下面为大家整理一篇优秀的essay代写范文- The American deposit insurance system，供大家参考学习，这篇论文讨论了美国的存款保险制度。美国存款保险制度建立80多年来，虽然总体效果理想，但期间还是出现了很多问题。在1980年至1995年，美国的存款保险制度就受到了储贷危机的考验。当时储贷机构监管不力，无法抑制其道德风险；利率市场化、放松管制等宏观经济环境引发的系统性风险超出了存款保险制度的保险范围是储贷危机期间美国存款保险制度失灵的最主要原因。
In 1933, after American government passed the glass-steagall act in response to the impact of the great depression on the banking sector, the federal deposit insurance corporation was established in 1934. In the same year, the federal deposit and credit insurance corporation was established to provide deposit insurance to the savings and credit association. However, it was taken over by the FDIC in 1985.
Since the establishment of the deposit insurance system more than 80 years ago, the overall effect of the deposit insurance system in the United States has been ideal. The first phase, from 1934, when the FDIC was created to 1980, is called the golden age. The total number of fdic-insured bank failures over the 47 years was 480, with an average of more than 10 failures per year, well below the average of 50 failures per year between 1934 and 2014. First of all, this is mainly due to the strict division of business carried out by the us financial industry during this period. During this period, Banks rarely involved in securities and insurance business, and bank transaction account assets accounted for a very low proportion of total assets. Secondly, due to the strict clause Q and the implementation of financial regulation, Banks cannot pay interest for demand deposits, and also set the upper limit of the maximum interest rate for time deposits, and restrict the cross-regional operation of Banks, so the interest rate risk of Banks is low. Finally, during this period, the us economy maintained rapid growth with an average growth rate of 4.74%, and the banking industry lived in a sound macroeconomic environment.
In the second stage, from 1980 to 1995, the American deposit insurance system was tested by the savings and loan crisis. In the 1970s, high inflation and high interest rates in the United States led to a sharp rise in interest rate risk of savings and loan institutions that issued long-term fixed-rate real estate loans through short-term savings deposit financing. In 1982, congress passed a bill that allowed savings and loan institutions to invest in safe and unsafe loans and even junk bonds. In 1986, the us lifted the "Q" clause that sets the upper limit of deposit interest rate, prompting savings and loan institutions to conduct aggressive deposit-taking with high interest rate. The mismatch of the maturity of assets and liabilities and the inversion of deposit and loan interest rates make the savings and loan institutions in the United States, which rely on short-term savings deposits to invest in real estate loans, get into trouble by nearly 30%. Between 1986 and 1995, the FSLIC closed 1,043 savings and loan institutions, more than a third of the total in the early 1980s. The huge cost of bailing out the savings and loan institutions eventually led to FSLIC becoming insolvent and incorporated into the FDIC.
The supervision of savings and loan institutions is insufficient to restrain their moral hazard; Systemic risks caused by macroeconomic environment such as interest rate liberalization, high inflation and deregulation beyond the insurance scope of the deposit insurance system are the main reasons for the failure of the deposit insurance system in the United States during the savings and loan crisis.
In the third stage, the deposit insurance system of the United States is facing another crisis. In April 2007, the second largest subprime mortgage company in the United States went bankrupt, marking the outbreak of the subprime crisis. As the subprime crisis spread, investment Banks and large commercial Banks that were heavily exposed to subprime bonds and related derivatives CDO suffered heavy losses. The FDIC's capital balance was just $34.6 billion over the same period, and the failure of a midsize bank like Washington mutual could drain the FDIC's capital. Against this background, the us government launched a huge rescue plan, injecting more than 300 billion us dollars into fannie mae and Freddie MAC, AIG, citigroup, jpmorgan chase and other large financial institutions to prevent the spread of the financial crisis. Still, since 2007, commercial Banks have failed a total of 516 times, and among the top five investment Banks, bear stearns and merrill lynch were acquired, lehman brothers went bust, and the U.S. capital markets and real economy suffered.
