John Mearsheimer: Is China the Real Winner of Ukraine War? | Endgame #136 (Luminaries)
朝日記230906 赤峰和彦氏ロシア・ウクライナ戦争の落としどころ論説について
その①
https://blog.goo.ne.jp/akamine_2015/e/6625fc78e6cbeab0f8f9eca88972bacd?st=0#comment-form
その②
②ロシア・ウクライナ戦争の落としどころ
https://blog.goo.ne.jp/akamine_2015/e/8c16fa54f6afb661704f772017e16b09?fm=entry_awc
- ロシア・ウクライナ戦争の落としどころ
――中東情勢、米大統領選も影響か：230905情報
私の投稿コメント：
四面戦の筋 (あらいやすまさ) 赤峰和彦の 『 日本と国際社会の真相 』あ
2023-09-05 23:52:15
赤峰先生、貴重な論説でした。残念ながら伊藤貫先生の四面戦の筋にリアリティをもっとも感じます。
１．そのうちの二つ；台湾と韓国の両筋は、戦略的判断の前をこえて同盟強化の選択がせまられることになりそうです。第二次「日清戦争」の再来となります。
２．アメリカは、同盟強化のもとに自身は身を後方に陣し、主要同盟国に先陣を張らせることになる。
３．英、独（仏）、イスラエル、日本が先陣国か。
４．英は亜先陣で米の陣幕にあるかもしれない。
５．独と日が軍事突出を一挙に進めることになる。
６．独と日は局所戦術的核所有と判断権を得え、現実的に、かなり速やかに認められる。
７．ロシアのプーチンはトランプの再登場に賭けるかもしれない。バイデンが中途半端にウクライナ支援してきたことが戦況を悪化させている。彼に停戦にむけての大胆な決断を望めない。
８．中東は、イスラエルのバックとして英と仏が陣取るか。
９．アメリカの庇護のもと７５年にわたって日本が国として他国の人を殺めない誇りたかい徳性は、残念ながら傷つくことになるが、この徳性と経済力が
大きな盾となることになろう。
１０．しかし、わが国は大きく舵をきることになりましょう。憲法前文の平和主義を錦の御旗とし、アジア域安全保障先導国家と羽化するということになりますね。
１１．福島処理水放出に対して、中国の法外な反対に対して国論のまとまりはまことに速やかで、野党左も、おっとり刀で駆けている観があります。むしろ理性ある判断の矜持が肝要であると顧るものであります。
朝日記230825 トランプ氏と共和党のたたかいdeep stateとはなにか、どのように存在しうるかという問かけ
これはdeep stateとはなにか、どのように存在しうるかという問かけです。
上の和訳をしておきます；
もしある銀行に２０の共謀者がいてかれらが銀行の金を盗んだとする。かれらはお互いが誰であるかしっていて、それからの事態についてなにもかたらない。さて、新しい頭取が就任したとしよう。かれはこの銀行の業績を上げるために、現状を分析し新しい改革案を命令する。さて、例の２０人はその改革案を失敗に終わらせるためにできるすべてをおこなう。かれらの利益が暴露され終焉することを防ぐために全力を尽くすのである。これを言っているこの私は、これを読んでいるあなたにワシントン特区を差し上げよう。以上が訳であるが、肝心な誤訳がある、それはこの２０人は形式において共謀を何らせず、ただ相互の意図に無言の共感をもち、その成功をねがった場合である。共謀の証拠が取れない場合である。このようなことをevilなdeep stateということになるが、２０名側からはrighteousなstateともなる。あなたはこのstateの存在を証明できると考えますか。
Trump支持の共和党はこのよう次元からの大統領選をたたかう典型アッピールとしているようです。
NewYorkTimes,Washington Postは一様に民主党支持メディアであり、日本のメディアはCNNなど片側の
報道になっています。日本ではしたがってTrumpがなにと闘っているか全く歪んだ報道になっています。
出典は以下からです；https://www.facebook.com/groups/706565766946838/permalink/1335934870676588/
Two ways
朝日記220714 日本維新の会の党規約を掲載します と今日の絵
今日の絵はめんどりルイーズ ２題です。
日本維新の会の党規約を掲載します。
この政党の党首独裁的な体質について２０１２年の規約で指摘しましたが、その本質は変わっていないと見ました。執行体制が理論的にすべて代表の意志できまる、その代表を選出する党大会開催の決定も代表の胸三寸できまることになります。地方自治と国政を同バランスということは見かけ上受けますが、国の運命をきめる国権の最高機関の議員党員が地域性のつよいリーダーの下に帰属している構造はやはり危険とみます。みなさま、この党の規約に目をとおされることを勧めます。参考まで、朝日記121018と170704を以下に添付しましたのでお読みください。
朝日記220526 現レジュームの中興の祖となる日本としてと今日の絵
今日の絵は嵐Storm ４つです。
赤峰和彦さんの投稿をご紹介します；
赤峰和彦の 『 日本と国際社会の真相 』
https://blog.goo.ne.jp/akamine_2015/e/4c7a8754b876f03d5ea4a9674163ec0e?st=0#comment-form
わたくしのコメント：
