news20091224gdn3

[News] from [guardian.co.uk]

[Environment > Copenhagen Climate change conference 2009]
Pressure on poor at Copenhagen led to failure, not diplomatic wrangling
The summit was a culmination of attempts by rich countries to steamroller the G77 into accepting a deal not in their interests
Bernarditas de Castro Muller
guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 23 December 2009 14.41 GMT Article history

The failure of negotiators to agree a significant deal in Copenhagen was not due to two weeks of frenetic diplomatic wrangling, it was the culmination of years of attempted bullying and bribery by rich nations, in order to steamroller the developed world into accepting a deal that was not in their interests.

The EU for example made sustained attempts to influence and pressure developing nations – something that only served to increase their cohesion. They bribed where they could, promising the same recycled financing and maybe more to come if countries bent to their demands. And they bullied when they could not bribe.

The UK financed workshops in selected vulnerable countries and deployed climate envoys. One of its envoys told intransigent negotiators that the UK would mobilise a group of vulnerable countries to pressure the major developing countries – such as China, Brazil and India – into committing to emissions reductions, contrary to their obligations under the climate treaty.

Meanwhile, everybody waited to see which way the US would go. The whole process went into slow motion until the new US administration took over early in 2009. The US did begin to engage, but only to make more noise in the negotiations, dampening hopes for a US emissions reduction target. It promised recycled financing, most of it to be spent domestically, and above all warned that everything depended on US congressional approval. This ensured nothing would happen until mid- to late-2010.

What occurred in Copenhagen was the culmination of the frustrations many developing countries have about the total lack of transparency and inclusiveness in the process. Rumours of a "Danish text" – the now infamous document prepared by rich countries outside the negotiating process and leaked to the Guardian in the first week of the conference – were circulating weeks before Copenhagen. When confronted with these rumours, the Danish presidency firmly denied the text's existence.

At the beginning of the second week, new procedures were introduced that delayed negotiations for at least two days. The G77 group of developing nations was blamed for these delays, while developed countries stalled in the closed negotiating rooms.

But to the press outside, rich countries continued to push the message that "the G77 is blocking negotiations".

The G77 negotiators continued to engage in negotiations, hoping for these to be part of the final agreed outcome. We waited in vain. What took place behind closed doors was backroom wheeling and dealing. I took part as part of the Sudanese team in the first meeting, where the big G77 countries were trying to revise the text. Small gains were made, but largely the revisions suggested were ignored. Sudan dropped out of the final backroom negotiations when it became clear that little more could be accomplished for small developing countries.


The final plenary, which all members from all parties must attend, broke out in confusion when the Danish prime minister and conference chairman, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, marched in after making the delegations wait for nearly five hours without any explanation. He took the microphone to announce that a deal (the Copenhagen accord) was done, and secretariat personnel frantically distributed the text. Countries had just an hour to read the text and come up with their positions.

Rasmussen then closed the session without following normal procedures of soliciting views of parties and proceeded to march out again, leaving pandemonium on the floor. The only way to be allowed to speak in the subsequent debate was to ask for points of order, which were not heeded until delegates began banging name-plates on the table. During the interventions, the chairman looked on, glaring at the proceedings, turning now and then to consult the secretariat. No courtesy nor proper attention were accorded to the speakers. The claim that only three or four countries spoke against the accord is false.

The intervention of Ed Miliband, the UK's climate change minister, focused on the paragraphs concerning financing, saying they would not be put into operation unless countries signed up to the accord. The US made a similar point. Tuvalu, in speaking against the accord, likened the financing offered to the "30 pieces of silver" Judas Iscariot received to betray Jesus. It is sad to say but pledges of financing have a way of evaporating over time, and financing done through existing institutions are unpredictable, difficult to access, conditional and selective.

The parties decided to continue with the negotiations, while taking note of the accord which, on many of its provisions, undermines the developing countries' positions in these negotiations.

Copenhagen represented a complete breakdown of trust among the parties. To build it up again, under the shadow of a the Copenhagen accord, is immensely challenging. The holidays might provide time for reflection, and the firm resolve of the New Year should be to do something, finally, please, to address climate change and its adverse effects.

Bernarditas de Castro Muller is the former lead coordinator and negotiator for the G77 and China in Copenhagen