朝鮮日報
ローレス米国防部次官補「韓米同盟変えたい時はいつでも言ってくれ」
2005/06/10 10:24
韓米首脳会談を1日後に控え、米国側から相次いで韓国政府に対する不満がもれている。
9日、ソウルではローレス米国防部次官補の発言が問題となった。一部メディアは今月5日から6日まで韓国を訪れていたローレス次官補が「韓国の戦略的価値は終わった」とし、韓国が米国側の要求を受け入れない場合、駐韓米軍を撤退させる状況が来ることもあり得ると脅かしたと報じた。
ローレス次官補はまた、先月31日、ワシントンの韓国大使館を訪れ、洪錫（ホン・ソクヒョン）駐米大使に「北東アジアのバランサー論は韓米同盟と両立できない概念だ。もし同盟を変えたければいつでも言ってくれ。希望通りしてやる」と述べたという報道も出た。
国防部と外交部は公式的には「事実と異なる報道」と否定した。
しかし、一部当局者は「ワシントンにそのような意見があることを伝える形だった」、「ローレス次官補はいつもそのように話す。発言一つ一つに一々神経を使う必要はない」とも述べた。
正確ではなくても、そのような趣旨の発言があったことは事実だということだ。
マスコミの報道ではあるが、国と北朝鮮に対する不満も出た。この日、ニューヨークタイムズ紙は『ならず者政権：金正日（キム・ジョンイル）と北核脅威の登場』と題した本の著者 ベッカー氏の「独裁者とのダンス」という寄稿を掲載した。
同氏は「韓国は独裁者の権力を維持させようと追い求めている。盧大統領はあらゆる柔和策で何を得たのか。核の恐喝に対価を支払うのではなく、金正日を国際刑事裁判所に立たせるべきだ」と書いた。
また、日刊紙「クリスチャンサイエンスモニター」は、「米国の一部国防省高官と専門家らは韓米同盟が再考の時点に至ったと考えている」とし、「長期的な流れとしては、両国を取り離す方向」とした。
ケイト研究所の韓国専門家も、「ブッシュ政権の中には、盧大統領を真のパートナーと考える傾向は多くない」と述べた。
しかし、このような雰囲気が韓米首脳会談に直接的な影響を及ぼすことはない見通しだ。作戦計画5029など、韓米の同盟問題において相当部分調整が行われたためだ。
また、北核解決という懸案を目前に、両国首脳が公開的に衝突する姿を見せることも難しい。
ワシントン＝許容範（ホ・ヨンボム）特派員>heo@chosun.com
朝鮮日報
「韓米同盟は死活的事案」 米国防省がローレス次官補発言に論評
2005/06/10 17:04
米国防省は最近、ローレス米国防部次官補が韓米同盟関係と関連し、「同盟を変えたければいつもで言ってくれ」などと発言したという一部報道に対し、9日、異例の報道官論評を発表した。
論評で、「両国同盟は両国の国益にとって依然として死活的事案であり、米国は韓国防御と地域安保および安定、同盟強化に確固たる意志を持っている」と述べた。
また、ローレス次官補の発言内容に関しては、「国防高官の間であった秘密会議の内容には触れないのが慣例」とし、対話内容が流出したことに対し間接的に遺憾の意を表明した。
The New York Times
Dancing With the Dictator
June 9, 2005
By JASPER BECKER
Beijing
ローレス米国防部次官補「韓米同盟変えたい時はいつでも言ってくれ」
2005/06/10 10:24
韓米首脳会談を1日後に控え、米国側から相次いで韓国政府に対する不満がもれている。
9日、ソウルではローレス米国防部次官補の発言が問題となった。一部メディアは今月5日から6日まで韓国を訪れていたローレス次官補が「韓国の戦略的価値は終わった」とし、韓国が米国側の要求を受け入れない場合、駐韓米軍を撤退させる状況が来ることもあり得ると脅かしたと報じた。
ローレス次官補はまた、先月31日、ワシントンの韓国大使館を訪れ、洪錫（ホン・ソクヒョン）駐米大使に「北東アジアのバランサー論は韓米同盟と両立できない概念だ。もし同盟を変えたければいつでも言ってくれ。希望通りしてやる」と述べたという報道も出た。
国防部と外交部は公式的には「事実と異なる報道」と否定した。
しかし、一部当局者は「ワシントンにそのような意見があることを伝える形だった」、「ローレス次官補はいつもそのように話す。発言一つ一つに一々神経を使う必要はない」とも述べた。
正確ではなくても、そのような趣旨の発言があったことは事実だということだ。
マスコミの報道ではあるが、国と北朝鮮に対する不満も出た。この日、ニューヨークタイムズ紙は『ならず者政権：金正日（キム・ジョンイル）と北核脅威の登場』と題した本の著者 ベッカー氏の「独裁者とのダンス」という寄稿を掲載した。
同氏は「韓国は独裁者の権力を維持させようと追い求めている。盧大統領はあらゆる柔和策で何を得たのか。核の恐喝に対価を支払うのではなく、金正日を国際刑事裁判所に立たせるべきだ」と書いた。
また、日刊紙「クリスチャンサイエンスモニター」は、「米国の一部国防省高官と専門家らは韓米同盟が再考の時点に至ったと考えている」とし、「長期的な流れとしては、両国を取り離す方向」とした。
ケイト研究所の韓国専門家も、「ブッシュ政権の中には、盧大統領を真のパートナーと考える傾向は多くない」と述べた。
しかし、このような雰囲気が韓米首脳会談に直接的な影響を及ぼすことはない見通しだ。作戦計画5029など、韓米の同盟問題において相当部分調整が行われたためだ。
また、北核解決という懸案を目前に、両国首脳が公開的に衝突する姿を見せることも難しい。
ワシントン＝許容範（ホ・ヨンボム）特派員>heo@chosun.com
朝鮮日報
「韓米同盟は死活的事案」 米国防省がローレス次官補発言に論評
2005/06/10 17:04
米国防省は最近、ローレス米国防部次官補が韓米同盟関係と関連し、「同盟を変えたければいつもで言ってくれ」などと発言したという一部報道に対し、9日、異例の報道官論評を発表した。
論評で、「両国同盟は両国の国益にとって依然として死活的事案であり、米国は韓国防御と地域安保および安定、同盟強化に確固たる意志を持っている」と述べた。
また、ローレス次官補の発言内容に関しては、「国防高官の間であった秘密会議の内容には触れないのが慣例」とし、対話内容が流出したことに対し間接的に遺憾の意を表明した。
The New York Times
Dancing With the Dictator
June 9, 2005
By JASPER BECKER
Beijing