仰る安倍戦略は日本が現世界レジームの中興のための指向基礎を自由世界に放ったものとみます。これによって手詰まりであったレジームが立ち直りを賭けることになります。舞台裏で地味に働いていた職人が、ワーグナー楽劇の舞台を知り尽くし、演出の一旦を担うことになったとみることができます。電気釜やウォークマンなど民生に集中して、おもわぬ科学技術のブレークスルーを成し遂げ、その存在を世界に認めさせたこの国は、世界から表舞台で働くことをながらく求められてきました。巨大な兄弟の衣の裾において安泰であった安全保障と国民生存環境は、終焉を向かうこと長からずです。気がついたら大人になっていたということか。レジュームを支える有力幹事役として世界は納得するとみます。国連の安保理国などケチな役回りとは違います。７０年余手を血でそめないこの国に世界は期待することであることに確信します。蛇足ですが日・独・イスラエルそしてあのウクライナとトルコあたりが登場してくることを勝手に想像します。
今日の絵４つ
朝日記210707 Make Japan Clever again！！と今日の絵
今日の絵は 九谷風浜木綿 です。
評論家高島洋一さんの解説をきいての 敬愛する友人との論議です。
徒然こと 以下論議です；
友人NA氏
レベルの高い、とても面白い『政談』
私Arai
政治現象としては顕在してくることは認めます。踊らせておけです。世渡り術だけの政治家です。K-phonomenaのあたらしいラウンド。
友人NA氏
「すごいが何もない」と言い切っているところがなかなかと思います。「政治家というのは時代思想の過去からの連続性の末端に位置するものでもので、時代精神のチャンピオンだからトップの一人になれる。ぽつんと一人で独裁者になれる人なんていない」というのが政治学科の恩師（ドイツ史でナチズム研究の大家だった）の言葉ですが、その通りと思います。その点、彼女が時代精神という進行中の歴史を入れている器なのでしょう。
友人NA氏
それはそれで憂鬱な現象です。
私Arai
目下は国難の真っただ中で、むしろ戦争状態にあるとみることになります。二律背反のような事態を乗り越える、それが一進一退。後出しじゃんけんですませれば、楽であるが、それができないことを ６・２も感じている。どちらに賭けるかこれも自由意志であるが、そう、向かうべき方向を指し示すこれこそが自由意志であり、政治家の真価を為すといえますね。現象、これは勿論観念的な力学運動系ですが、これを使って自らの呻吟し、考え抜いた意志を示しえない、あるいは、世論の空気だけをたよりに、雇った軍師のことばを演技する代表者であるならば、歴史的に弾劾されるべきです。橋下徹、わたくしは嫌いですし、彼の意志は常に危険ですから反対ですが、自分の理念に基づいて勝負をかけてきたことは世界に誇れる政治家とみます。そうその系統の怪物はD.Trumpです。なんであろうと彼は自分の価値観しかほとんど信じない。しかしそれを恥気もなく、あるいは勇気をもって指ししめす、自由意志です。これを評価します。（次期、彼は返り咲きます。賭けです） 都民ファーストで祭り空気に流されている都民に対して、それは誤りであることを申し上げたいとおもいます。 この困難を傷だらけながらも生き抜く日本、そのすがたこそ人類の勝利のシンボルとなれかしです。ニーチェのいうこの国の民を偉大にする試練の好機です。
Make Japan Clever again！！
友人NA氏
凡そトップの大変なところは全部に対して決断しなければならないことです。野党や市民活動家ならシングル一シューにこだわっていれば済むけれども、山ほどある政策は互いに利害が対立することもあり、予算の配分もあるし、そんな何百通りをジャッジすればすべての人から良く言われない。身内とすら戦う必要を避けられません。それをやり抜こうとするには相当な強固な意志と、なぜそうしなければならないかという思想が必要とされると思います。それがなければ始まらないでしょう。そのように考えない人は「そんなことも分からないんだ。ばーか、ばーか」とお気楽です。マスコミは最近に限らずそうです。市民運動家レベルで受けようとしたのが民主党時代の敗因と思います。それは立憲になっても同じです。「だったらやってみろ」とは、もう永遠に言われないでしょう。なんだかんだと言っても、戦後この方、日本人の時代精神に沿ってきた点では自民党に揺るぎないアドバンテージがあり、勿論あまり感心しない総理もいたし、今よりもっと左寄りだった時代もあったけれども、総合的にそうとっぱずれたこともなく、官僚組織を操縦してやってきたということを、サイレントマジョリティーは概ね良しとしてきたということでしょう。政治というのはまず「最大多数の最大幸福」であり、次にそれから洩れた人達をどう手当てするかでしょう。リソースは限られていますから、前段だけでも実現は難しく、後段も可能にするのはよほど強い政権でないと出来ないことと思います。特定少数の最大幸福ではどんな政権でも倒れます。「現にそうなんだ」と言いたがるのはマスコミの常套ですが、長く続いたという事実によってフェイクであれば否定されます。むしろそれ以外の評価軸はありません。個人的には安倍さんも菅さんもなかなか良く出来た総理大臣と思います。むしろ、折角の支持率を高いうちに充分活用しきったとは言えず、安全運転に過ぎたことを残念に思います。以上は私見です。
Arai
そういうことであろうと思います。
九谷風浜木綿
朝日記210301 ひさびさのトランプの登場動画,Trump’s speech on Sunday, February 28 from fox TV
徒然こと トランプスピーチ 2921-20-28です。
https://www.facebook.com/FoxBusiness/videos/1152710291829332
御覧あれ。Trumpは元気ですね。 コロラドの共和党支持の友人のネットから掲載です。
劇映画と同じ長さで、うまく構成されています。
Jim Jordan下院議員(Ohio, Rp)の勇気を称賛していたのが印象的でした。
She is Smart!
Asanikki 210220 A VIEW FROM JAPAN and Today drawing
