, June 22, 2005; A21
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's remarkable statements to a South Korean envoy last Friday present a rare opportunity to move promptly toward ending the dangerous nuclear proliferation crisis in Northeast Asia. The Bush administration should seize the moment.
The reclusive leader told South Korea's minister of unification, Chung Dong Young, that he is willing to return to the six-nation talks on his nuclear weapons program if the United States "recognizes and respects" his country. More than that, according to Chung, he raised the prospect of reversing his burgeoning nuclear program, rejoining the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which he abandoned two years ago, and welcoming back U.N. nuclear inspectors in return for a credible security guarantee.
The U.S. national interest as well as the interests of our Asian partners in the talks -- all of whom favor much greater U.S. engagement with North Korea -- call for a positive response from Washington. This would be particularly welcome in Seoul, which both of us visited last week.
For starters, we suggest that President Bush, after touching base with our Asian partners -- South Korea, China, Japan and Russia -- communicate directly with Kim Jong Il to follow up on his remarks. He might consider offering to send Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill and Ambassador Joseph DeTrani to Pyongyang to prepare for a visit to Kim by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The purpose would be to explore the policies behind Kim's words to determine whether practical arrangements can be made, subject to approval by our partners in the six-nation talks, to end the dangerous North Korean nuclear program.
In efforts to reassure North Korea, the United States has repeatedly declared that it recognizes North Korean sovereignty, has no hostile intent and is willing to arrange security guarantees and move toward normal relations with Pyongyang once the nuclear issue is resolved. Kim's remarks present a golden opportunity to take the U.S. offers to the one and only person in North Korea who has the power of decision. According to those who have met him personally in the past -- including former secretary of state Madeleine Albright, former South Korean president Kim Dae Jung and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi -- Kim is more flexible than anyone else in his government. That is not surprising, since he sets the line and others must follow.
As we well know, this is not the first time that Kim has sought engagement rather than hostility with President Bush, whom he discussed in surprisingly positive terms last Friday. During a visit we made to Pyongyang in November 2002 following a nuclear-related trip by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, we were given a written personal message from Kim to Bush declaring: "If the United States recognizes our sovereignty and assures non-aggression, it is our view that we should be able to find a way to resolve the nuclear issue in compliance with the demands of a new century." Further, he declared, "If the United States makes a bold decision, we will respond accordingly."
We took the message to senior officials at the White House and State Department and urged the administration to follow up on Kim's initiative, which we have not made public until now. Then deep in secret planning and a campaign of public persuasion for the invasion of Iraq, the administration spurned engagement with North Korea. Kim moved within weeks to expel the inspectors from the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency, withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reopen the plutonium-producing facilities that had been shut down since 1994 under an agreement negotiated with the Clinton administration.
Now the North Koreans are believed to have produced the raw material for at least a half-dozen nuclear weapons and many believe their claim to have fabricated the weapons themselves. Early this year North Korea declared that it has become "a full-fledged nuclear weapons state" and that it is working to produce still more atomic arms, all in response to U.S. hostility.
Kim's statements in Pyongyang Friday may be a sign that he is uncomfortable with persistent pressure from the United States and his Asian neighbors to return to the six-nation talks, which he left a year ago. He may also be feeling the pinch of deepening food shortages in his country. By reversing his nuclear program in return for the guarantees he seeks, Kim could avert stronger measures being discussed in Washington and other capitals to force the issue. These measures, in our judgment, promise only greater confrontation and growing danger on all sides.
By visiting Pyongyang and engaging Kim, Rice would not be condoning North Korea's human rights practices. The State Department has made clear that human rights is an issue to be resolved in negotiations on establishing full U.S. relations, not in talks on the nuclear question. If she responds to Kim's latest statements with a well-prepared visit and successful negotiations, Rice will have earned her spurs as America's chief diplomat.
Donald Gregg is a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea and currently president of the Korea Society. Don Oberdorfer is a former diplomatic correspondent for The Post and currently journalist-in-residence at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.
The reclusive leader told South Korea's minister of unification, Chung Dong Young, that he is willing to return to the six-nation talks on his nuclear weapons program if the United States "recognizes and respects" his country. More than that, according to Chung, he raised the prospect of reversing his burgeoning nuclear program, rejoining the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which he abandoned two years ago, and welcoming back U.N. nuclear inspectors in return for a credible security guarantee.
The U.S. national interest as well as the interests of our Asian partners in the talks -- all of whom favor much greater U.S. engagement with North Korea -- call for a positive response from Washington. This would be particularly welcome in Seoul, which both of us visited last week.
For starters, we suggest that President Bush, after touching base with our Asian partners -- South Korea, China, Japan and Russia -- communicate directly with Kim Jong Il to follow up on his remarks. He might consider offering to send Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill and Ambassador Joseph DeTrani to Pyongyang to prepare for a visit to Kim by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The purpose would be to explore the policies behind Kim's words to determine whether practical arrangements can be made, subject to approval by our partners in the six-nation talks, to end the dangerous North Korean nuclear program.