THERE are hopes that President Bush's meeting tomorrow with President Roh Moo Hyun of South Korea, coming on the heels of the latest North Korean overture on restarting nuclear-weapons negotiations, may lead to a breakthrough. However, anyone who expects the South to help us put pressure on the North hasn't been paying much attention to what has happened between the two countries over the last five years.
Since South Korea's president at the time, Kim Dae Jung, met with North Korea's Kim Jong Il in 2000 (and pocketed a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts), Seoul has gone to remarkable lengths to gain the North's trust. Unsurprisingly, the only real changes under this Sunshine Policy have occurred in South Korea. And efforts by President Roh, who was elected in 2002, to engage Kim Jong Il have led him to plunge his own nation into North Korea's world of lies.
For example, Seoul no longer sees any evidence of North Korea's crimes: the government tries to keep South Korean newscasts from showing a smuggled tape of the public execution of "criminals" by the North that has been broadcast in Japan and elsewhere; reports that China is shipping refugees back to North Korea are denied by the Roh government; the North's testing of chemical weapons on live prisoners goes largely unmentioned; and even Pyongyang's apparent preparations for nuclear weapons tests are played down.
South Korea, a member of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, has abstained for the last three years from voting to condemn the North for its abuses. The South's latest national defense white paper even indicates that Seoul no longer considers the North to be its "main enemy" - which implies that the presence of American forces on the peninsula is no longer necessary.
Because Seoul chooses to regard the North as a friendly neighbor, it no longer wants to help North Koreans fleeing the regime - even though its Constitution declares that these refugees have the legal right to become citizens of South Korea. There have been press reports that Seoul has been pressuring China to prevent North Korean escapees from seeking asylum in South Korea's embassy and consulates in China (there are at least 100,000 North Koreans hiding in China).
Last year, when 468 North Korean refugees who had taken refuge in Vietnam were flown into South Korea, Seoul's minister in charge of reunification declared that "we disapprove of mass defections" and promised there would not be another large-scale movement of refugees. In December, the ministry cut the "resettlement" grant program for escaped Northerners by two-thirds and announced that henceforth there would be far greater scrutiny of asylum-seekers (on the questionable grounds that these refugees might be spies).