This is an excellent essay to sending a message to President Biden and American people. So, I recommend you, my friend to have a read it. Very clear and comprehensive talking on crucial matter of meaning as US primacy and commitment of presence in Indo-Pacific area. One point be careful this author is said an officer in duty of the Japanese government of foreign affairs, and used name with Y.A. initials, which is something embarrassment to my name of also same with Y.A, as abbreviation. Be careful, my friend. The author is quite different of me, Y.A.
The original article is below;
The Virtues of a Confrontational China Strategy - The American Interest (the-american-interest.com)
徒然こと；
A VIEW FROM JAPAN
The Virtues of a Confrontational China Strategy
A Japanese official criticizes aspects of the Trump Administration’s confrontational approach to China, but on balance finds it preferable in almost every way to Obama’s engagement and accommodation.
Views of President Donald Trump among Japan’s policy elites are complex. Ask a foreign policy expert about the current occupant of the White House, and most would probably find many things to criticize. But if you ask them if they miss the Obama presidency, most of the same people would also respond negatively—perhaps more so.
Japanese policymakers despaired of Obama’s so-called “21st-century approach” when contrasted against China’s 19th-century habit of using raw power to intimidate all countries in the region to build up its own sphere of influence. While President Obama was talking about possible cooperation with China on global issues in a bid to make a responsible stakeholder out of a rival, Beijing was busy sending military ships to the Senkakus, muscling the Philippines out of Scarborough Shoal, and creating artificial islands in the South China Sea. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan had continuously warned the United States about China. For all of President Trump’s various shortcomings, it looks like Japan finally has someone in the White House who properly recognizes and appreciates the challenge.
Although Japan never openly opposed the United States’ optimistic engagement policy towards China (which first flowered during the Clinton Administration), Japanese Sinologists had little confidence that China would ever become a liberal democracy. Most of Japan’s China experts argued, based on 2,000 years of experience, that China would never change its culture or nature: China was and always will be China. From the time of Confucius in the fifth century B.C., for the Chinese the world has had only one heaven and one ruler—the Emperor of China. All non-Chinese “barbarians” have to acknowledge Chinese preeminence.