In efforts to reassure North Korea, the United States has repeatedly declared that it recognizes North Korean sovereignty, has no hostile intent and is willing to arrange security guarantees and move toward normal relations with Pyongyang once the nuclear issue is resolved. Kim's remarks present a golden opportunity to take the U.S. offers to the one and only person in North Korea who has the power of decision. According to those who have met him personally in the past -- including former secretary of state Madeleine Albright, former South Korean president Kim Dae Jung and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi -- Kim is more flexible than anyone else in his government. That is not surprising, since he sets the line and others must follow.
As we well know, this is not the first time that Kim has sought engagement rather than hostility with President Bush, whom he discussed in surprisingly positive terms last Friday. During a visit we made to Pyongyang in November 2002 following a nuclear-related trip by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, we were given a written personal message from Kim to Bush declaring: "If the United States recognizes our sovereignty and assures non-aggression, it is our view that we should be able to find a way to resolve the nuclear issue in compliance with the demands of a new century." Further, he declared, "If the United States makes a bold decision, we will respond accordingly."
We took the message to senior officials at the White House and State Department and urged the administration to follow up on Kim's initiative, which we have not made public until now. Then deep in secret planning and a campaign of public persuasion for the invasion of Iraq, the administration spurned engagement with North Korea. Kim moved within weeks to expel the inspectors from the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency, withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reopen the plutonium-producing facilities that had been shut down since 1994 under an agreement negotiated with the Clinton administration.
Now the North Koreans are believed to have produced the raw material for at least a half-dozen nuclear weapons and many believe their claim to have fabricated the weapons themselves. Early this year North Korea declared that it has become "a full-fledged nuclear weapons state" and that it is working to produce still more atomic arms, all in response to U.S. hostility.
Kim's statements in Pyongyang Friday may be a sign that he is uncomfortable with persistent pressure from the United States and his Asian neighbors to return to the six-nation talks, which he left a year ago. He may also be feeling the pinch of deepening food shortages in his country. By reversing his nuclear program in return for the guarantees he seeks, Kim could avert stronger measures being discussed in Washington and other capitals to force the issue. These measures, in our judgment, promise only greater confrontation and growing danger on all sides.
By visiting Pyongyang and engaging Kim, Rice would not be condoning North Korea's human rights practices. The State Department has made clear that human rights is an issue to be resolved in negotiations on establishing full U.S. relations, not in talks on the nuclear question. If she responds to Kim's latest statements with a well-prepared visit and successful negotiations, Rice will have earned her spurs as America's chief diplomat.
Donald Gregg is a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea and currently president of the Korea Society. Don Oberdorfer is a former diplomatic correspondent for The Post and currently journalist-in-residence at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.
東亜日報
金総書記の親書に「悪い行動には補償ない」と米は黙殺
JUNE 24, 2005 05:55
「ドナルド・グレッグ元駐韓米大使が米朝間の対話チャンネル作りの重要性を強調すると、北朝鮮は、ホワイトハウスあてに送る金正日（キム・ジョンイル）の親書を作った」
グレッグ（アジアソサエティー会長）氏とともに０２年１１月、平壌（ピョンヤン）を訪問したオーバードーファー米ジョンズ・ホプキンス大教授は、２３日の電話インタビューで、当時、北朝鮮の姜錫柱（カン・ソクジュ）第１外務次官から、金総書記の親書を受け取って、ホワイトハウスに渡した経緯をこのように説明した。
グレッグ氏とオーバードーファー教授は前日、米紙ワシントンポストに共同で寄稿した「北朝鮮をつかまえるべき瞬間」というコラムを通じて「親書」を渡した事実を公開している。
――親書はどう処理したか。
「当時、金桂冠（キム・ゲグァン）北朝鮮外務次官に招かれて、平壌を訪問中だったが、１１月３日に親書を受け取った。ケリー米国務省次官補（東アジア太平洋担当）の平壌訪問（１０月）で、２回目の北朝鮮核危機が発生してから２～３週間後だった。ワシントンに戻った後、当時のハドリー米ホワイトハウス国家安保会議（ＮＳＣ）副補佐官に親書を渡した。韓国語の表現を知人を通じて英訳したものも一緒に渡した。金総書記の親書を私に渡した人は姜第１外務次官だ。同氏は『親書は金総書記がブッシュ米大統領に送るものだ』と話した」
――こうした重要な文書に署名がないのはおかしい。
「外交的に口頭メッセージ（verbal message）として通用する方式だ。正式な文書の形を避けたのは、後ほど、否認しようとした意図があったものと見受けられる」
――ブッシュ政府は、どんな出方をしたか。
「ハドリー副補佐官は『米国は悪い行動に補償しない』と話した。その後、ブッシュ政権は、ジュネーブ枠組み合意の破棄を理由に、対北朝鮮への重油供給を中断した」
――何故３１ヵ月が過ぎた今になって公開したのか。
「北朝鮮は秘密維持を要請し、米国は対応しないことで一貫した。しかし、金総書記－鄭東泳（チョン・ドンヨン）統一部長官の会談という好材料を生かすため、公開を決心した」
――親書に「今回発生した核問題は…」という部分がある。２回目の北朝鮮核危機の原因となった高濃縮ウラン（ＨＥＵ）計画のことのようだが…。
「姜第１外務次官は当時、ＨＥＵの存在を認めなかったが、否認もしなかった」。
