China offered Gadhafi huge stockpiles of arms: Libyan memos （２０１１．９．７）
China offered huge stockpiles of weapons to Colonel Moammar Gadhafi during the final months of his regime, according to papers that describe secret talks about shipments via Algeria and South Africa.
Documents obtained by The Globe and Mail show that state-controlled Chinese arms manufacturers were prepared to sell weapons and ammunition worth at least $200-million to the embattled Col. Gadhafi in late July, a violation of United Nations sanctions.
Gadhafi vows no surrender in Libya The documents suggest that Beijing and other governments may have played a double game in the Libyan war, claiming neutrality but covertly helping the dictator. The papers do not confirm whether any military assistance was delivered, but senior leaders of the new transitional government in Tripoli say the documents reinforce their suspicions about the recent actions of China, Algeria and South Africa. Those countries may now suffer a disadvantage as Libya’s new rulers divide the spoils from their vast energy resources, and select foreign firms for the country’s reconstruction.
Omar Hariri, chief of the transitional council’s military committee, reviewed the documents and concluded that they explain the presence of brand-new weapons his men encountered on the battlefield. He expressed outrage that the Chinese were negotiating an arms deal even while his forces suffered heavy casualties in the slow grind toward Tripoli.
“I’m almost certain that these guns arrived and were used against our people,” Mr. Hariri said.
Senior rebel officials confirmed the authenticity of the four-page memo, written in formal style on the green eagle letterhead used by a government department known as the Supply Authority, which deals with procurement. The Globe and Mail found identical letterhead in the Tripoli offices of that department. The memo was discovered in a pile of trash sitting at the curb in a neighbourhood known as Bab Akkarah, where several of Col. Gadhafi’s most loyal supporters had lavish homes.
The document reports in detail about a trip by Col. Gadhafi’s security officials from Tripoli to Beijing. They arrived on July 16, and in the following days they met with officials from three state-controlled weapons manufacturers: China North Industries Corp. (Norinco); the China National Precision Machinery Import & Export Corp. (CPMIC); and China XinXing Import & Export Corp. The Chinese companies offered the entire contents of their stockpiles for sale, and promised to manufacture more supplies if necessary.
The hosts thanked the Libyans for their discretion, emphasized the need for confidentiality, and recommended delivery via third parties.
“The companies suggest that they make the contracts with either Algeria or South Africa, because those countries previously worked with China,” the memo says.
The Chinese companies also noted that many of the items the Libyan delegation requested were already held in the arsenals of the Algerian military, and could be transported immediately across the border; the Chinese said they could replenish the Algerian stocks afterward. The memo also indicated that Algeria had not yet consented to such an arrangement, and proposed further talks at the branch offices of the Chinese companies in Algiers.
Appendices stapled to the memo, and scattered nearby, show the deadly items under discussion: truck-mounted rocket launchers; fuel-air explosive missiles; and anti-tank missiles, among others. Perhaps most controversially, the Chinese apparently offered Col. Gadhafi’s men the QW-18, a surface-to-air missile small enough for a soldier to carry on his shoulder – roughly similar to a U.S. Stinger, capable of bringing down some military aircraft.
Government spokespeople in Beijing, Algiers and Pretoria either declined to comment or could not be reached on Friday. E-mails sent to two Chinese arms manufacturers were not answered.
The three governments have been reluctant to endorse NATO’s actions in Libya, but claimed to support the arms embargo. Before abstaining from the UN resolution that authorized “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, China approved an earlier decision, Resolution 1970, that banned all military assistance to Tripoli. At the time, China’s representative at the United Nations said the “bloodshed and civilian casualties” were part of the “special circumstances” that prompted his country to vote in favour of the sanctions. South Africa also endorsed the sanctions, saying they would send a message that the Libyan regime should stop its indiscriminate use of force.
Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci issued a statement on Thursday, saying that his country had “resolutely applied” the terms of UN resolutions, and complaining about widespread rumours to the contrary.
“The truth of Algeria’s behaviour will be revealed,” Mr. Medelci said.
A possible justification for any state caught supplying weapons to Col. Gadhafi would be that NATO, and other sponsors of the Libyan rebels, were funnelling arms to the opposite side of the conflict. Trucks filled with war supplies rolled across the Egyptian border for rebels in the east, and France confirmed that it dropped weapons – including Milan anti-tank missiles – into the hands of rebels in the mountains of the western front.
Those supplies for the rebels were not prohibited by Resolution 1970, however; the embargo referred specifically to the “Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” or Libyan government.
“About the ‘Oh, NATO did it too!’ defence, I don’t think it holds,” said Shashank Joshi, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a defence think tank.
Arms embargoes are usually monitored by panels of experts appointed by the United Nations. George Lopez, a professor at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies who recently served on such a panel, said that proof of a violation typically requires a bill of lading or other documentation to show that weapons changed hands.
If anybody strikes a deal that breaks the rules, however, it may also qualify as a sanctions violation.
“The willingness to assent to the deal is all that is needed,” Mr. Lopez said.
Given the difficulty of punishing UN embargo breaches, it seems likely that the more important consequences for the countries involved – China and Algeria in particular – will be their tarnished reputations in Tripoli.
Now that Col. Gadhafi has lost power, the Chinese appear to fear, with some justification, that they could lose their foothold in the Libyan oil fields.
“Oil is a basis for war, and oil was the fundamental interest behind the war,” wrote the Chinese media group Caixin in a recent commentary.