Japan has never subscribed to this view. Japan’s historic approach toward the Indo-Pacific was to maintain its own sovereignty while preserving economic, cultural as well as political interactions with its neighbors. In the face of China’s recent rise, Japan is still determined to sustain its sovereignty and prosperity. The present international order and regional balance of power, with the U.S.-Japan Alliance as its central pillar, has made that possible. Japan wants to sustain this status quo.
For its part, China has consistently challenged this status quo since at least 1992 when it adopted its Territorial Legislation, unilaterally declaring the inclusion of Senkaku and South China Sea islands as “the land territory of the People’s Republic of China.” After attempts at accommodation under the Clinton Administration, President Bush entered office prepared to take the China challenge seriously. His administration’s first Quadrennial Defense Review, published in September 2001, referred to the China challenge for the first time, stating that “[t]he possibility exists that a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in the [Asia) region.” Japan and the United States were planning to discuss China during their annual meeting between foreign and defense ministers during the UN General Assembly in New York that September when 9/11 happened. China quickly agreed to support the U.S. global anti-terrorism effort, buying Beijing at least a decade to continue its modernization effort while Washington was focused elsewhere. The Chinese started investing heavily in renewing their aging military and in developing modern power-projection capabilities, including building up a large blue water navy—a first for China in modern times. And China has not been shy in leveraging its new capabilities. Outposts across the South China Sea were gradually built up and occupied one by one, and from 2008 on, Beijing began sending patrol vessels into Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkakus.
President Obama was nevertheless not moved to take a harder line when he came to power. The Obama Administration was executing exactly what liberal intellectuals in its orbit were advocating: focusing on cooperation on global issues coupled with deference to China’s so-called core interests (including Taiwan and human rights catastrophes in Tibet and Xinjiang)—all in the hope of shaping China into a more liberal actor that would share the U.S. burden of underwriting the existing international order. Until its last day, the Obama Administration believed China was “shapeable.”Until its last day, the Obama Administration believed China was “shapeable.”
Throughout this period, policy consensus was not monolithic. A minority of Washington’s Sinologists warned against the efficacy of engagement. James Mann’s 2007 book The China Fantasy: Why Capitalism Will Not Bring Democracy to China, for example, argued that the central problem with the concept of “engagement” was in effect the question: “Who is engaging whom?” Are we really engaging China, or is China engaging the international system to its own benefit? And who is changing whom—are we changing China, or is the international system changing to accommodate Chinese behavior? And to its credit, the United States did do a fair bit of “hedging” on its bet that China would come around. The Obama Administration strengthened the U.S.-Japan alliance, enhanced military cooperation with Australia and the Philippines, and embraced India and Vietnam as close partners. All of these efforts were more than welcomed in Tokyo and other Asian capitals.
However, the priority mission was always to engage China. Obama’s trip to China in 2016 is a case in point. That July, Beijing had refused to accept the verdict of the International Tribunal in Hague which overwhelmingly supported Manila’s claims in the South China Sea, calling the ruling “just a piece of paper.” A month later, in August, China had sent some 200 to 300 fishing vessels to the Senkakus. Right after these events, President Obama visited Hangzhou, and issued a Fact Sheet reflecting U.S. priorities with Beijing: among them Peacekeeping, Refugees, Maritime Risk Reduction and Cooperation, Iraq, Space Cooperation, Afghanistan, Nuclear Security and Liability, Combating Wildlife Trafficking, Oceans Cooperation, Strengthening Development Cooperation, Africa, and Global Health. There was no mention of censuring China’s coercive and destabilizing behavior.
This was the regional strategic backdrop to President Trump’s election. Japan was, of course, as surprised as anyone by the results. Tokyo, however, was quick to act. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe quickly flew to New York to meet President-elect Trump in his offices in Trump Tower. This was a risky and unprecedented move, but the gambit paid off for Japan, enabling Abe to take Trump’s measure on international issues, build a relationship with his future counterpart, and deliver a clear message about the importance of the region and the challenge posed by China. In February 2017, when Abe met Trump after his inauguration, they agreed to a joint declaration that was unprecedented in its scope and ambition. The impact was twofold.
