民進党発足 1強と対峙するには

2016-03-31 06:29:35 | 英字新聞

--The Asahi Shimbun, March 28
EDITORIAL: Minshinto’s task is to become viable foe of 'sole winner' Abe
(社説)民進党発足 1強と対峙するには

Minshinto (The Democratic Party), formed from the merger between the Democratic Party of Japan and the Japan Innovation Party, was officially inaugurated at a party convention on March 27.
The new party’s first task is to try to close the gap between the ardor of its members and the cool indifference of the public at large.


Shiori Yamao, a 41-year-old Lower House member who made news headlines for confronting the Abe administration over the problem of children on waiting lists for child-care facilities, has been chosen to head the new party’s policy research committee. But since almost all party executives, including leader Katsuya Okada, have essentially retained their posts from their DPJ days, critics point out that the party name is the only thing that has changed.

The public’s chilly reaction is quite understandable.

After coming into power in 2009 to end decades of rule by the Liberal Democratic Party, the DPJ did nothing but repeatedly betray the hopes of voters who were looking forward to a new era in Japanese politics.

The DPJ proved itself incapable of living up to its campaign pledges. Its attempts at government led by politicians, rather than by bureaucrats, went nowhere. And the party eventually split over the controversial issue of a consumption tax hike.

The impression cannot be denied that the new Democratic Party did nothing more than welcome back to the fold some of the DPJ members who had broken away at that time.

While the DPJ languished after its fall from power, the Abe administration consolidated a “sole winner” political system by winning three national elections in a row, starting with the 2012 Lower House election that was called upon the dissolution of the chamber by then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda.

Abe stresses that the LDP’s return to power has improved the economy, claiming there are 30 percent fewer bankruptcies on his watch than when the DPJ was at the helm.

But on the other hand, the public’s discontent continues to run deep over growing social disparities and other issues, including that of children who cannot enter child-care facilities.

And as evidenced by his decision to allow Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense and enact a divisive national security legislation, Abe has been walking a precarious path that may well lead the nation astray from its Constitution.

What lies at the end of the path is constitutional revision, the sole purpose of which is to change the Constitution itself.

There are many frustrated voters who are apprehensive of the Abe administration’s style of politics but do not see any alternative. One indication of their frustration is that voter turnout languished just above 52 percent in the 2013 Upper House election as well as the 2014 Lower House poll.

At the inaugural party convention, Okada expressed “deep remorse” for the DPJ’s failure to live up to the people’s expectations while it was in power. On that note, his party must take the first step forward.

As the largest opposition party with 156 Diet members, can the Democratic Party become a formidable opponent of the “sole winner” Abe administration? The answer to this holds the key to whether Japanese politics will emerge from its lethargy.

“Liberty, coexistence and responsibility for the future” are the Democratic Party’s founding principles. The party promises to rectify disparities in education, employment and gender-related matters, and defend constitutionalism. The party is at least heading in the right direction.

But the only way in which it can regain the lost trust of the voting public is to commit itself to what every political party is tasked to undertake with patience, which is to heed the voice of each citizen and challenge the ruling party with concrete and persuasive policies.


安全保障法制の施行 「違憲」の法制、正す論戦を

2016-03-30 06:50:04 | 英字新聞

--The Asahi Shimbun, March 29
EDITORIAL: Diet must debate constitutionality of new security legislation
(社説)安全保障法制の施行 「違憲」の法制、正す論戦を

The new national security legislation expanding the scope of Japan’s military operations took effect on March 29.

The ruling coalition, led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party, rammed the legislation through the Diet in September in the face of anxiety and opposition among many citizens and criticism by constitutional scholars that it is unconstitutional. The controversial set of laws is now in force.

The legislation, composed of two statutes incorporating the content of 11 bills, significantly expands the scope of Self-Defense Forces operations outside Japan. It allows Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defense by changing the government’s interpretation of the Constitution.
It also enables the SDF to provide logistical support to the forces of the United States and other countries and engage in a wider range of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

The Abe administration railroaded the broad security legislation through just one session of the Diet. Many observers say Abe was in a rush to get the legislation passed because he promised in his April 29 address to a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress to “achieve” the legislative reform “by this coming summer.”

After the legislation passed the Diet, Abe said he would “make tenacious efforts to explain” it to the public. But he has failed to deliver on his promise.

The Diet debate on related issues since then has been far from sufficient.


This situation represents a crisis of Japan’s constitutionalism, which means the government’s power is defined and limited by the Constitution. This extraordinary and dangerous situation must not be allowed to continue.

The “unconstitutional” legislation, not based on broad public consensus, should be rectified. It is necessary to sort out the content of the legislation so that at least the unconstitutional parts will be repealed. The Diet, especially the opposition camp, needs to play a vital role in this undertaking.