President Roh has defended this approach by more or less throwing up his hands. He refuses to give even moral support to dissidents in the North, claiming that Kim Jong Il would ruthlessly crush any protests. For Mr. Roh, there is no chance his "partner for peace" will fall from power; in fact, he makes clear that he would not wish the regime to crumble any time soon.
So, what has President Roh received for all this appeasement? The South still has to keep paying in hard cash for any political or economic contacts to take place - it even has to bribe the North to take part in tae kwon do competitions. No reunions among families who have been divided since the armistice of 1953 have taken place in the last year; the previous rounds of reunions received a lot of positive news media coverage around the world but consisted of only brief encounters involving a small number of elderly people wanting to meet loved ones before they die. And, of course, the entire world has to put up with Pyongyang's nuclear shell game.
Many of those pushing the Sunshine Policy came of age while trying to force South Korea's postwar dictators to step down; they believe that the North can follow their model, in which economic gains paved the way for democracy. But forcing North Koreans to remain under Kim Jong Il's rule and hoping that he will make gradual reforms is unlikely to bear fruit.
North Korea undertook some economic changes in 2002, but they actually left the people worse off. A United Nations World Food Program report last month noted that the market price of rice in North Korea has nearly tripled and that of maize has quadrupled in the last year. And of course it is the government, with its monopoly on commodities, that reaps the profits from high prices.
Kim Jong Il has conned the South's big businesses as well as its government, luring them in with offers of exclusive concessions. For example, in 2000 the automaker Hyundai gave the North $500 million in exchange for a promise that it would be awarded all the major civil engineering projects Pyongyang would undertake after it received an influx of foreign aid. Hyundai has yet to realize any profit from the deal and its chairman, who faced criminal charges stemming from his dealings with the North, killed himself in 2003.
WHY does Seoul pay so dearly to prop up the criminal regime? It has claimed that if North Korea were to collapse, it would cost $1.7 trillion to rebuild it, a sum that would cripple the South's treasury. But this figure seems preposterous. Given its population of about 23 million people, the North would need an emergency influx of only about $1 billion a year to pay for food, medicines and fuel until it got back on its feet. South Korea, with its trillion-dollar gross domestic product, could easily afford this.
Nor is Seoul necessarily correct to assume that the collapse of the North would lead to an exodus of desperate people to the South. After ridding themselves of the criminal regime, wouldn't those in the North be just as likely to stay in their homes than to flee south as paupers? The huge need for capital investment in the North would probably create an economic boom, just as it has done in China over the last 25 years. With Mr. Kim gone, South Korean conglomerates and international agencies like the World Bank would be eager to invest in new power stations and factories. Unification is more likely to provide a boost to the South Korean economy than to damage it.
But beyond the economic factors, we must consider the moral ones. South Korea is seeking to keep a tyrant in power against the wishes of his own people. At 63, Kim Jong Il has spent a lifetime in a paranoid and claustrophobic dictatorship. If he were going to become a reformer, we would surely know it by now. And even if against all odds he undertook reforms, he is still personally responsible for a manmade famine that has killed 3 million people over the last decade. Would Pol Pot have been given a second chance if he had vowed to open Cambodia's markets?
Rather than coddling Kim Jong Il and paying him nuclear blackmail, we should be working to arraign him before an international criminal tribunal, just as we did with the murdering leaders of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Yes, it is highly unlikely we would ever get him before such a court, but simply making the symbolic effort might get leaders in China, Japan, South Korea and the West to envision just how attractive a post-Kim era would be for everyone.
Jasper Becker is the author of "Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea."
Since South Korea's president at the time, Kim Dae Jung, met with North Korea's Kim Jong Il in 2000 (and pocketed a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts), Seoul has gone to remarkable lengths to gain the North's trust. Unsurprisingly, the only real changes under this Sunshine Policy have occurred in South Korea. And efforts by President Roh, who was elected in 2002, to engage Kim Jong Il have led him to plunge his own nation into North Korea's world of lies.
For example, Seoul no longer sees any evidence of North Korea's crimes: the government tries to keep South Korean newscasts from showing a smuggled tape of the public execution of "criminals" by the North that has been broadcast in Japan and elsewhere; reports that China is shipping refugees back to North Korea are denied by the Roh government; the North's testing of chemical weapons on live prisoners goes largely unmentioned; and even Pyongyang's apparent preparations for nuclear weapons tests are played down.
South Korea, a member of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, has abstained for the last three years from voting to condemn the North for its abuses. The South's latest national defense white paper even indicates that Seoul no longer considers the North to be its "main enemy" - which implies that the presence of American forces on the peninsula is no longer necessary.