First, it sent a strong warning signal to China. The two leaders confirmed all the fundamental principles which we in Tokyo considered to form the foundation for peace and stability in the region: The United States’ renewed commitment to the Indo-Pacific, to nuclear deterrence against territorial aggression, as well as a recommitment to the pursuit of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. “The United States will strengthen its presence in the region, and Japan will assume larger roles and responsibilities in the alliance,” the communiqué read, and further instructed foreign and defense ministers to “review the respective roles, missions, and capabilities of the two countries.” The outlines of the big picture were agreed to by Trump himself, and all other “details” would be handled by senior ministers. This first declaration reassured not only Japan but also allies and partners across the region.
Second, it altered the decision-making on the conduct of the bilateral alliance. The declaration was drafted jointly, with the Japanese side contributing equally—if not more—to its content. Maximum pressure toward North Korea, a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, the importance of Southeast Asia—all of these concepts were, to a certain extent, suggestions from the Japanese-side.Maximum pressure toward North Korea, a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, the importance of Southeast Asia—all of these concepts were, to a certain extent, suggestions from the Japanese-side. For some Americans, it may be easy to overlook the significance of this transition for Japan. Since the end of World War II, Japan’s foreign policy has been more or less responsive to, and heavily shaped by, U.S. preferences and influence. Japanese bureaucrats and policymakers had become accustomed to depending on international pressure to inform Japanese decision-making—so much so that there is even a term for it in Japanese: “Gai-atsu.” Psychologically, this was a critical breakthrough. So, for the first time, Japanese officials were jointly formulating strategic directions and approaches to geopolitical challenges in the Indo-Pacific with our American counterparts, rather than soliciting their views and providing our critique as we had historically done.
Since then, Trump has called Abe at every important occasion—before and after his meeting with Xi Jinping, for example, and as he planned his opening toward North Korea. According to media reports, as of May 2019, Abe and Trump had met 10 times, talked over the phone 30 times, and played golf 4 times. This volume of engagement, as measured in telephone calls, was already quadruple the number of engagements that Abe had with Obama. This is by far the most intimate relationship that Trump has established among foreign leaders.
The Trump Administration’s implementation of its confrontational policy with China, however, has caused considerable confusion, especially among the broader public. As former Vice President Joseph Biden argued in his recent Foreign Affairs essay, “the most effective way to meet that challenge [China] is to build a united front of U.S. allies and partners to confront China’s abusive behaviors.” When President Trump used economic leverage not only against China but also against its allies and partners, it raised doubts in many minds across the region as to the credibility of American security guarantees and commitments. Japan is no exception. A recent Nikkei poll conducted in January 2020 revealed that 72 percent of Japanese don’t want President Trump to be re-elected, precisely because of this uncertainty.
So, do we want, if possible, to go back to the world before Trump? For many decision-makers in Tokyo, the answer is probably no, because having a poorly implemented but fundamentally correct strategy is better than having a well-implemented but ambiguous strategy. We just don’t want to see the United States go back again to engagement, which will undoubtedly come at our, and other Asian countries’ expense.
We certainly do not consider the U.S.-Japan alliance to be transactional in nature. That said, we would prefer an alliance that both better serves our national interests while also serving broader U.S. interests. In plainer language, an alliance explicitly focused on China is better than one which is vague and unfocused, or worse yet, afraid to confront the greatest challenge. How to share that burden is a matter of alliance management. In other words, it is a process matter. It is important to re-affirm that an alliance is a means, not an end, to serve our shared national interests.
Western Europeans, in particular, may be puzzled by this kind of calculus, but that is merely the result of Europe’s own economically transactional approach when it comes to China, which has prioritized business ties and had leaders look the other way as China has thrown its weight around in its neighborhood. For countries on the receiving end of Chinese coercion, a tougher U.S. line on China is more important than any other aspect of U.S. policy. Asian elites—in Taipei, Manila, Hanoi, New-Delhi—increasingly calculate that Trump’s unpredictable and transactional approach is a lesser evil compared to the danger of the United States going back to cajoling China to be a “responsible stakeholder.” A prominent pundit went so far as to assert that “Asian elites have grown oddly sanguine about a Trump second term.”
