朝日記240219 その６ Zombies ゾンビについて

朝日記240219 その６　Zombies　ゾンビについて

朝日記240219 　エントリー⇒Zombies　ゾンビについてーZombi, its philosophical backgroundー

ー本文ー

Bibliography

• Alter, T., 2007, ‘On the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts’, Philosophical Studies, 134: 235–53.
• Aranyosi, I., 2010, ‘Powers and the Mind-Body Problem’, International Journal of Philosophy, 18: 57–72.
• Bailey, A., 2009, ‘Zombies and Epiphenomenalism’, Dialogue, 48: 129–44.
• Ball, D., 2009, ‘There Are No Phenomenal Concepts’, Mind, 122: 935–62.
• Balog, K., 1999, ‘Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem’, Philosophical Review, 108: 497–528.
• –––, 2012, ‘In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy‘, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84: 1–23.
• Barnes, G., 2002, ‘Conceivability, Explanation, and Defeat’, Philosophical Studies, 108: 327–38.
• Block, N., 1980a, ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, in Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1, Ned Block (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 268–305.
• –––, 1980b, ‘Are Absent Qualia Impossible?’ Philosophical Review, 89: 257–274.
• –––, 1981, ‘Psychologism and Behaviorism’, Philosophical Review, 90: 5–43.
• –––, 1995, ‘On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18: 227–247.
• –––, 2002, ‘The Harder Problem of Consciousness’, Journal of Philosophy, 99: 391–425.
• –––, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (eds.), 1997, The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.
• ––– and R. Stalnaker, 1999, ‘Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap’, Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46.
• Braddon-Mitchell, D., 2003, ‘Qualia and Analytical Conditionals’, Journal of Philosophy, 100: 111–135.
• Brown, R., 2010, ‘Deprioritizing the A Priori Arguments Against Physicalism’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 17 (3–4): 47–69.
• Brueckner, A., 2001. ‘Chalmers’s Conceivability Argument for Dualism’, Analysis, 61: 187–193.
• Campbell, K., 1970, Body and Mind, London: Macmillan.
• Campbell, D., J. Copeland and Z-R Deng 2017. ‘The Inconceivable Popularity of Conceivability Arguments’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 67: 223—240.
• Carruth, A., 2016, ‘Powerful qualities, zombies and inconceivability’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 66: 25—46.
• Chalmers, D. J., 1996, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 1999, ‘Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 475–496.
• –––, 2002, ‘Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?’, in Gendler and Hawthorne 2002.
• –––, 2003, ‘The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief’, in Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2007, ‘Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap’, in T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 167–94.
• –––, 2010, ‘The Two-Dimensional Argument against Materialism’, in his The Character of Consciousness, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• ––– and F. Jackson, 2001, ‘Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation’, Philosophical Review, 110: 315–61.
• Cottrell, A., 1999, ‘Sniffing the Camembert: on the Conceivability of Zombies’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6: 4–12.
• Crane, T., 2005, ‘Papineau on Phenomenal Consciousness’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71: 155–62 .
• Dennett, D. C., 1991, Consciousness Explained, Boston, Toronto, London: Little, Brown.
• –––, 1995, ‘The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2: 322–6.
• –––, 1999, ‘The Zombic Hunch: Extinction of an Intuition?’ Royal Institute of Philosophy Millennial Lecture.
• Descartes, R., Discourse on the Method; The Objections and Replies, in The Philosophical Writings Of Descartes, 3 vols., translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (volume 3, including A. Kenny), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
• Flanagan, O., and T. Polger, 1995, ‘Zombies and the Function of Consciousness’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2: 313–321.
• Frankish, K., 2007, ‘The Anti-Zombie Argument’, Philosophical Quarterly, 57: 650–666 .
• Garrett, B. J., 2009, ‘Causal Essentialism versus the Zombie Worlds’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 39: 93–112 .
• Gendler, T., and J. Hawthorne (eds.), 2002, Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Goff, P., 2010, ‘Ghosts and Sparse Properties: Why Physicalists Have More to Fear from Ghosts than Zombies’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81: 119–37.
• Harnad, S., 1995, ‘Why and How We Are Not Zombies’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1: 164–167.
• Hawthorne, J. P., 2002a, ‘Advice to Physicalists’, Philosophical Studies, 108: 17–52.
• –––, 2002b. ‘Blocking Definitions of Materialism’, Philosophical Studies, 110: 103–13.
• Hill, C. S., 1997, ‘Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem’, Philosophical Studies, 87: 61–85.
• Hill, C. S., and B. P. McLaughlin, 1999, ‘There are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 446–454.
• Howell, R. J., 2013, Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity: the Case for Subjective Physicalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Jackson, F., 1982, ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–136.
• Jackson, F., 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press.
• James, W., 1890, The Principles of Psychology, New York: Dover (originally published by Holt).
• Kirk, R., 1974a, ‘Sentience and Behaviour’, Mind, 83: 43–60.
• –––, 1974b, ‘Zombies v. Materialists’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 48 (Supplementary): 135–152.