In the subprime crisis, the United States deposit insurance system faced the crisis again mainly because under the mixed operation, the operational risks of insurance and securities companies would be quickly transferred to the trading accounts of commercial Banks through the financial market, resulting in huge writedowns of bank assets, while the assets of insurance and securities companies were not insured. Moreover, nearly 50% of the capital sources of large us Banks are non-deposit liabilities, mainly bonds and notes, which do not need to pay premiums but face greater market and liquidity risks. At the same time, the proportion of trading accounts and off-balance sheet assets of commercial Banks increased sharply under the mixed operation. In the case of financial market turmoil, these assets may suffer huge writedowns, making commercial Banks take higher risks than traditional banking businesses.
Although there are many crises, the American deposit insurance system is undoubtedly the most successful deposit insurance system so far, and it is also a model of the world deposit insurance system. By summarizing its 80 years of practical experience and lessons, it can provide some enlightenment for the implementation of China's deposit insurance system.
Deposit insurance can help normal Banks avoid runs. Although us deposit insurance failed to prevent thousands of Banks from going bankrupt when the savings and loan crisis and the subprime crisis broke out, since the establishment of the deposit insurance system in the us, even in the financial crisis, there has not been a serious run. Deposit insurance system plays an important role in enhancing the confidence of depositors in Banks, especially in small and medium-sized Banks. The establishment of depositors' confidence in Banks can effectively prevent the spread of bank risks and avoid the systemic risks caused by the failure of a single bank.
The deposit insurance system is conducive to the establishment of an effective incentive and restraint system in the banking industry, and to the withdrawal of poorly managed Banks under the circumstances of controllable risks. At present, the implicit guarantee provided by the government to commercial Banks makes some Banks bear higher operational risks. If the government takes unlimited responsibilities for the Banks with poor management, it will not only fail to establish a normal survival mechanism of the fittest in the banking industry, but also greatly increase the burden of the government. The establishment of the deposit insurance system, can make the mismanagement of the bank in the case of a limited impact to the customer in bankruptcy and liquidation, and won't cause depositors panic and run, helps to establish the real market economy mechanism, for the interest rate marketization completely and laying a foundation for the renminbi fully convertible, prompted the formation of internationally competitive banking.
The deposit insurance system can only prevent non-systemic risks in the banking industry. It is unrealistic to hope that it can prevent systemic risks in the banking industry. Like property insurance companies cannot be for a wide range of earthquake, tsunami, etc natural disasters caused by force majeure damage insurance, banking deposits accounted for about 1% of the deposit insurance fund only can never deal with bank failures caused by the financial crisis, therefore, the response to systemic risk responsibility in government, only can't expect too much of a deposit insurance system. At present, China is actively promoting the reform of interest rate liberalization and mixed operation of Banks, which will undoubtedly increase the operational risks of Banks, especially those of small and medium-sized Banks. Such systemic risks are beyond the capability of deposit insurance system. Therefore, in the context of economic growth rate decline, the government should increase the prevention of systemic risks in the banking industry, improve the operating environment of Banks, vigorously adjust the industrial structure, and avoid excessive dependence on the real estate industry, so as to be more conducive to the implementation of the deposit insurance system.
The scope and limit of deposit insurance should be adjusted timely to give full play to the function of deposit insurance system to maintain financial stability. The us deposit insurance fund only covers eight types of deposit accounts of depositors. Before the current financial crisis, the insurance limit was $100,000. To cope with the financial crisis, the insurance limit is now adjusted to $250,000. China's deposit insurance regulations set the maximum amount of deposit insurance at 500,000 yuan, which can cover the deposits of most natural persons. However, for enterprises and social groups, the coverage is insufficient. Therefore, the deposit insurance system may divert some enterprise deposits from small and medium-sized Banks to large Banks, and 80% of the deposits of small and medium-sized Banks come from corporate deposits, which will further strengthen the strong position of large Banks in the market. If the insurance limit on corporate deposits can be raised to a reasonable level, such as 1.5 million yuan, it will help small and medium-sized Banks to achieve relatively fair competition with large Banks.