The truth is that, facing continuous pressure from Beijing, Asian countries are desperately seeking continued U.S. commitment and presence in the region, and the U.S.-Japan alliance is a key component of that. While quietly resenting President Trump boasting about how much he manages to squeeze from allies, most countries would be ready to consider a revised form of burden-sharing provided that U.S. commitments remain firm. There is a real opening here to set a healthy new dynamic for the region that could guarantee stability for several generations.
Of course, a more sophisticated implementation of a strategy for balancing China—one that leverages the strengths and support of like-minded allies like Japan—would be most welcome. Whoever resides in the White House in January 2021, Tokyo’s expectation is to continue our bilateral strategic discussion on equal terms, focusing our shared efforts on wisely implementing the current strategy objective of maintaining U.S. primacy and presence in the Indo-Pacific in support of the existing rules-based international system that we have all benefitted so greatly from.
Published on: April 10, 2020
Y.A. is an official of the Government of Japan.
Noh-play Fujitaiko
朝日記210219 ワシントンポスト記事：トランプ弾劾は証拠不足だが脅迫があった
～～～～～
参考；
Asanikki210219 "Lack of witnesses at Trump's trials,Witness Intimidation is"
～～～
Asanikki210219 Copy of Article of The Washington Post; "Lack of witnesses at Trump's trials,Witness Intimidation is"
ワシントンポスト紙（読売新聞ジャパン・ニュース2021-2-18掲載）の記事の要点を掲載します。
Today's picture are two; infant Nut and bird Jay and Keiko ba of Hakoneダニエル・ゴールドマン記者の記事；トランプ弾劾裁判は証拠不足であるが、彼の脅迫を証拠付けることはできる。
The Washington Post wrote by Daniel S. Goldman, an article that Trump's second impeachment trial has closed as Lack of witnesses at Trump's tials is not the problem: Witness intimidation is.
1. He praized the House manager had brilliant prosecuted the case,and Trump's counsel had wrapped it could muster.
上院はすばらしい弾劾を取り上げたが、トランプ側はそれを阻止した。
2. A lone outstanding question are whether witness would be called, the answer was no.
証拠に関する重要な質問がひとつだされたが却下された。
3. Rep. Jaime Herrera Beuterm R-Wash., provided information about a heated phone conversation that Trump and Kelvin McCarthy,R-Calif., in the middle of the riot. which shed light on whether Trump had been aware of the immediate danger to then Vice President Mike Pence during the mob attack on the Capital.
ジェーム・ヒレーラ議員（共和党）はトランプとケルビン・マッカーシー議員（共和党）との電話での激しいやりとりの電話のときは、まさに暴動の真っ最中であった。このとき、トランプはペンス副大統領が議事堂で暴徒に襲撃が差し迫っていることを憂慮したか証拠になる証人がいることを提案した。
4. "Well,Kelvin, I guess these people are more upset about the election than you are." Trump reportedly said when McCarthy angrily told him that that he needed to call off his supporters.
ケルビン、君が怒っている以上にこれらの人々は選挙に怒っているのだ。これはマッカーシー議員が彼のサポーターを呼びもどすべきだと強く言ったときのトランプの言であるも確認している。
5. Regarding to this witness was taken under the matter at the impeachment trial, it was withdrawn because of the record being of part of other recording matter.
この証拠については弾劾法廷では採用されなかった。証人が来るのではなく、録音の一部のものであるということによるものであった。
6. The writer has a feeling of regret, and he recognizes whether or not taken this would been appealed to them, there would not be reaching to be shown a proof of Trump's conviction.
この記者は非常に残念とした。なぜならこの録音こそトランプの有罪を決定できるものとする可能性をみたからである。
7. The writer put the long comment of his feeling to Trump where put the following;
記者のこの記事はあと長いが、要点は以下である；
7-1. Given this track record, reasonable to worry that such intimidation will come into play in the various investigation now circling Trump.
この録音があれば、かれの脅迫がこんごトランプの調査に有益であるはすである。
7-2. Trump's propendisity for witness tampering, intimidating and retaliating is well known.
トランプは なだめたり、おどしたり、仕返しをしたりする気質であることがよく知られている。
7-3. His "Stop the Steal" campaign has created a loosely coordinated group of domestic terrorist orgabizations ready to inflict harm at his command.