• –––, 2005, Zombies and Consciousness, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 2008, ‘The Inconceivability of Zombies’, Philosophical Studies, 139: 73–89.
• –––, 2013, The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2017, Robots, Zombies and Us: Understanding Consciousness, London: Bloomsbury.
• Kriegel, U., 2011, Subjective Consciousness: a self-representational theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Kripke, S., 1972/80, Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell. (Revised and enlarged version of ‘Naming and Necessity’, in Semantics of Natural Language, D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 253–355.
• Latham, Noa, 2000, ‘Chalmers on the Addition of Consciousness to the Physical World’, Philosophical Studies, 98: 71–97.
• Leuenberger, S., 2008, ‘Ceteris Absentibus Physicalism’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 4, D. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 145–170.
• Levine, J., 2001, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
• Loar, B., 1990/1997, ‘Phenomenal States’, in Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 4, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero: Ridgeview. Revised version repr. in Block, et al. 1997, 597–616.
• –––, 1999, ‘David Chalmers’s The Conscious Mind’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 465–472.
• Lyons, J. C., 2009, Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules and the Problem of the External World, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• McLaughlin, B. P., 2005, ‘A Priori versus A Posteriori Physicalism’, in Philosophy-Science-Scientific Philosophy, Main Lectures and Colloquia of GAP 5, Fifth International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy (C. Nimtz & A. Beckermann eds.), Mentis.
• Marcus, E., 2004, ‘Why Zombies are Inconceivable’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 477–90.
• Marton, P., 1998, ‘Zombies vs. materialists: The battle for conceivability’, Southwest Philosophy Review, 14: 131–38.
• Nagel, T., 1970, ‘Armstrong on the Mind’, Philosophical Review, 79: 394–403.
• –––, 1974, ‘What is it Like to Be a Bat?’ Philosophical Review, 83: 435–450, reprinted in his Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
• –––, 1998, ‘Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem’, Philosophy, 73: 337-352.
• Olson, E. T., 2018, ‘The Zombies Among Us,’ Noûs, 52: 216–226.
• Papineau, D., 2002, Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Pereboom, D., 2011, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Perry, J., 2001, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Piccinini, G., 2017, ‘Access Denied to Zombies,’ Topoi, 36: 81–93.
• Russell, B., 1927, The Analysis of Matter, London: Routledge.
• Searle, J. R., 1992, The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Sebastián, M. A., 2017, ‘On a Confusion About Which Intuitions to Trust: From the Hard Problem to a Not Easy One’, Topoi, 36: 31–40.
• Shoemaker, S., 1975, ‘Functionalism and Qualia’, Philosophical Studies, 27: 291–315.
• –––, 1999, ‘On David Chalmers’s The Conscious Mind,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 439–444.
• Stalnaker, R., 2002, ‘What is it Like to Be a Zombie?’, in Gendler and Hawthorne 2002.
• Stoljar, D., 2000, ‘Physicalism and the Necessary a Posteriori’, Journal of Philosophy, 97: 33–54.
• –––, 2001, ‘The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical’, in Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 15, James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 393–413.
• –––, 2005, ‘Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts’, Mind and Language, 20: 469–94.
• –––, 2006, Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Stout, G. F., 1931, Mind and Matter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Sturgeon, S., 2000, Matters of Mind: Consciousness, reason and nature, London and New York: Routledge.
• Taylor, Henry, 2017, ‘Powerful qualities, the conceivability argument and the nature of the physical’, Philosophical Studies, 174: 1895–1910.
• Thomas, N. J. T., 1998, ‘Zombie Killer’, in S. R. Hameroff, A. W. Kaszniak, and A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 171–177.
• –––, 2006. ‘Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem’, Philosophical Review, 115: 139–68.
• –––, 2008, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Webster, W. R., 2006, ‘Human Zombies are Metaphysically Impossible’, Synthese, 151: 297–310.
• Woodling, C., 2014, ‘Imagining Zombies’, Disputatio, 6: 107–116.
• Yablo, S., 1993, ‘Is conceivability a guide to possibility?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53: 1–42.
• –––, 1999, ‘Concepts and Consciousness’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 455–463.

Academic Tools

	How to cite this entry.
	Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society.
	Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO).
	Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers, with links to its database.

Other Internet Resources

• Bibliography on Zombies and the Conceivability Argument, maintained by David Chalmers (New York University).

Related Entries

animal: consciousness | behaviorism | conceivability | consciousness | dualism | epiphenomenalism | functionalism | knowledge argument | Kripke | mental causation | mind/brain identity theory | neutral monism | other minds | physicalism | private language | qualia | skepticism | supervenience

Acknowledgments

Many thanks to David Chalmers and to Bill Fish for valuable detailed comments and suggestions on drafts of this entry.

Copyright © 2019 by
Robert Kirk <Robert.Kirk@nottingham.ac.uk>

朝日記240219 　エントリー⇒Zombies　ゾンビについてーZombi, its philosophical background