A senior official at the Arabian Gulf Oil Co., in Benghazi, told The Globe and Mail last month that he would be reluctant to do business with Chinese companies in future because of their government’s stand against the rebellion.
While a diplomatic quarrel between China and Libya may have significant economic implications, the tensions along the Algerian border may prove more troublesome from a security standpoint. Many Libyans already feel outraged by the fact that Col. Gadhafi’s wife and three children escaped into Algeria last week, and a rebel commander suggested that his men might pursue them into Algerian territory.
At the beginning of the uprising, rebels used radar installations at Benina Airport, near Benghazi, to track suspicious aircraft travelling between Algeria and the loyalist strongholds of Sabha and Surt. They recorded details for several flights by giant C-130 Hercules and Ilyushin Il-76 transport planes, bearing registration codes used by the Algerian military.
“Now we know what was inside those planes,” said Mohammed Sayeh, a member of the National Transitional Council. “That is why it took the Libyan people such a long time to get rid of the dictator, because they were fighting against the mercenaries and machinery provided by our neighbours.”
The new leadership in Tripoli seems acutely aware, however, that Libya needs peace with the neighbours during this shaky moment of transition. Having seized control of the capital, the rebels have not yet secured some of the remote desert towns that remain dangerously close to the Algerian border. Even while criticizing Algiers for its role in the war, Mr. Hariri referred to the Algerians as “brothers;” Mr. Sayeh emphasized that the new government must forge good relations with all countries, regardless of their history.
“We will start a new era,” Mr. Sayeh said. “We will forgive them, but we will not forget.”
Battle-hardened fighters seem less inclined to forgive. The authoritarian regime in Algiers now finds itself uncomfortably close to two North African countries that have overthrown their dictators, which could offer staging grounds for dissidents. Salaheldin Badi, a former pilot who commands one of the Misrata brigades that rushed into Tripoli last month, hinted that his men might be willing to let their revolutionary fervour spill across the border.
“Algeria played an important role, helping Gadhafi get his Chinese weapons,” Mr. Badi said. “That’s okay,” he added, with a mischievous grin, “because we will send weapons back for the revolutions in their countries.”
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抄訳と解説
中国がリビアのカダフィ政権に巨額武器援助、中国側は密約を否定（2011年9月9日）
カダフィ側近の治安担当者の住宅から、ＮＡＴＩＯ軍が発見した秘密文書によると、
カダフィ大佐の治安担当者は、7月16日、トリポリから北京へ向かい、中国武器関連3社の社員と協議した。
中国側３社とは、北部産業社(Norinco)、 国家機械貿易社(CPMIC)、兵器輸出入社（XinXing ImportとExport）である。中国３社は、在庫のある兵器を、リビアに２億ドル相当分を輸出すると約束した。
極秘文書によると、中国側３企業とリビア政府は、武器取引の秘密保持のため、中国は、アルジェリアか南アフリカのいずれかの企業を経由してリビアに輸出するとの契約を作ることで合意した。
アルジェリアは、中国とリビアの武器取引の仲介を承諾しなかったため、南アフリカの中国系企業とリビア政府との取引に偽装し、中国からリビアに武器が輸出された。
極秘文書に記載された取引は、次のとおりである。
（１） トラックから発射できるロケット砲とミサイル。
（２）対戦車小型ミサイル（QW-18地対空ミサイル）。
南アフリカ政府は、リビアと中国に、ＮＡＴＯに屈服したのではないが、国連決議に従って、リビアと中国との武器取引には関与しないし、また、リビア政府は国内の武器使用をやめるべきことを、リビアに通告したが、武器の輸出以後のことであった。
カダフィ大佐の妻子がアルジェリアに逃亡した時、リビアの反政府勢力が、アルジェリアの反政府運動と結びつく気配があり、リビアの反政府勢力がアルジェリアまでの航空機を追跡できる能力があること、つまり、リビアの反政府勢力がアルジェリアを空爆する能力があることが明白になったから、表向き、アルジェリアは、中国からアルジェリアへの武器輸出の中継を否定した。
中国政府も、直接間接にリビアのカダフィ政権に武器輸出したことはない、と語っている。
フランス製兵器については、また、中国製兵器とは別の話になる。
アルジェリア経由でフランス製兵器が、リビア反政府軍に供給されることには、ＮＡＴＯは黙認している。そのため、理論的には、アルジェリア政府の反対にもかかわらず、アルジェリアの中国系企業がリビア政府軍に、中国製かフランス製の武器を供給することは、あり得ることである。
しかし、リビアのガダフィ政権が国内の政治基盤を失った今、中国はリビア産原油の利権を失うことを警戒して、カダフィに武器を輸出をしても、無駄に終わるかもしれない。
もし、リビアの反政府勢力が強くなると、中国はリビアの原油に関しての利権を完全に失い、武器輸出代金さえも得られない恐れもある。将来、リビアと中国の深刻な外交問題に発展するかもしれない。
リビアの反政府勢力は、かつてアルジェリアと国境争いはあったが、カダフィ政権崩壊後には、リビアとアルジェリアは平和的関係を築かなくてはならないと言明した。このことも、中国のカダフィ大佐への武器供給を困難にしている。
今後、中国製の武器・兵器が第3国経由でリビアのカダフィ政権に輸出されることはない。リビアの原油と中国の兵器のバーターは困難になった。中国の資源外交・アフリカ外交の失敗となるであろう。中国の資源外交としての発展途上国援助は、見直されることは必死である。