投票を盗むなの運動は、その過程で徐々に組織化され、彼の指揮下になっている。
7-4. Sen. Mitch McConnell ,GOP leader, Trump's on constitutional gound,but primarily responsible for the insurrection.
ミッチー・マコーネル上院議員は共和党のリーダーであるが、トランプは基本的には憲法が認める範囲にとどまっているが、騒動には第一義的な責任があるとした。
7-5. powerful evidence to engage in violence by his thetotic leading, and endorsing his supporters' violence.
かれの巧みな弁舌によって法律違反があったのであり、支持者にそれを裏書きしたつよい証拠がある。
7-6. organizing the rally on Jan.6--a date and time speciffially chozen to coincidate with Congress' certification of Biden's election. Atempt the overturn of the election in conjugated with his endorsement of violence.
１月６日については議会でなにがあるかを熟知しているはずであり、バイデンの当選承認を転覆するために法律違反を裏書きした。
7-7. Further situated witness were apparently unwilling or afraid to cooperate undermined the entire proceeding.
さらなる証拠に協力することを他人は報復を受けることを嫌い、結局そのままになる。
7-8. Trump's consistent record of intimidation is cause for grave concern to any other mechanisms intended to hold him accountable the future.
トランプの脅迫の録音はかれがこれから起こすであろうことを防ぐために有効である。
荒井君の印象；
ワシントンポストは一貫して反トランプであり、主流メディアをけん引してきたといえる。日本の新聞は、およそAPやロイターであり、そのバックはワシントンポスト等である。 したがって、ある意味で洗脳されているといえる。
一方アメリカの国内は大分様子が違う。これは共和党支持者等が受信している系統がこれらと大分その傾向を異にしていることを知るものである。
そのことをわれわれもしっかり留意しておき、アメリカの動向を把握しておくことが大切なのは論をまたたい。
infant Nut and bird Jay
Keiko ba of Hakone
Asanikki210219 Copy of Article of The Washington Post; "Lack of witnesses at Trump's trials,Witness Intimidation is"
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(Briefings and comments of mine will be posted later. Yasumasa Arai)
朝日記210219 ワシントンポスト記事：トランプ弾劾は証拠不足だが脅迫があった
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Today's picture are two; infant Nut and bird Jay and Keiko ba of Hakone
The Washington Post wrote by Daniel S. Goldman, an article that Trump's second impeachment trial has closed as Lack of witnesses at Trump's tials is not the problem: Witness intimidation is.
1. He praized the House manager had brilliant prosecuted the case,and Trump's counsel had wrapped it could muster.
2. A lone outstanding question are whether witness would be called, the answer was no.
3. Rep. Jaime Herrera Beuterm R-Wash., provided information about a heated phone conversation that Trump and Kelvin McCarthy,R-Calif., in the middle of the riot. which shed light on whether Trump had been aware of the immediate danger to then Vice President Mike Pence during the mob attack on the Capital.
4. "Well,Kelvin, I guess these people are more upset about the election than you are." Trump reportedly said when McCarthy angrily told him that that he needed to call off his supporters.
5. Regarding to this witness was taken under the matter at the impeachment trial, it was withdrawn because of the record being of part of other recording matter.
6. The writer has a feeling of regret, and he recognizes whether or not taken this would been appealed to them, there would not be reaching to be shown a proof of Trump's conviction.
7. The writer put the long comment of his feeling to Trump where put the following;
7-1. Given this track record, reasonable to worry that such intimidation will come into play in the various investigation now circling Trump/
7-2. Trump's propendisity for witness tampering, intimidating and retaliating is well known.
7-3. His "Stop the Steal" campaign has created a loosely coordinated group of domestic terrorist orgabizations ready to inflict harm at his command.
7-4. Sen. Mitch McConnell ,GOP leader, Trump's on constitutional gound,but primarily responsible for the insurrection.
7-5. powerful evidence to engage in violence by his thetotic leading, and endorsing his supporters' violence.
7-6. organizing the rally on Jan.6--a date and time speciffially chozen to coincidate with Congress' certification of Biden's election. Atempt the overturn of the election in conjugated with his endorsement of violence.
7-7. Further situated witness were apparently unwilling or afraid to cooperate undermined the entire proceeding.
7-8. Trump's consistent record of intimidation is cause for grave concern to any other mechanisms intended to hold him accountable i the future.
infant Nut and bird Jay
Keiko ba of Hakone