Because Seoul chooses to regard the North as a friendly neighbor, it no longer wants to help North Koreans fleeing the regime - even though its Constitution declares that these refugees have the legal right to become citizens of South Korea. There have been press reports that Seoul has been pressuring China to prevent North Korean escapees from seeking asylum in South Korea's embassy and consulates in China (there are at least 100,000 North Koreans hiding in China).
Last year, when 468 North Korean refugees who had taken refuge in Vietnam were flown into South Korea, Seoul's minister in charge of reunification declared that "we disapprove of mass defections" and promised there would not be another large-scale movement of refugees. In December, the ministry cut the "resettlement" grant program for escaped Northerners by two-thirds and announced that henceforth there would be far greater scrutiny of asylum-seekers (on the questionable grounds that these refugees might be spies).
President Roh has defended this approach by more or less throwing up his hands. He refuses to give even moral support to dissidents in the North, claiming that Kim Jong Il would ruthlessly crush any protests. For Mr. Roh, there is no chance his "partner for peace" will fall from power; in fact, he makes clear that he would not wish the regime to crumble any time soon.
So, what has President Roh received for all this appeasement? The South still has to keep paying in hard cash for any political or economic contacts to take place - it even has to bribe the North to take part in tae kwon do competitions. No reunions among families who have been divided since the armistice of 1953 have taken place in the last year; the previous rounds of reunions received a lot of positive news media coverage around the world but consisted of only brief encounters involving a small number of elderly people wanting to meet loved ones before they die. And, of course, the entire world has to put up with Pyongyang's nuclear shell game.
Many of those pushing the Sunshine Policy came of age while trying to force South Korea's postwar dictators to step down; they believe that the North can follow their model, in which economic gains paved the way for democracy. But forcing North Koreans to remain under Kim Jong Il's rule and hoping that he will make gradual reforms is unlikely to bear fruit.
North Korea undertook some economic changes in 2002, but they actually left the people worse off. A United Nations World Food Program report last month noted that the market price of rice in North Korea has nearly tripled and that of maize has quadrupled in the last year. And of course it is the government, with its monopoly on commodities, that reaps the profits from high prices.
Kim Jong Il has conned the South's big businesses as well as its government, luring them in with offers of exclusive concessions. For example, in 2000 the automaker Hyundai gave the North $500 million in exchange for a promise that it would be awarded all the major civil engineering projects Pyongyang would undertake after it received an influx of foreign aid. Hyundai has yet to realize any profit from the deal and its chairman, who faced criminal charges stemming from his dealings with the North, killed himself in 2003.
WHY does Seoul pay so dearly to prop up the criminal regime? It has claimed that if North Korea were to collapse, it would cost $1.7 trillion to rebuild it, a sum that would cripple the South's treasury. But this figure seems preposterous. Given its population of about 23 million people, the North would need an emergency influx of only about $1 billion a year to pay for food, medicines and fuel until it got back on its feet. South Korea, with its trillion-dollar gross domestic product, could easily afford this.
Nor is Seoul necessarily correct to assume that the collapse of the North would lead to an exodus of desperate people to the South. After ridding themselves of the criminal regime, wouldn't those in the North be just as likely to stay in their homes than to flee south as paupers? The huge need for capital investment in the North would probably create an economic boom, just as it has done in China over the last 25 years. With Mr. Kim gone, South Korean conglomerates and international agencies like the World Bank would be eager to invest in new power stations and factories. Unification is more likely to provide a boost to the South Korean economy than to damage it.
But beyond the economic factors, we must consider the moral ones. South Korea is seeking to keep a tyrant in power against the wishes of his own people. At 63, Kim Jong Il has spent a lifetime in a paranoid and claustrophobic dictatorship. If he were going to become a reformer, we would surely know it by now. And even if against all odds he undertook reforms, he is still personally responsible for a manmade famine that has killed 3 million people over the last decade. Would Pol Pot have been given a second chance if he had vowed to open Cambodia's markets?
Rather than coddling Kim Jong Il and paying him nuclear blackmail, we should be working to arraign him before an international criminal tribunal, just as we did with the murdering leaders of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Yes, it is highly unlikely we would ever get him before such a court, but simply making the symbolic effort might get leaders in China, Japan, South Korea and the West to envision just how attractive a post-Kim era would be for everyone.
Jasper Becker is the author of "Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea."
