The essential similarity between social problems and social movements can be seen in the definitions developed for each in sociological literature. Most definitions of social movements emphasize the element of collective behavior, which is relatively spontaneous, unstructured, and unorganized (as distinguished from behavior in established groups and institutions, which is structured by the role that members are expected to play). In the most unstructured form, collective behavior includes panics, mobs, crowds, fads, and so on, but it occurs also in the partially organized publics and interest groups which make up social movements.
Among the definitions which point to the collective element in social movements is Blumer’s (1971): “Social movements can be viewed as collective enterprises to establish a new order of life. They have their inception in a condition of unrest, and derive their motive power … from dissatisfaction … and … from … hopes for a new scheme … of living.” Gunfield (1968:445) defines movements as “socially shared demands for change in some aspect of the social order.” Turner and Killian (1957) recognize that movements can also arise to resist change, when they define a social movement as “collectively [which acts] which some continuity to promote or resist a attention is given to the elements of collective behavior, dissatisfaction, unrest, and shared demands for change or against change.
When we look at the definitions of social problems offered by current textbooks, we find a great deal of overlap with these definitions of movements. Recall the definition of Horton and Leslie (1974:4) given at the beginning of this prologue, which stresses a social condition deemed “undesirable” by a significant number of people and their desire to do something about it through “collective action.” Most other textbook definitions of social problems also point to collective decisions to “do something” about unsatisfactory conditions in a society. Because of the similarity in their established definitions, then, and especially because of collective behavior which characterizes both, we shall hereafter be considering social problems as a type of social movement.
Chapter 1 attempts to locate the origins of social problems. It combines the insights of Blumer and Becker with those of Berger and Luckmann by examining in some detail the importance of a variety of interests in society and the social constructions of reality associated with those interests. Interest groups and their publics are the creators or ”discoverers” of social problems and their valiant champions. Sociological theories about deviant behavior and about other social problems are presented here as simply construction of reality offered by social scientists as interest groups.
Chapter 2 is concerned mainly with the social movements which the various interest groups generate and which become part and parcel of the social problems themselves. Various social movement theories are considered, and, in large part, adopted, as the framework for understanding “what happens” to social problems. In particular, this chapter applies a “career” concept, or “natural history model,” to an examination of what happens to social problems as movements over time. As an addition to other frameworks that have used this model, Chapter 2 develops in particular the decline and demise portion of the natural history of social problems. Social problems are rarely “solved” in the sense that a substantial change is made in the “parameters of reality” which the interest groups and their champions have addressed, but the movements do come to an end in a variety of ways, independently of their impact on reality. They also frequently leave behind a “legacy” in the form of normative and legal changes. That legacy, in turn, may have many unintended consequences that become problematic for other interest groups in other generations.
Among the definitions which point to the collective element in social movements is Blumer’s (1971): “Social movements can be viewed as collective enterprises to establish a new order of life. They have their inception in a condition of unrest, and derive their motive power … from dissatisfaction … and … from … hopes for a new scheme … of living.” Gunfield (1968:445) defines movements as “socially shared demands for change in some aspect of the social order.” Turner and Killian (1957) recognize that movements can also arise to resist change, when they define a social movement as “collectively [which acts] which some continuity to promote or resist a attention is given to the elements of collective behavior, dissatisfaction, unrest, and shared demands for change or against change.
When we look at the definitions of social problems offered by current textbooks, we find a great deal of overlap with these definitions of movements. Recall the definition of Horton and Leslie (1974:4) given at the beginning of this prologue, which stresses a social condition deemed “undesirable” by a significant number of people and their desire to do something about it through “collective action.” Most other textbook definitions of social problems also point to collective decisions to “do something” about unsatisfactory conditions in a society. Because of the similarity in their established definitions, then, and especially because of collective behavior which characterizes both, we shall hereafter be considering social problems as a type of social movement.
Chapter 1 attempts to locate the origins of social problems. It combines the insights of Blumer and Becker with those of Berger and Luckmann by examining in some detail the importance of a variety of interests in society and the social constructions of reality associated with those interests. Interest groups and their publics are the creators or ”discoverers” of social problems and their valiant champions. Sociological theories about deviant behavior and about other social problems are presented here as simply construction of reality offered by social scientists as interest groups.
Chapter 2 is concerned mainly with the social movements which the various interest groups generate and which become part and parcel of the social problems themselves. Various social movement theories are considered, and, in large part, adopted, as the framework for understanding “what happens” to social problems. In particular, this chapter applies a “career” concept, or “natural history model,” to an examination of what happens to social problems as movements over time. As an addition to other frameworks that have used this model, Chapter 2 develops in particular the decline and demise portion of the natural history of social problems. Social problems are rarely “solved” in the sense that a substantial change is made in the “parameters of reality” which the interest groups and their champions have addressed, but the movements do come to an end in a variety of ways, independently of their impact on reality. They also frequently leave behind a “legacy” in the form of normative and legal changes. That legacy, in turn, may have many unintended consequences that become problematic for other interest groups in other generations.
