Assignment代写：Notice the debate about representationalism

下面为大家整理一篇优秀的assignment代写范文- Notice the debate about representationalism，供大家参考学习，这篇论文讨论了注意和表征主义关系争论。基于注意现象的针对表征主义的质疑往往通过指明表征内容没变而现象性特征却因为注意的影响而发生了变化，由此批评表征主义对现象特征的说明，进而指出表征主义是有问题的。

James, in his book principles of psychology, talks about the debate he and feichler had about whether attention affects the appearance of experience. James mentioned that fiddler thought that no matter how much attention we paid, the sound of a bell striking was no louder for us, and James thought that when we listened to the notes in a chord, it sounded louder. In recent years, some critical arguments against representationalism are based on the fact that attention changes the phenomenal characteristics of experience. One of the advantages that representationalism often claims is its treatment of phenomenal features, the phenomenal features of experience that can be explained by the representational content of experience, which is defined by an exact set of conditions.

Attention based on the phenomenon of representationalism is often questioned by pointing out that the content of representation has not changed while the phenomenal features have changed due to the influence of attention, so as to criticize the description of the phenomenal features of representationism, and then point out that there is something wrong with representationism. Chalmers pointed out that most of the examples involving identical representations but different phenomenal features are related to attention. Nickel criticized representationalism through the following examples of the numerical 9: the empirical phenomenology of focusing attention on 1, 3, 5, 9 and on 2, 4, 6, 8 are different, but the visual representational content remains the same. Similarly, the Mach square/diamond case has been developed: it will be regarded as a square or diamond depending on the point of attention. Nani once pointed out that the common form of these arguments is to illustrate the problem of representationalism by comparing the difference of the phenomenological characteristics of two kinds of experience and pointing out that the representational content has not changed.

In response to these examples, representationalism suggests that what we represent in experience has changed because of attention. Thayer responds that in the square/diamond case, experience is represented in a different way: when we see a square, the axis of symmetry we represent is an edge; When it's a diamond, the axis of symmetry that we represent is an Angle. Braddock also accepts that representationalism can respond to phenomenal changes by selective attention. However, block argues that the experimental work on implicit attention by psychologists such as carrasco challenges representationalism, because it can no longer employ the strategies described above to explain content differences through apparent attention selection.

Brock points out that many of the examples of attentional change in implicit attention do not involve explicit selection of nature, and that changes in empirical phenomena have a strong effect when they occur. The experimental research of carrasco et al., focused by block, focuses on the implicit attention, and particularly focuses on the phenomenological aspects of experience. It is believed that attention will change the phenomenological aspects of visual experience and improve the contrast of brightness, saturation of color, size of distance, coordination of movement and spatial frequency. Block says carrasco's "results show that if the Gabor visual cues that are being looked at are slightly lower than the actual comparison, the attention enhances the contrast so that the two visual cues are roughly equal; If both Gabor visuals are identical to the actual comparison, then the visuals that are being looked at will look higher in the comparison." For details, see the light/dark contrast of Gabor's visual index in the following figure: the square point in the middle is the fixed point. When paying attention to this fixed point, the visual index on the left is lower than that on the right. When the fixed point is fixed, look at the left side of the target and the contrast will look the same as on the right side, i.e. the contrast of the left side of the target will increase by 6%.

Block accepted the results of this experiment, believing that attention affects perceived contrast, size, etc., and that the object being noticed looks bigger, faster, and more prominent. When comparing the attention of the same object with the absence of attention, block holds that it is about two different phenomenological experiences of the same object: "the attention to the same thing and the less attention to the same thing are phenomenally different but the object itself or the exemplary nature of the object itself is not different". Representationalism then needs to explain what changes in content lead to two different phenomenological features. And this content cannot be arbitrarily chosen, it needs to be given in the context of normal true perception. But the problem is, there are two real experiences of the same object that are not illusions, and if both are real, then it seems impossible to compare the object at 22% and 28%. The problem brock poses with this experiment is not that representationalism gives a proper account of the content, but that representationism "has no way of determining which distribution of attention produces real perception and which produces hallucinations" with respect to the same left-hand contrast. He argues that representationalism is arbitrary in judging whether one of the two experiences of E1 and E2 is true and the other is not, and its interpretation of content cannot be arbitrary. The question here is how to interpret and judge the exact conditions required by representationalism, that is, what resources of attention can produce accurate experience? If all attention resources are required, then almost everything involving attention will not be accurate; If there were no attention resources at all, the same conclusion would be reached -- because most conscious observations still involve some level of attention. So for braddock, it's not exactly a case of all attention, much less a case of no attention at all; The exact condition must be related to a particular attention resource. Braddock's point is that representationalism can't say either E1 or E2 is real or illusion without being arbitrary, it can't say the exact conditions of experience without being arbitrary, so it can't say what changes are. Block points out that an arbitrary arbitrary distinction is not conducive to accuracy. So for carrasco's experiment, representationalism does not determine the relationship between attention and the precise conditions that determine representational content.

