少し前になりますが、原発問題で、先月ニューヨークタイムズの記者さんに取材を受けました。
わたしはかねてから原発反対の立場をとっており、そのことで取材依頼がきました。
お話したことが、Kusuo Oshimaの意見として、掲載されています。
ぜひご覧ください。
私の発言は、原発推進への批判は、原子力村の利権にからんでなかなか発言できない中、
私はその利権とは無縁の立場をとってきたので、堂々と反対論を唱えてきた、という趣旨です。
国民を危険にさらすことが、国民の日常の利便性や産業発展の代償となってはいけません。
イタリアのように、国民投票があったなら、日本はどんな結論をだすのでしょうか。
原文引用いたします。
ニューヨークタイムズ、4月26日のアーカイブでもご覧いただけます。
“It’s all about money,” he added.
At Fukushima Daiichi and elsewhere, critics say that safety problems have stemmed from a common source: a watchdog that is a member of the nuclear power village.
Though it is charged with oversight, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency is part of the Ministry of Trade, Economy and Industry, the bureaucracy charged with promoting the use of nuclear power. Over a long career, officials are often transferred repeatedly between oversight and promotion divisions, blurring the lines between supporting and policing the industry.
Influential bureaucrats tend to side with the nuclear industry — and the promotion of it — because of a practice known as amakudari, or descent from heaven. Widely practiced in Japan’s main industries, amakudari allows senior bureaucrats, usually in their 50s, to land cushy jobs at the companies they once oversaw.
According to data compiled by the Communist Party, one of the fiercest critics of the nuclear industry, generations of high-ranking officials from the ministry have landed senior positions at the country’s 10 utilities since Japan’s first nuclear plants were designed in the 1960s. In a pattern reflective of the clear hierarchy in Japan’s ministries and utilities, the ministry’s most senior officials went to work at Tepco, while those of lower ranks ended up at smaller utilities.
わたしはかねてから原発反対の立場をとっており、そのことで取材依頼がきました。
お話したことが、Kusuo Oshimaの意見として、掲載されています。
ぜひご覧ください。
私の発言は、原発推進への批判は、原子力村の利権にからんでなかなか発言できない中、
私はその利権とは無縁の立場をとってきたので、堂々と反対論を唱えてきた、という趣旨です。
国民を危険にさらすことが、国民の日常の利便性や産業発展の代償となってはいけません。
イタリアのように、国民投票があったなら、日本はどんな結論をだすのでしょうか。
原文引用いたします。
ニューヨークタイムズ、4月26日のアーカイブでもご覧いただけます。
“It’s all about money,” he added.
At Fukushima Daiichi and elsewhere, critics say that safety problems have stemmed from a common source: a watchdog that is a member of the nuclear power village.
Though it is charged with oversight, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency is part of the Ministry of Trade, Economy and Industry, the bureaucracy charged with promoting the use of nuclear power. Over a long career, officials are often transferred repeatedly between oversight and promotion divisions, blurring the lines between supporting and policing the industry.
Influential bureaucrats tend to side with the nuclear industry — and the promotion of it — because of a practice known as amakudari, or descent from heaven. Widely practiced in Japan’s main industries, amakudari allows senior bureaucrats, usually in their 50s, to land cushy jobs at the companies they once oversaw.
According to data compiled by the Communist Party, one of the fiercest critics of the nuclear industry, generations of high-ranking officials from the ministry have landed senior positions at the country’s 10 utilities since Japan’s first nuclear plants were designed in the 1960s. In a pattern reflective of the clear hierarchy in Japan’s ministries and utilities, the ministry’s most senior officials went to work at Tepco, while those of lower ranks ended up at smaller utilities.