I don't think it's a round of golf at Trump National Golf Club. #NorthKorea: We Asked 9 of the World's Leading Experts What Happens Next https://t.co/DOgj3vVcJr
— Jean H. Lee (@newsjean) 2018年7月23日
9人の識者に聞く、これからの米朝関係
Michael Auslin , Williams-Griffis Fellow in Contemporary Asia at the Hoover Institution:
Overall, however, the prospects for meaningful negotiations, let alone actual denuclearization, look slim, leaving Pyongyang on the cusp of becoming a legitimate nuclear power
John Feffer , Co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies:
Nuclear disarmament is an important goal. But denuclearization was not one of the demands the United States made of China during the détente of the 1970s. Détente, however, ensured that China, once embedded in the international system and the global economy, would be considerably less likely to use nuclear weapons.
Ultimately, that should be the U.S. goal with North Korea as well. CVID may well be a chimera. But Washington and Seoul can engage Pyongyang in ways that make it less likely to use any of its weapons.
Kim Sung-han , Professor, Korea University; former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade for South Korea (2012-2013):
If North Korea agrees, the four parties, which include the two Koreas, the United States, and China, should start talking about the establishment of the peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. If the End of the War Declaration is agreed to be inevitable, however, it needs to be done only when North Korea agrees to a specific timeline and roadmap for complete denuclearization.
Bruce Klingner , Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation:
The diplomatic path with Pyongyang remains open, but it will be far longer and bumpier than has been depicted by the Trump administration.
Jean H. Lee , Director of the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy at the Woodrow Wilson Center:
Vipin Narang , Associate Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology:
The President might believe he was betrayed by Kim, despite Kim having never actually agreed to unilaterally disarm, as Trump believes. This might lead to heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula such as a resumption of exercises and missile testing if talks fall apart. Alternatively, the President might live in denial about North Korea’s nuclear weapons, wanting to chalk up Singapore as a win and willfully overlooking evidence that North Korea is not only not disarming, but continuing and possibly expanding nuclear production. That avoids direct conflict, but does little to help cap what could potentially be a monster of a nuclear weapons arsenal.
Ankit Panda , Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Defense Posture Project at the Federation of American Scientists:
Joshua Stanton , OneFreeKorea founder and editor and fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies:
Some now counsel us to coexist with a nuclear North Korea. Yet already, Pyongyang asserts its nuclear hegemony over a submissive government in Seoul. As Pyongyang calls for a U.S. withdrawal, Seoul erodes it by trimming away at missile defenses and welcoming Trump’s suspension of joint exercises. But fundamentally, the U.S. cannot coexist with any regime that proliferates nuclear and chemical weapons technology, sends assassination and kidnapping squads abroad, uses nerve agents to commit murder in crowded airport terminals, or wages cyberwarfare against our own freedom of expression. Today’s capitulation to Pyongyang puts us on a path to tomorrow’s war. So let Trump pretend his negotiation remains viable if he must. What is imperative is that he keep the financial pressure on.
President Trump must be feeling bitter from his interactions with his counterpart Kim Jung-un. Contrary to his comments, it appears that Pyongyang hasn’t genuinely changed its mindset of holding nuclear weapons while seeking gains by dangling verbal pledges of giving up its nuclear weapons. It’s replaying old tricks we have witnessed more than two decades.
ま、目新しい議論はないな。
