The following is a continuation of the previous chapter.
Nuclear Deterrence Reality and Nuclear Sharing
Only nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons.
It is because these weapons kill a fraction of the population at once and because if they are fired, they will be fired back that a leader with common reason would not use them.
That is Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). The reality of nuclear deterrence, however, is a bit more human. It is not that simple.
The U.S. Strategic Command headquarters is in Omaha, Nebraska. As soon as an infrared detection satellite detects an enemy nuclear missile launch, the Strategic Commanders are roused.
The President permits him to fire back the nuclear missiles. No matter how advanced AI becomes, the final decision must be made by humans.
At the time of my visit, the headquarters building was still old and may have changed since then, but on the desk of the Strategic Command Commander was an analog phone with a direct line to the President.
I pray I don't have to use this phone every day," he said. I pray I don't have to use it every day," the commander laughed.
The President of the United States would not hesitate to order an immediate nuclear counterattack if he were told that atomic missiles, whether Russian or Chinese, were on the U.S. mainland.
However, in the case of a nuclear attack against Japan, the situation is different.
Both China and North Korea are too close to Japan.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles require several minutes to reach the U.S. mainland, but intermediate-range and short-range ballistic missiles can reach Japan in seconds.
The commander of the U.S. Strategic Command would have to ask the President: "How close is North Korea to the U.S.?
"Mr. President, Tokyo has been destroyed by a nuclear bomb. The Imperial Palace and the Prime Minister's residence are no longer there. Will you strike back immediately with atomic weapons?"
The President might say, in his pajamas.
"Let me think about it for a minute."
There is no nuclear war between the nuclear powers of the U.S. and China.
Japan has no value as an ally if Tokyo is doomed.
If Japan is destroyed and the U.S. and China enter into a cease-fire agreement, peace will be restored in Asia without Japan alone.
Therefore, the Taiwan contingency must not be allowed to occur, and nuclear deterrence must be complete.
The U.S., which possesses nuclear weapons, somehow tries to reassure its allies.
However, allies without nuclear weapons continue to demand complete assurance.
It is the psychological truth among allies concerning extended nuclear deterrence.
German politicians did not trust the United States; Adenauer, Schmidt, and all German leaders were cold-hearted strategists.
They forced Germany to bring large numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons into the country and became relentlessly entangled in their deployment and operation.
It gave rise to NATO nuclear weapons.
NATO nukes (B61) are operated under the command of a top American commander. Still, in some, such as Germany, NATO members are also supposed to be responsible for targeting, deployment, and operations.
These nuclear weapons are not operated solely by the United States but by NATO.
The U.S. has come to the conclusion that this is the only way to prevent Germany from acquiring its own nuclear weapons.
Nuclear deterrence is essential to maintain control of the escalation ladder, match the enemy's movements without interruption, demonstrate the ability to climb to a higher level and press them not to think of using force from the beginning because the result will be a nuclear war.
Under high tension, this means not allowing the war to start in the first place.
It is a flexible response strategy.
The introduction of U.S. intermediate-range missiles for both nuclear and non-nuclear use is an issue that should be seriously considered.
There is one thing that is definitely lacking in the U.S.-Japan alliance's escalation ladder compared to China.
It is an intermediate-range missile.
China has thousands of medium-range missiles, some of which are nuclear-capable.
After China attacked Japan with medium-range nuclear missiles, the U.S. could hesitate to attack China with strategic nuclear weapons.
That is nuclear realism.
To protect Japan, it is evident that deterrence is more robust if Japan and the U.S. share nuclear missiles that should be fired back in a nuclear attack on Japan.
It is the lesson of the war in Ukraine.
Putin will not step into NATO's Baltic states, even though he has overrun Ukraine.
If U.S. intermediate-range nuclear missiles are brought to Japan, Japan must have a say in their deployment and operation.
It cannot afford to shoot on its own, and it cannot afford not to shoot when it should.
It would be the beginning of Japan-U.S. nuclear talks.
The sharing of information, personnel, policies, and operations will begin.
And once Japan begins to be substantially involved in the operation of nuclear weapons, nuclear sharing will begin.
Post-sentence omitted.