The Abe administration has maintained that the legislation is constitutional because it only allows Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defense in limited situations.

On the other hand, the administration has continued giving equivocal answers at the Diet to questions about the limits to the exercise of this right by Japan in an apparent attempt for the government to secure as much discretion as possible in assessing situations.

This will allow the government in power to interpret the scope of the limits in any manner it chooses.

The administration’s move to make it possible for Japan to engage in collective self-defense operations was prompted primarily by the challenge of countering the growing military power of China through enhancing the deterrence provided by Japan’s security alliance with the United States.

Here’s the idea behind the move. Japan needs to ensure that U.S. forces will maintain their presence in the Asia-Pacific region while compensating for the relative decline in U.S. military power by enhancing the SDF and expanding its security cooperation with other countries in the region.

The legislation is designed to allow the SDF to operate in wide areas outside Japan by eliminating a broad range of obstacles and impediments to the SDF’s joint operations with U.S. forces.
This approach can be likened to casting a wide net to catch as many fish in as wide an area as possible.

This means the SDF will expand its joint military drills, information sharing and cooperation concerning military equipment with the forces of the United States and other countries. Such efforts will be made not just during security emergencies but in peacetime as well.


The problem is that the administration, to achieve its security policy goals, has relaxed the restrictions that the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution had imposed on the SDF’s overseas operations.

At the end of February, the Commission on the Future of the Alliance, a study group comprising Japanese and American experts including Richard Armitage, a former U.S. deputy secretary of state, released a report titled “The U.S.-Japan Alliance to 2030.”

Stressing the importance for Tokyo and Washington to have a coordinated China strategy, the report urged Japan to “have fully funded, modern and highly capable military forces” and called on the two countries to “at least coordinate, and if possible integrate, their policies and actions elsewhere in Asia and beyond.”

This is a clear call for integrating the two nations’ security policy development and execution in all aspects, including defense budgeting.

But the national interests of the United States don’t necessarily coincide exactly with those of Japan with regard not only to how to respond to China’s rise but also to other key issues.

The question facing Japan is if it can decline any strong security policy request from the United States, which has a history of launching misguided wars.

Abe has said that Japan will make its own independent decisions as to whether it should exercise its right to collective self-defense. But will this be really possible for Japan when the effectiveness of Article 9 as a protection against the risk of becoming involved in overseas conflict has been seriously undermined?

Japan should be well aware of the fact that the United States, while wary about China’s military buildup, has been working eagerly to build sturdy multiple channels of dialogue with the country.

To protect its own peace, Japan should also pursue close dialogue and a broad range of cooperation with China.

The Abe administration, however, has been focusing its security policy efforts on bolstering Japan’s alliance with the United States, allowing erosion in the human interactions underpinning the bilateral ties with China.

Given Japan’s geographical proximity to China and the complicated and troubled history of their bilateral relations, the Japanese government needs to perform a delicate balancing act in dealing with its neighboring giant.

Japan should restrain itself from getting embroiled in U.S. military actions and stick to its traditional strictly defensive security policy to avoid an arms race with China. The functions of Article 9 can, and should, serve as a foundation for Japan’s efforts to strike a proper balance between deterrence and dialogue.


An Upper House election will be held this summer. Simultaneous polls of both chambers of the Diet appear to be in the cards.

In a move with significant political implications, the Abe administration has decided to postpone until after the Upper House poll some important new steps based on the security legislation. They include expanding the scope of Japan’s peacekeeping missions to allow SDF personnel to come to the assistance of members of U.N. and private-sector organizations and other countries’ troops who have come under attack during such operations. The administration has also delayed the introduction of a bill to revise Japan’s Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement with the United States to expand the SDF’s logistic support for U.S. forces.

The Abe administration is again concentrating its political energy on economic issues before a key election with a clear intention to shift the focus of its policy discourse to security topics after the poll. The administration adopted the same strategy for its initiatives to enact the state secrets protection law and the security legislation.

This time, too, the administration will try to push through the related measures all at once if the ruling camp is victorious in the election.

The Abe administration has taken a series of foreign and security policy measures aimed at concentrating power in the hands of the government. They include the enactment of the state secrets protection law and the creation of the National Security Council.

That has made it all the more important for the Diet to perform its function of checking the actions of the executive branch. But the Diet’s performance has been deeply disappointing.

The Diet has not even bothered to consider the joint opposition bill to repeal the security legislation or the counterproposals made by the opposition parties. This fact is a clear and undeniable sign that the Diet has become dysfunctional.

The opposition parties have a crucial mission to carry out. They need to expand electoral cooperation among themselves and strengthen their solidarity with citizens.

They also have to protect the nation’s constitutionalism and redress the “unconstitutional” legislation. The mission requires fresh and serious debate on the future of politics in this nation.