51due留学教育原创版权郑重声明：原创essay代写范文源自编辑创作，未经官方许可，网站谢绝转载。对于侵权行为，未经同意的情况下，51Due有权追究法律责任。主要业务有essay代写、assignment代写、paper代写、作业代写服务。
51due为留学生提供最好的essay代写服务，亲们可以进入主页了解和获取更多essay代写范文 提供代写服务，详情可以咨询我们的客服QQ：800020041。
In 1933, after American government passed the glass-steagall act in response to the impact of the great depression on the banking sector, the federal deposit insurance corporation was established in 1934. In the same year, the federal deposit and credit insurance corporation was established to provide deposit insurance to the savings and credit association. However, it was taken over by the FDIC in 1985.
Since the establishment of the deposit insurance system more than 80 years ago, the overall effect of the deposit insurance system in the United States has been ideal. The first phase, from 1934, when the FDIC was created to 1980, is called the golden age. The total number of fdic-insured bank failures over the 47 years was 480, with an average of more than 10 failures per year, well below the average of 50 failures per year between 1934 and 2014. First of all, this is mainly due to the strict division of business carried out by the us financial industry during this period. During this period, Banks rarely involved in securities and insurance business, and bank transaction account assets accounted for a very low proportion of total assets. Secondly, due to the strict clause Q and the implementation of financial regulation, Banks cannot pay interest for demand deposits, and also set the upper limit of the maximum interest rate for time deposits, and restrict the cross-regional operation of Banks, so the interest rate risk of Banks is low. Finally, during this period, the us economy maintained rapid growth with an average growth rate of 4.74%, and the banking industry lived in a sound macroeconomic environment.
In the second stage, from 1980 to 1995, the American deposit insurance system was tested by the savings and loan crisis. In the 1970s, high inflation and high interest rates in the United States led to a sharp rise in interest rate risk of savings and loan institutions that issued long-term fixed-rate real estate loans through short-term savings deposit financing. In 1982, congress passed a bill that allowed savings and loan institutions to invest in safe and unsafe loans and even junk bonds. In 1986, the us lifted the "Q" clause that sets the upper limit of deposit interest rate, prompting savings and loan institutions to conduct aggressive deposit-taking with high interest rate. The mismatch of the maturity of assets and liabilities and the inversion of deposit and loan interest rates make the savings and loan institutions in the United States, which rely on short-term savings deposits to invest in real estate loans, get into trouble by nearly 30%. Between 1986 and 1995, the FSLIC closed 1,043 savings and loan institutions, more than a third of the total in the early 1980s. The huge cost of bailing out the savings and loan institutions eventually led to FSLIC becoming insolvent and incorporated into the FDIC.
The supervision of savings and loan institutions is insufficient to restrain their moral hazard; Systemic risks caused by macroeconomic environment such as interest rate liberalization, high inflation and deregulation beyond the insurance scope of the deposit insurance system are the main reasons for the failure of the deposit insurance system in the United States during the savings and loan crisis.
In the third stage, the deposit insurance system of the United States is facing another crisis. In April 2007, the second largest subprime mortgage company in the United States went bankrupt, marking the outbreak of the subprime crisis. As the subprime crisis spread, investment Banks and large commercial Banks that were heavily exposed to subprime bonds and related derivatives CDO suffered heavy losses. The FDIC's capital balance was just $34.6 billion over the same period, and the failure of a midsize bank like Washington mutual could drain the FDIC's capital. Against this background, the us government launched a huge rescue plan, injecting more than 300 billion us dollars into fannie mae and Freddie MAC, AIG, citigroup, jpmorgan chase and other large financial institutions to prevent the spread of the financial crisis. Still, since 2007, commercial Banks have failed a total of 516 times, and among the top five investment Banks, bear stearns and merrill lynch were acquired, lehman brothers went bust, and the U.S. capital markets and real economy suffered.
In the subprime crisis, the United States deposit insurance system faced the crisis again mainly because under the mixed operation, the operational risks of insurance and securities companies would be quickly transferred to the trading accounts of commercial Banks through the financial market, resulting in huge writedowns of bank assets, while the assets of insurance and securities companies were not insured. Moreover, nearly 50% of the capital sources of large us Banks are non-deposit liabilities, mainly bonds and notes, which do not need to pay premiums but face greater market and liquidity risks. At the same time, the proportion of trading accounts and off-balance sheet assets of commercial Banks increased sharply under the mixed operation. In the case of financial market turmoil, these assets may suffer huge writedowns, making commercial Banks take higher risks than traditional banking businesses.