Thayer's response to carrasco's visual contrast experiment was this: according to this experiment, the shift in attention improved the contrast by 3-6%, which was a change in the content of the experience; Considering the visual experience, there is no possibility of a change in attention but no change in the content of the experience; Examples in the literature, such as chalmers and nicol, actually involve changes in the content of experience. In short, if we experience a phenomenal change, it means that something in our experience has changed. And thayer suggests that there may be unconscious properties of experience that are partly responsible for the response to higher distinctions. The problem is that thayer doesn't go much further than that. Representationalism deals with the challenge that the representational content is the same as the phenomenal difference, mostly through the understanding of the nature of the representational object to explain the phenomenal difference. As speakes points out, representationalism will accuse anti-representationism of having too narrow an understanding of the nature of what is represented, and should be more general. Schellenberg's description of "the nature of environmental dependence"; Shoemaker's distinction between present manifestation and tendency manifestation; Brogard's explanation of "interesting central features" and so on. Similarly, in the face of braddock's challenge, the response to representationalism is still mainly to adopt the usual strategies mentioned above, with only different interpretations of representational properties. The same is true of attention-indication theory and uncertainty theory, which will be examined below.

Pritman argues that both E1 and E2 can be accurate and compatible. She believes that some properties of perceptual representation are dependent on the "narcissistic nature" of the subject -- they are defined by the relationship with the subject, and then gives a new understanding of the exact conditions of these properties, that is, not only the state of the world is needed, but also the state of the subject, such as the direction of attention. Based on the description of this property, she puts forward the "attention-indication view" : depending on the attention distribution of subjects, there can actually be many correct representations of Gabor's visual objects. The idea is that there is a change in the representational content of experience from 28% to 22% as attention shifts implicitly to the left-hand marker, but neither is a false representation. Because in E2, Gabor visual criteria can be correctly represented as "no-attention -22% comparison", and E1 can also be correctly represented as "attention -28% comparison". In short, an accurate representation of the narcissistic nature depends not only on what the world is like, but also on the observer's relative state, such as the state of attention. In different forms of attention, the same contrast can be represented differently, just as subjects in different internal states have different representations of the same objective temperature. The attention-indication view does not deny that there are objective properties, but argues that perception does not represent them in the case of comparative objects. Pritman even suggests that a seemingly objective property, such as contrast, is actually a narcissistic property. Pritman concludes that it seems that objects with 22 percent contrast and 28 percent contrast are incompatible, but their compatibility is easy to understand once they are viewed as dependent on the attention of the subject.

In response to pritman's view that the comparative nature of empirical representation is related to the state of attention of the subject, watters questions how to understand perceptual constancy. In general, perception, such as size, shape, color, and so on, maintains its stability in a range of conditions such as brightness, distance, and so on, which may be justified in saying that these are objective properties rather than properties related to the state of the subject. Thus, the constancy aspect appears to indicate that these perceptual situations are indicative of the external world rather than the subjective state, thus posing problems for the attention-indication theory. To which prittman responded simply: some properties such as contrast properties do maintain constancy in many variations, but it does not exhibit constancy in the context of attention; Moreover, a property remains constant in brightness and distance, and it cannot be concluded that this property is objective and not narcissistic; The properties of a subject dependency can remain unchanged through change, such as the distance from the object, but it will depend on other state of the subject, such as the direction of attention. Watters' criticism of constancy is indeed inadequate. As pritman points out, carrasco's experiment showed exactly that -- that attention changes perception of contrast. But pritman's response to constancy is again too sketchy. Since it is not clear exactly what the connection between attention and the manifestation of constancy is, it is certainly not entirely excluded, since attention and perceptual constancy are common phenomena, it would be necessary to elaborate further. Otherwise, just to say that properties like contrast, as the experimental results show, do not exhibit constancy in the context of attention, and are arbitrary; Also, not all attention situations, perceptual constancy does not occur. A series of experiments by carrasco's team showed that perceptual properties such as color did not change.

In addition, according to pritman, braddock's argument presupposes an understanding of the concept of "accuracy", that is, the objective nature of represented content is compared with that of represented. She thinks that what we should change is the understanding of this "accuracy", and then puts forward the concept of accuracy that needs to consider the state of attention of subjects. What is important, however, is how much pritman's accuracy in this sense means to representationalism. Although the interpretation scheme is to argue that E1 and E2 are both accurate in response to block's query. But that raises another question, which is does representationalism need the accuracy of this understanding? If many properties are indicative of attention, subject-dependent, is this condition of accuracy still the one understood by representationalism? Watters points out that the opposition of attention-indication theory to the objective contrastive nature of experience representation shows some extremes of this theory. And, in practice, the precise conditions of such an indication are hardly clear. Because it can't be a simple case of paying attention and not paying attention. As pritman puts it: "characterizing 22% of the comparisons accurately requires characterizing that correct contrast in a particular context of attention." Pritman did not elaborate further on this particular background of attention. While this answer has a lot of flexibility, can avoid difficult problem is put forward by the bullock determine pay attention to the link between the distribution and experience the accuracy, but still need to further illustrate specific attention to background can be characterized socialist conditions, the veracity of the need to otherwise this response is also useless, although can avoid arbitrariness problem but fall into the same is impossible to judge the other extreme.

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