原発停止命令 国民の不安を直視せよ

2016-03-29 07:19:59 | 英字新聞

--The Asahi Shimbun, March 27
EDITORIAL: Nuclear power proponents still scoffing at public safety concerns
(社説)原発停止命令 国民の不安を直視せよ

An Otsu District Court injunction has suspended operations of two reactors at Kansai Electric Power Co.’s Takahama nuclear power plant in Fukui Prefecture, one of which was online.
Again, the significance of that development should be taken to heart.

Proponents of nuclear power, in particular, should squarely face up to the public anxiety that lies in the backdrop of the court decision.

But instead they are boiling with disgruntlement.

“Why is a single district court judge allowed to trip up the government’s energy policy?” Kazuo Sumi, a vice chairman of the Kansai Economic Federation, said resentfully.
“We could demand damages (from the residents who requested the injunction) if we were to win the case at a higher court,” Kansai Electric President Makoto Yagi said, although he prefaced his remark with a proviso that he is arguing only in general terms.

The government is maintaining a wait-and-see attitude.

The decision called into question the appropriateness of the Nuclear Regulation Authority’s new regulation standards and government-approved plans for evacuations in case of an emergency.

But NRA Chairman Shunichi Tanaka argued, “Our standards are nearing the world’s top level.”

And the government has no plans to review its emergency evacuation plans. It has only reiterated that it will “proceed with restarts of nuclear reactors in paying respect to NRA decisions.”

The Otsu decision is the third court order issued against the operation of nuclear reactors since the meltdowns five years ago at Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.

There has, in fact, been no fixed trend in court decisions. Another court rejected residents’ request last year for an injunction against reactor restarts at Kyushu Electric Power Co.’s Sendai nuclear plant in Kagoshima Prefecture.
But courts appear to be playing a more active role now than before the Fukushima disaster.

The nuclear proponents’ reactions reveal an underlying thinking: “The use of nuclear power is indispensable for Japan, which does not abound in energy resources. The government set up the NRA following the Fukushima disaster to increase expert control. Regional utilities have also taken safety enhancement measures. Courts are therefore asked not to meddle.”

But they should have a deeper understanding that this argument is no longer convincing to the public and court judges.

Some critics say the latest decision deviated from the 1992 Supreme Court ruling saying that decisions on the safety of nuclear plants should be made by administrative organs on the basis of expert opinions. But that argument is also off the mark.

The ruling, given in a case over Shikoku Electric Power Co.’s Ikata nuclear plant, certainly presented that point of view. But it also stated that the objective of safety regulations based on the Law on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors is to “make sure that no serious disaster will happen by any chance.”

A safety net, left in the hands of experts, collapsed all too easily during the Fukushima disaster, turning the phrase “by any chance” into reality.

Courts, which are the guardians of law, should rather be commended for trying to find out independently, to the extent that they can, if there is enough preparedness when a nuclear reactor will be restarted.

The latest alarm bell sounded by the judiciary sector provides an opportunity to ask once again why all the safety measures taken after the Fukushima nuclear disaster are still struggling to win the trust of the public.

The Fukushima disaster changed the awareness of the public. The judiciary sector was also affected.

It is high time for a change among nuclear proponents.


香山リカのココロの万華鏡: 「かさじぞう」になろう /東京

2016-03-28 07:22:34 | 英字新聞

March 27, 2016 (Mainichi Japan)
Kaleidoscope of the Heart: Recognizing others' kindness
香山リカのココロの万華鏡: 「かさじぞう」になろう /東京

I am often asked which types of people are likely to experience emotional disorders. Truthfully speaking, the answer is "anyone."

While even intransigent or unkind persons are sometimes known to experience depression, it is also true that a large number of the patients who visit my office could be characterized as people who are considerate and serious.

Despite feeling unwell and suffering from illness themselves, quite a few such persons often say thoughtful things to me such as, "You are looking a little pale. Are you feeling tired?"

I suppose that this is a tendency among kind people to go out of their way to do things for others, even if this means inconveniencing themselves -- and often using up all of their energy in the process.

Sometimes I struggle when thinking about this matter, since it would seem as if kindness is somehow a demerit, while those who think exclusively of themselves end up enjoying benefits.

To be sure, people who defiantly take an attitude of "I was not the one at fault" no matter what the situation at hand, and who consistently blame others without looking at themselves, likely never end up practicing self-reproach or facing exhaustion.

Faced with the question of whether one might like to live in a society where everyone thinks only of their own well-being, however, and acts accordingly, I would wager to guess that most people would answer negatively.

Small, thoughtful actions and consideration -- such as allowing others to pass in front of you on the street, or saying you are fine when asked how you are feeling to avoid causing others worry, even though you are actually feeling tired -- seem to help preserve the tranquility of everyday society.