Although there are many crises, the American deposit insurance system is undoubtedly the most successful deposit insurance system so far, and it is also a model of the world deposit insurance system. By summarizing its 80 years of practical experience and lessons, it can provide some enlightenment for the implementation of China's deposit insurance system.
Deposit insurance can help normal Banks avoid runs. Although us deposit insurance failed to prevent thousands of Banks from going bankrupt when the savings and loan crisis and the subprime crisis broke out, since the establishment of the deposit insurance system in the us, even in the financial crisis, there has not been a serious run. Deposit insurance system plays an important role in enhancing the confidence of depositors in Banks, especially in small and medium-sized Banks. The establishment of depositors' confidence in Banks can effectively prevent the spread of bank risks and avoid the systemic risks caused by the failure of a single bank.
The deposit insurance system is conducive to the establishment of an effective incentive and restraint system in the banking industry, and to the withdrawal of poorly managed Banks under the circumstances of controllable risks. At present, the implicit guarantee provided by the government to commercial Banks makes some Banks bear higher operational risks. If the government takes unlimited responsibilities for the Banks with poor management, it will not only fail to establish a normal survival mechanism of the fittest in the banking industry, but also greatly increase the burden of the government. The establishment of the deposit insurance system, can make the mismanagement of the bank in the case of a limited impact to the customer in bankruptcy and liquidation, and won't cause depositors panic and run, helps to establish the real market economy mechanism, for the interest rate marketization completely and laying a foundation for the renminbi fully convertible, prompted the formation of internationally competitive banking.
The deposit insurance system can only prevent non-systemic risks in the banking industry. It is unrealistic to hope that it can prevent systemic risks in the banking industry. Like property insurance companies cannot be for a wide range of earthquake, tsunami, etc natural disasters caused by force majeure damage insurance, banking deposits accounted for about 1% of the deposit insurance fund only can never deal with bank failures caused by the financial crisis, therefore, the response to systemic risk responsibility in government, only can't expect too much of a deposit insurance system. At present, China is actively promoting the reform of interest rate liberalization and mixed operation of Banks, which will undoubtedly increase the operational risks of Banks, especially those of small and medium-sized Banks. Such systemic risks are beyond the capability of deposit insurance system. Therefore, in the context of economic growth rate decline, the government should increase the prevention of systemic risks in the banking industry, improve the operating environment of Banks, vigorously adjust the industrial structure, and avoid excessive dependence on the real estate industry, so as to be more conducive to the implementation of the deposit insurance system.
The scope and limit of deposit insurance should be adjusted timely to give full play to the function of deposit insurance system to maintain financial stability. The us deposit insurance fund only covers eight types of deposit accounts of depositors. Before the current financial crisis, the insurance limit was $100,000. To cope with the financial crisis, the insurance limit is now adjusted to $250,000. China's deposit insurance regulations set the maximum amount of deposit insurance at 500,000 yuan, which can cover the deposits of most natural persons. However, for enterprises and social groups, the coverage is insufficient. Therefore, the deposit insurance system may divert some enterprise deposits from small and medium-sized Banks to large Banks, and 80% of the deposits of small and medium-sized Banks come from corporate deposits, which will further strengthen the strong position of large Banks in the market. If the insurance limit on corporate deposits can be raised to a reasonable level, such as 1.5 million yuan, it will help small and medium-sized Banks to achieve relatively fair competition with large Banks.
51due留学教育原创版权郑重声明：原创essay代写范文源自编辑创作，未经官方许可，网站谢绝转载。对于侵权行为，未经同意的情况下，51Due有权追究法律责任。主要业务有essay代写、assignment代写、paper代写、作业代写服务。
51due为留学生提供最好的essay代写服务，亲们可以进入主页了解和获取更多essay代写范文 提供代写服务，详情可以咨询我们的客服QQ：800020041。
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