So what can be done to avoid thoughtful people becoming hurt, as well as to make sure that persons who are deeply considerate of others do not become tired to the point of exhaustion?

In my view, the answer seems to lie in the act of someone recognizing this type of thoughtfulness -- and then saying something like "Thank you" or "Please don't push yourself" to the person who is exercising it.

In reality, however, people these days are so occupied with their own personal issues that they simply pretend not to notice the presence of an overly considerate person -- and many of them will even go as far as to use such persons for the purposes of their own personal benefit.

There is an old Japanese fable titled the "kasa jizou" -- "straw hat bodhisattva" -- which tells the story of an elderly couple who give their last straw hat to a bodhisattva statue to protect it from the snowy cold, and are later rewarded by a visit from the statue bearing gifts of food.
Through this tale, we understand that acts of kindness end up by eventually becoming rewarded. I wonder whether a modern-day version of this scenario exists, wherein people reward others by telling them, "I see your thoughtful actions."

While I try to do my own part by acting as a "straw hat bodhisattva" in my office, it is unfortunate that the people who come to me are already exhausted and facing conditions such as depression.

It is my great hope that you, too, will become a "straw hat bodhisattva" by speaking up and letting someone know that their kindness has not gone unnoticed.

(By Rika Kayama, psychiatrist) (精神科医)


伊方1号機廃炉 採算より40年ルールだ

2016-03-27 07:06:14 | 英字新聞

March 26, 2016 (Mainichi Japan)
Editorial: 40-year reactor life rule must prevail over profitability
伊方1号機廃炉 採算より40年ルールだ

Shikoku Electric Power Co. has decided to decommission the No. 1 reactor at the Ikata nuclear power complex in Ehime Prefecture, as the reactor will have been in operation 40 years come September next year.

In the wake of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant disaster, the government has set a new rule limiting the operational life of reactors to 40 years, in principle. An extension of up to 20 years can be granted by the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA). Ikata nuclear plant operator Shikoku Electric Power Co. had sought to have the No. 1 reactor's lifespan extended, but abandoned the idea after finding the enormous safety improvement costs would make it unprofitable to keep the reactor running.

Reactor pressure vessels are said to deteriorate in 40 years due to being bombarded by neutrons. From the viewpoint of ensuring nuclear plant safety, reactors over 40 years of age need to be decommissioned, regardless of their profitability. It is hoped that Shikoku Electric's decision will set a precedent for other power companies.

Five other reactors around the 40-year limit are already set to be decommissioned, including the No. 1 and 2 reactors at Kansai Electric Power Co.'s Mihama nuclear plant in Fukui Prefecture, and the No. 1 reactor at Kyushu Electric Power Co.'s Genkai nuclear station in Saga Prefecture -- decisions made in March last year. With the decommissioning of the Ikata plant's No. 1 reactor, the number of reactors in Japan will be reduced to 42.

The six reactors facing decommissioning are relatively small, with output in the 300,000 to 500,000 kilowatt range. More recent reactors can generate 1 million kilowatts each.

The decision over whether to decommission reactors is left up to each utility, and behind Kansai Electric and Kyushu Electric's decisions to decommission the aforementioned reactors also lay the issue of profitability. The smaller the output of a reactor is, the less profitable it is considering the massive cost of safety measures.

Meanwhile, Kansai Electric has applied to the NRA to extend the service life of the No. 1 and 2 reactors at the Takahama nuclear plant, and the No. 3 reactor at the Mihama plant, both in Fukui Prefecture. The utility decided that those reactors -- which can each generate about 800,000 kilowatts -- will be profitable enough even with the immense safety costs.

However, aging reactors are fraught with more problems than deteriorating pressure vessels. The longer it has been since a reactor entered operation, the fewer engineers there are who can pass down legacy technologies. Some experts point out that there is a limit to how much the safety of elderly reactors can be improved because their design concept itself is outdated. The question of decommissioning a reactor and its output and economic efficiency should be considered separately.

Furthermore, utilities face a host of other challenges to moving ahead with steady decommissioning.

First and foremost, the final disposal site for the colossal amount of radioactive waste that will be generated by dismantling reactors has yet to be decided. There are not even regulatory standards for disposing of the severely contaminated inner components of reactors.

It is also imperative to secure storage locations for spent nuclear fuel generated by nuclear plants. Under the government's nuclear fuel cycle policy, spent fuel had been destined for the reprocessing plant in Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture. However, the plant is under safety review by the NRA, and there is no prospect of it becoming operational anytime soon.

Power companies and the government need to overcome these challenges.

Reactor decommissioning seriously affects regional economies and the finances of local governments dependent on nuclear plant hosting subsidies.  廃炉は、原発関連の交付金などに頼ってきた地元自治体の財政や地域経済にも大きく影響する。

The central government's support is indispensable in associating the decommissioning business with regional revitalization, among other measures.